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http://www.archive.org/details/immediatecauseso01chit 



THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES 

OF 

THE GREAT WAR 



BY 

OLIVER PERRY CHITWOOD 

Professor of European History West Virginia University 



NEW YORK 

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 



Hi 
.Cs 



Copyright, 1917 
By OLIVER PERRY CHITWOOD 



MAY 14 1317 



, CI,A460794 



PREFACE 

The object of this volume is to narrate briefly 
the direct causes of the European war as they 
are given in the published documents of the bel- 
ligerents. These sources are abundantly ade- 
quate for determining the immediate respon- 
sibility of each nation and apportioning the 
guilt for this great crime. It may be thought 
that, inasmuch as each government in publish- 
ing its official correspondence, has tried to con- 
vict its enemies and clear itself and its allies, 
the statements made are so biased as not to be 
accepted as evidence. This, however, is not the 
case. The documents corroborate each other 
sufficiently to show that statements of fact given 
in official despatches by ambassadors to foreign 
ministers and vice versa can usually be accepted 
at face value. The numerous cross-references 
in the published correspondence enable us some- 
times to detect false claims based on the omis- 
sion, misinterpretation, or even the distortion 



iv Preface 

of facts. Some discrepancies, however, are ir- 
reducible, and where such occur, the evidence 
presented by both sides is given. 

In Chapter I, I have not attempted a gen- 
eral discussion of the indirect causes of the war, 
but have only tried to restate some well-known 
facts that constitute the background of the great 
conflict. For the information contained in this 
chapter I am indebted to the following works: 
Europe since 1815, by Charles Downer Hazen; 
The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, by Ellery 
C. Stowell; A Political and Social History of 
Modern Europe, by Carlton J. H. Hayes; and 
the International Year Booh. 

The rest of the work, except a few pages, is 
written entirely from the documents given out 
by the various belligerents. The principal col- 
lections of official papers used are the follow- 
ing: The translations made by the Neiv York 
Times and other documents published by the 
American Association for International Con- 
ciliation; Diplomatic Documents Relating to the 
Outbreak of the European War, edited by James 
Brown Scott and published under the auspices 
of the Carnegie Endowment for International 



Preface v 

Peace; Collected Diplomatic Documents Relat- 
ing to the Outbreak of the European War and 
Miscellaneous Correspondence, printed under 
the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1915; and the Austro-Hungarian Red Booh, 
official English translation. 

In presenting this digest of the source ma- 
terial on the causes of the war, my aim is not to 
argue the case, but only to give and systematize 
the evidence — not all the evidence on all the 
points, but only adequate evidence on the main 
points. 

I want to acknowledge my indebtedness to 
Professors Charles Downer Hazen and Carlton 
J. H. Hayes of Columbia University, and Frank 
Maloy Anderson, of Dartmouth College, for the 
very valuable suggestions and criticisms that 
they have kindly offered. My thanks are also 
due to my colleagues, Professor David Dale 
Johnson of the English department, and Dean 
James M. Callahan, head of the department of 
history, who have read portions of my manu- 
script and have made helpful suggestions and 
criticisms. 

Inasmuch as so many books have already been 



vi Preface 

written on the causes of the war, I feel that I 
should offer an explanation, if not an apology, 
for adding to the list even a small volume. My 
only excuse for so doing is the hope that a brief 
work will prove useful to college students and 
others who do not have time to read the fuller 
accounts. My own experience as a teacher of 
current European history has caused me to feel 
the need of such a work. 

0. P. Chitwood. 
West Virginia University, 
April, 1917. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Chapter I. Some Indirect Causes of the 
War. 

The Concert of Europe 1-4 

The Triple Alliance 4-7 

The Dual Alliance 7-8 

The Triple Entente 8-12 

Morocco as a cause of friction 12- 16 

The Near Eastern question 16- 31 

Rise of the Christian States in the Balkans . 16- 25 

The Balkan Wars 25-31 

Chapter II. The Assassination op Francis 
Ferdinand. 

The assassination of the Crown Prince and his 

wife at Sarajevo 32 

Significance of the crime . . . . . . . 32- 33 

Attitude of the people and press in Serbia to- 
ward the crime 33- 37 

Attitude of Austro-Hungarian press . . . 37- 38 
Serbia's delay in instituting trial of Serbian 

accomplices 38- 39 

Serbian officials implicated in the crime . . 39- 40 

Chapter III. The Austro-Hungarian Note to 
Serbia. 

Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia, July 

23, 1914 41 

Surprise of the Entente powers at the nature of 

the demands 41- 42 

vii 



viii Table of Contents 

PAGE 

Contents of the note 42-46 

Austria's case against Serbia 46- 50 

Responsibility of Germany for the Austrian 

note 50-52 

The demands of Austria considered unreason- 
able by Serbia 52- 53 

Opinion of other powers regarding these de- 
mands 53- 54 

Attitude of powers toward isolation of the 

quarrel 54- 57 

Shortness of the time limit . 57- 59 

Chapter IV. Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

The Austrian note defined as a demarche and 

not an ultimatum 60 

Serbia advised to send a conciliatory reply to 

Austrian note by Entente powers . . . 60- 62 

Contents of Serbian note ...:... 62- 67 

Opinion of Entente powers regarding Serbian 

concessions 67- 68 

Serbian reply not acceptable to Austria-Hun- 
gary .' 68- 70 

Diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary 

and Serbia broken off 69 

Chapter V. Efforts to Prevent War. 

The problem confronting European diplomacy . 71- 73 

Germany's plan for solving it 73- 74 

Joint mediation between Serbia and Austria 

favored by Sir Edward Grey . . . . 74— 75 

Italy's plan for preventing war 75- 78 

Austria asked to take a favorable view of Ser- 
bian reply 78- 79 

Joint mediation between Austria and Serbia 

proposed 79- 82 



Table of Contents ix 

PAGE 

Direct negotiations between Russia and Austria- 
Hungary 81-82 

Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia 83 

Chapter VI. Efforts to Isolate the War. 

A general war not desired by the powers . . 84- 85 
Russia's determination to protect Serbia . . 85- 86 
Russia's! dissatisfaction with Austrian assur- 
ances as to the integrity and independence 

of Serbia 86-89 

Sir Edward Grey's proposal for joint mediation 

renewed 89- 93 

Mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia 

accepted by the former 91- 93 

Chapter VII. The War Area Broadens. 

Russian mobilization 94— 99 

Germany's and Austria-Hungary's declarations 

of war on Russia . 99 

France's obligations to Russia 99-100 

French and German mobilization .... 99-100 
Inquiry as to the attitude of France toward a 
possible conflict between Germany and Rus- 
sia 100-101 

Germany's declaration of war on France . . 101 

Montenegro enters the war . . . . . . 101 

Chapter VIII. Great Britain Declares War 
on the Teutonic Powers. 

Great Britain interested in Austro-Serbian dis- 
pute only insofar as it affects the peace of 
Europe 102-103 

Her refusal to join Russia and France in a 

threat against Austria-Hungary . . . 103-104 

Germany's first bid for British neutrality . . 104-105 

Britain's refusal to pledge support to France 105-107 



x Table of Contents 

PAGE 

Anxiety of British foreign minister that the 

quarrel be settled by mediation .... 105-107 
Answer of France and Germany as to Belgian 

neutrality 107 

Germany's effort to secure neutrality of France 107-111 
Germany's second bid for British neutrality . 111-112 
Sir Edward Grey's offer to France of the aid 
of the British navy if French coast is at- 
tacked 112-115 

Belgian neutrality violated by Germany . . 115-116 
Last interview between the British ambassador 

and the German chancellor 116-120 

Great Britain at war with Germany and Aus- 
tria-Hungary . 120 

Neutrality of Luxemburg violated .... 120-121 

Chapter IX. The Violation - op the Neutral- 
ity op Belgium. 
Neutralization of Belgium in 1839 .... 122-124 
Germany's obligation to uphold neutrality of 

Belgium 124-126 

Belgium's announcement of her neutrality . . 126 

Germany's request for permission to go through 

Belgium 126-128 

Belgium's refusal 128-129 

Belgium invaded by German troops .... 129-130 
Great Britain's offer to aid Belgium in uphold- 
ing her neutrality 130-131 

The charge that Belgium had violated her neu- 
trality prior to 1914 131-140 

Chapter X. Japan and Turkey Drawn into 
the Conflict. 

Entrance of Japan into the war 141-145 

Entrance of Turkey into the war 145-156 

Requisition of Turkish warships by British 
government 145-146 



Table of Contents xi 

PAGE 

Mobilization by Turkey — ber announcement 

of a policy of neutrality 146-148 

Two German warships sheltered in the Dar- 
danelles 147-148 

Terms offered by the Entente for Turkish 

neutrality 149-152 

The Capitulations abolished by Ottoman gov- 
ernment 152 

The closing of the Dardanelles 153 

Turkish military preparations against Egypt 153-155 

Sinking of Entente vessels in Odessa harbor 
by Turkish torpedo boats 155-156 

Negotiations with Turkey broken off by the 

Entente powers 156 

Chapter XL Italy Enters the War. 

Peace moves favored by Italy 157 

Italy's refusal to aid her allies 158 

The question of compensation to Italy for Aus- 
trian invasion of Serbia 158-162 

Italy's request for Austro-Hungarian territory 162-166 
Immediate transfer of ceded territory demanded 

by Italy 165-168 

Terms of Italy's proposal 168-170 

Austria-Hungary's answer 170-172 

Italy's withdrawal from the Triple Alliance . 172-173 

Final offer of Austria-Hungary 173-176 

Italy's declaration of war against her former 

allies 177 

Chapter XII. The Lesser Belligerents. 

Bulgaria's support won by Teutonic allies . . 178-181 
Declaration of war against Portugal by the Cen- 
tral Powers 181-183 

Entrance of Rumania into the war .... 183-184 

Conclusions 185-191 

Index 192-196 



ABBREVIATIONS 



A.R.B. ... 
A.R.B. (2) 
B.C. (13) 

B.C. (14) 

B.G.B. ... 
B.G.B. (2) 
B.W.P. . . 
Col. Doe. 



F.Y.B. ... 
G.W.B. .. 
I.G.B. . . . 
R.O.B. . . . 
R.O.B. (2) 
S.B.B. ... 
S 



References are 
indicated. 



Austro-Hungarian Red Book (No. 1). 

Austro-Hungarian Red Book ( No. 2 ) . 

British Correspondence, Miscellaneous, 
No. 13 (1914). 

British Correspondence, Miscellaneous, 
No. 14 (1914). 

Belgian Grey Book (No. 1). 

Belgian Grey Book (No. 2). 

British White Paper. 

Collected Diplomatic Documents Relat- 
ing to the Outbreak of the European 
War, printed under the authority of 
His Majesty's Stationery Office. 

French Yellow Book. 

German White Book. 

Italian Green Book. 

Russian Orange Book (No. 1). 

Russian Orange Book (No. 2). 

Serbian Blue Book. 

Diplomatic Documents Relating to the 
Outbreak of the European War, edited 
by James Brown Scott and published 
under the auspices of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 
to numbers except where page references are 



THE CAUSES OF THE 
EUROPEAN WAR 

CHAPTEE I 

SOME INDIRECT CAUSES OF THE WAR 

During the greater part of the first decade 
and a half of the nineteenth century, the great 
powers of Europe were united in an effort to 
curb the imperial ambitions of Napoleon. 
After years of useless war, Napoleon was sent 
to a deserved exile, and the balance of power 
was restored in Europe. A peace congress was 
then held at Vienna (1814-15), and the map of 
Europe was rearranged. Europe was sick of 
war and was anxious for an agreement whereby 
the nations would be forced to keep the peace. 
In November, 1815, therefore, the Allies — Eng- 
land, Prussia, Eussia, and Austria — concluded 
a quadruple alliance, pledging themselves to the 
preservation of "public peace, the tranquillity 
of states, the inviolability of possessions, and 
the faith of treaties. ' ' For the next eight years, 
European congresses were held from time to 

l 



2 The Causes of the European War 

time to enforce this policy. France, too, took 
part in these meetings, and so there was in ef- 
fect a sort of league to enforce peace. This 
league included all the great powers of Europe, 
and is known as the Concert of Europe. 

The Concert subsequently declared in favor 
of intervention to put down insurrections in the 
various states of Europe, and carried out this 
policy by sending troops to stamp out revolu- 
tions in Spain and Italy. Great Britain dis- 
sented from this interpretation of the treaty of 
alliance and so dropped out of the Concert. 
Therefore, the Concert, in so far as it rested 
on formal engagements, did not last many years. 
There has been a feeling, however, during the 
entire century following the Congress of Vienna 
that certain questions are of interest to all 
Europe and should be settled only by joint 
agreement of the powers. Such joint action 
has been taken occasionally, and in a sense the 
Concert of Europe continued until the outbreak 
of the war in 1914. 

This important experiment in international- 
ism was neither a complete success nor an en- 
tire failure. The great aim of maintaining 
peace in Europe was not realized, but some prog- 
ress toward world peace was probably made. 
Peace conferences were held, and the principles 
of international law were expounded. The fact 
that only four wars (and most of these short 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 3 

ones) were fought between great European 
powers during this century-long period is evi- 
dence in favor of the partial success of this 
peace experiment. 

The Concert might have accomplished its pur- 
poses more completely but for certain mistakes 
made in the early years while it was dominated 
by a reactionary royalist, Prince Metternich. 
During this period it ignored two powerful 
forces — the spirit of nationalism and the spirit 
of liberalism. In some sections of Europe (not- 
ably in Germany, in the Habsburg Empire, and 
in the Italian and Balkan peninsulas) there was 
a growing demand for a change in political 
boundaries in the interest of racial and linguis- 
tic unity; Metternich opposed all these aspira- 
tions and insisted on the maintenance of the 
status quo regardless of national feeling. The 
people all over Europe were clamoring more 
and more for a voice in the government of 
themselves; Metternich 's policy was one of 
rigid adherence to the autocracy of the old 
regime. Thus nationalism was allied with 
liberalism; internationalism, with despotism. 
Nationalism was progressive ; internationalism, 
reactionary. Nationalism was going with the 
current ; internationalism was pulling against it. 
Nationalism was supported by patriotism; in- 
ternationalism by pacificism. In the struggle 
between these two ideals, the advantage, though 



4 The Causes of the European War 

not altogether the right, was with nationalism. 
The result was a complete triumph for national- 
ism and the eclipse (temporary it is to be 
hoped) of internationalism. A triumphant, un- 
disciplined nationalism is in large part respon- 
sible for the war of 1914. If internationalism 
had in the beginning joined forces with democ- 
racy instead of autocracy and had made rea- 
sonable concessions to nationalism and thus 
neutralized patriotism, she might have tri- 
umphed instead of her opponent. If such had 
been the result, the summer of 1914 might have 
ushered in an era of world peace instead of one 
of world war. 

The Franco-German War was ended by the 
Treaty of Frankfort, signed in 1871. One of 
the provisions of this treaty was that Alsace and 
a part of Lorraine should be ceded to Germany. 
The loss of these provinces was a great humilia- 
tion to France. When the proposed treaty was 
brought before the French assembly for ratifica- 
tion, it is said that the members broke down and 
wept over the clause that compelled them to sac- 
rifice a portion of their country's territory. 
The French people have never allowed this feel- 
ing to die out, but on the contrary have been 
nursing it to keep it warm. They have re- 
garded Alsace and Lorraine as lost provinces, 
and have kept the statue in Paris representing 
Strasburg (in Alsace) draped in mourning. 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 5 

Bismarck realized that this feeling would lead 
France into another war with Germany unless 
he could continue to keep the odds against her. 
After 1871 he did not want war ; he preferred a 
period of peace for the internal development of 
the newly-created empire. Besides, he thought 
it would not be safe to subject united Germany 
to the strain of another war until the cement 
that held the members of the union together 
had had time to dry. His policy, therefore, was 
to isolate France and thus deprive her of all 
hope of success in a war with Germany. To 
this end he approached Austria and Eussia with 
a view to allying them with Prussia. Since the 
war of 1866, he had maintained a very friendly 
attitude toward Austria. He had also in 1863 
offered the Tsar of Eussia aid in putting down 
the Polish revolt and had thereby won his last- 
ing gratitude. Conditions being thus favorable, 
he was able to bring the rulers of Austria, Ger- 
many, and Eussia together in Berlin (1872) and 
the Three Emperors' League was the result. 
It was not an alliance but apparently an in- 
formal understanding. 

The success and permanence of this league 
was endangered by the rivalry of Austria and 
Eussia in the Balkans. This rivalry became 
acute at the time of the Berlin Congress (1878). 
Eussia had, without the aid of the great powers, 
concluded a successful and righteous war with 



6 The Causes of the European War 

Turkey and forced her to sign the treaty of San 
Stefano. By the terms of this treaty Turkey 
was left with only a strip of territory in Eu- 
rope, and Russia was put in a favorable position 
with reference to the Balkan states. Great 
Britain and Austria-Hungary protested against 
this settlement of the Balkan question, and a 
European congress was held at Berlin to revise 
the treaty of San Stefano. The decision of the 
powers was a diplomatic victory for Austria- 
Hungary and a defeat for Russia. Bismarck 
supported Austria-Hungary's demands in the 
congress and thereby strengthened the cordial 
feeling existing between his country and Aus- 
tria-Hungary but at the same time incurred the 
ill-will of Russia. The Three Emperors' 
League now fell into abeyance though Russia 
did not formally withdraw until about the mid- 
dle of the next decade. 

Bismarck, feeling that he would have now to 
count on the possible enmity rather than on 
the friendship of Russia, decided to draw more 
closely to Austria-Hungary. In 1879 Germany 
and Austria formed a defensive alliance against 
Russia. The treaty provided that if "one of 
the two Empires were to be attacked by Russia, 
the two contracting parties are bound to lend 
each other reciprocal aid with the whole of their 
imperial military power, and, subsequently, to 
conclude no peace except conjointly and in 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 7 

agreement." If one of the contracting parties 
should be attacked by any power other than 
Eussia this mutual obligation was to be bind- 
ing only in case the attacking power were " up- 
held by Eussia. ' ' * 

Italy became a party to the alliance in 1882. 
To take this step Italy had to suspend a deep- 
seated historic enmity toward Austria, for this 
power had frequently thwarted efforts on the 
part of the Italian people to liberate and unify 
the peninsula. Besides, she still held the 
Italian-speaking districts of Trieste and Trent, 
which Italy coveted. One reason for her tak- 
ing this unnatural step was that she was ambi- 
tious to play the role of a great power and was 
angered at France for having taken Tunis 
(1881), because she had picked out this region 
as a suitable field for Italian occupation. 

The league of the three powers was known as 
the Triple Alliance. It was made for a definite 
period, and has been renewed from time to time. 
Italy did not formally withdraw from it until 
May, 1915. The text of the treaties between 
Italy and the Teutonic powers has never been 
published in full, but it is thought that these 
treaties embody substantially the same engage- 
ments as those of the Austro-German alliance. 

Bismarck had thus succeeded in his policy of 

i For the whole treaty, see Stowell, The Diplomacy of the 
War of 1914, 540-41. 



8 The Causes of the European War 

isolating France. But this period of isolation 
ended in 1891, when France and Eussia formed 
the Dual Alliance. The terms of the agreement 
have not been made public, but apparently there 
are binding engagements as to joint action in 
certain international situations. In July, 1914, 
the French ambassador at Berlin told Von 
Jagow, German secretary of state, that 
France's obligations to Eussia were as binding 
as those of Germany to Austria. 2 

The formation of the Triple Alliance and the 
Dual Alliance had divided Europe into two 
hostile camps. Great Britain for a while stood 
aside in isolation, maintaining a policy of neu- 
trality toward both groups. She thus had the 
power of tipping the scales in favor of the side 
to which she might throw her support. There 
were causes of friction between Great Britain 
and members of both groups, and she might at 
any time give up her position of neutrality and 
identify herself with one side or the other. 

The friendship that Bismarck had cultivated 
between Germany and Great Britain began to 
wane in the 'nineties. The Conservative party, 
which ruled England from 1895 to 1905, favored 
imperialism and a strong foreign policy. In 
the meantime, Germany too had entered upon a 
policy of industrial development and colonial 

2 f. Y. B., 74. 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 9 

expansion. She was also building a large navy 
and this caused Britain to increase her naval 
strength. As a result of these imperialistic 
ambitions a feeling arose in both countries that 
the interests of Germany conflicted with those 
of Britain. Jealousy and suspicion now took 
the place of the friendship and confidence that 
formerly existed between these two great kin- 
dred peoples. It was thought by many Eng- 
lishmen that Germany had "an ambition to de- 
prive their country of her maritime supremacy 
and to rule the world." On the other hand, the 
charge was made in Germany that England was 
trying to isolate her and thus prevent her from 
playing an important part in world politics. 
These unsatisfactory relations were aggravated 
by Germany's attitude toward the Boer struggle 
with the British (1899-1902). "The British 
were especially aroused by the more or less open 
favor and sympathy which the emperor and 
official classes of Germany showed to the 
Boers." 3 

Great Britain's relations with the rivals of 
the Triple Alliance had also been characterized 
by friction. She had for a long time opposed 
Russia's ambitions in the Balkans. Eussian 
and British interests had also clashed in Persia, 
Afghanistan, and China. Russia had joined 

s Hayes, Political and Social History of Modern Europe, II, 
700-701. 



10 The Causes of the European War 

France in the Dual Alliance largely on account 
of England's opposition to her, and Great 
Britain had allied herself with Japan because 
of the fear of Russian aggression in the far 
East. 

Great Britain and France were also still rivals 
at the end of the nineteenth century. Conflict- 
ing ambitions as to certain parts of Africa were 
the main cause of friction. In 1879 they had 
intervened jointly in Egypt in the interest of 
English and French creditors. When a rebel- 
lion broke out in 1882, France declined to aid 
Great Britain in its suppression. The latter 
was thus left in sole control of the country, 
though France objected to Britain's position 
in the province. Later (1898), the Egyptian 
Sudan was brought under the authority of the 
English Government. Britain's progress south- 
ward conflicted with the ambition of France to 
expand eastward from the Congo. France de- 
sired to control the whole Sudan from the west- 
ern coast to the Abyssinian region in the east. 
In furtherance of this plan, Captain Marchand 
in 1898 led an expedition from the French 
Congo eastward and took possession of a little 
island, Fashoda, in the upper Nile region. As 
Fashoda was in territory that Great Britain 
had staked off for herself, its occupation by the 
French aroused great excitement among the 
English people. General Kitchener was sent 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 11 

south from Khartum and war seemed inevitable. 
Happily, France yielded and the incident was 
closed by an agreement between the two coun- 
tries in 1899. 

In the midst of her trouble with Great Britain, 
the French Government called to its foreign of- 
fice in 1898 Theophile Delcasse, one of the ablest 
diplomats of the modern period. His great am- 
bition, it is thought, was to recover for his coun- 
try Alsace and Lorraine. Such an ambition 
could be realized only on condition that France 
could count on the aid or at least the neutrality 
of some country other than Russia. It may have 
been this aim that led him to cultivate friendly 
relations with Great Britain. His advances 
were kindly received by the British Government 
and King Edward VII used his influence in 
favor of an understanding between his country 
and France. The result of these efforts was a 
treaty of mutual understanding between the two 
countries, signed in 1904. By this treaty Eng- 
land was for the future to be unhampered in 
Egypt, France was given a free hand in Mo- 
rocco, and other points at issue between them 
were settled. All causes of friction now being 
removed, there gradually developed during the 
decade of 1904—1914 " particularly friendly re- 
lations between the peoples and governments of 
France and Great Britain." 4 The mutual un- 

^Hayea, II, 702. 



12 The Ccmses of the Europecm War 

derstanding growing out of this friendship is 
known as the Entente Cordiale. 

In the meantime, Eussia had been badly de- 
feated by Japan in the war of 1904-05. Eus- 
sia 's weakness was revealed to such an extent 
that the English people became less afraid of 
her. Besides, Great Britain had come to re- 
gard Germany as the "most powerful nation on 
the Continent, and her most active rival for the 
world's commerce." 5 Her fears had also been 
aroused by the rapid growth of Germany's navy 
and merchant marine. The time was thus ripe 
for an understanding between Britain and Eus- 
sia, and so in 1907 these two powers came to 
agreements settling all disputes as to their re- 
lations with Persia and Afghanistan. These 
agreements " practically transformed the En- 
tente Cordiale between France and Great 
Britain into the Triple Entente between Eussia, 
France, and Great Britain." 6 It was never a 
formal alliance, but was a kind of "gentlemen's 
agreement." Japan was already in alliance 
with Great Britain. In 1910 she and Eussia 
came to an understanding regarding Manchuria. 
So Japan had virtually ranged herself on the 
side of the Entente. 

Germany was in favor of the "open-door" 
policy with reference to Morocco and was Op- 
es Stowell, 17. 
e Hayes, II, 702. 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 13 

posed to the arrangement provided for by the 
agreement of 1904 between Great Britain and 
France. She did not, however, protest against 
this arrangement, probably because she felt that 
the odds against her were too strong for her to 
risk a war; but in the next year, after Russia 
had suffered great defeats at the hands of 
Japan, she concluded that the opportunity had 
come for her to declare her disapproval of the 
French Moroccan policy. On March 31, 1905, 
the German Emperor stopped at Tangier on his 
way to Constantinople and made a speech. He 
declared that the Sultan of Morocco was an in- 
dependent ruler and that all nations had equal 
rights and should enjoy equal opportunities in 
his dominions. This was a challenge to France, 
but the latter country was not in a position to 
take it up owing to the weakness that her ally, 
Russia, was then exhibiting. The question was 
referred to an international congress held at 
Algeciras, Spain (1906). Great Britain and 
Italy supported France in the congress, and 
France won a diplomatic victory. It was de- 
cided that the merchants and investors of all 
the signatory powers were to have equal oppor- 
tunities in Morocco but that France and Spain 
were to supervise the policing of the country. 
The result of Germany's attitude was to 
strengthen the friendly feeling between Eng- 
land and France. 



14 The Causes of the European War 

In 1908 another occasion of dispute arose 
between France and Germany in Morocco. Six 
soldiers under the control of the French de- 
serted at Casablanca and appealed to the Ger- 
man consul for protection. Three of these 
soldiers were of German nationality. The Ger- 
man consul, thinking that all were Germans, 
gave them a safe-conduct to a German ship. 
The French officials disregarded this safe-con- 
duct and arrested the soldiers before they could 
embark. Germany protested most vigorously 
against this action, claiming that it violated 
her right to protect through her consuls Ger- 
man subjects in Morocco. France conceded to 
Germany the right to protect her subjects in 
Morocco, but contended that this right could 
not be exercised in such a way as to deprive 
her military officials of authority over their 
soldiers. The difficulty was settled by referring 
the questions in dispute to The Hague Tribunal. 

Germany and France also signed a conven- 
tion in 1909, by the terms of which Germany 
agreed to cease her opposition to French po- 
litical supremacy in Morocco and France agreed 
to "safeguard the economic equality" of all 
countries in the Sultan's dominions. This 
agreement, however, was not approved by the 
political leaders in Germany and Von Biilow, 
who negotiated it, was superseded as chancel- 
lor by Von Bethmann-Hollweg. The new chan- 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 15 

cellor was opposed to the convention and de- 
termined to annul it as soon as a proper occasion 
should arise. The opportunity came in 1911, 
when France sent troops to occupy Fez, the 
Moroccan capital. In July of this same year 
Germany sent a warship to the port of Agidir, 
claiming its presence was necessary for the 
protection of the interests of German capital- 
ists. At the same time, she stated that the 
" warship would be withdrawn as soon as con- 
ditions were sufficiently settled to admit of 
French withdrawal from Fez." 7 Both coun- 
tries began preparations for war, and Great 
Britain announced that France could count on 
her support. The trouble, however, was settled 
by another convention (November, 1911) be- 
tween Germany and France. By this second 
agreement, the "open-door" policy in Morocco 
was guaranteed by France and her political 
supremacy was recognized by Germany. The 
latter nation was also given a part of the French 
Congo. 

The long controversy over Morocco was thus 
finally settled but in a way that was unsatis- 
factory to both parties. The French were dis- 
pleased because they had lost a part of their 
territory and had gained nothing but a recog- 
nition of a right which they already had been 
exercising. Germany, too, was disappointed in 

7 Hayes, II, 705. 



16 The Causes of the European War 

not being able to win a port on the Moroccan 
coast. She also considered that her "position 
as a world power" had been jeopardized "by 
the joint machinations of the French and the 
British." 8 The friendship between England 
and France had been strengthened as well as 
the hostility between Germany and her rivals; 
and thus the Moroccan question in passing left 
behind a legacy of jealousy and hatred between 
the Entente and its enemies that foreboded 
greater trouble in the future. 

Although Morocco had thus been eliminated 
as a source of trouble, still the peace of Europe 
was being threatened from another quarter. A 
growing friction between the rival groups had 
developed over the Balkan situation. To un- 
derstand this situation it is necessary to review 
briefly some of the events out of which it has 
grown. 

There were many different peoples in the 
Balkan peninsula at the time it was overrun 
by the Turks. Of these, the most important 
were the Serbs, the Bulgars, the Albanians, the 
Eumanians, and the Greeks. The Turks ruled 
these subject races very harshly and unjustly, 
extorting from them exorbitant and at times 
almost ruinous taxes and subjecting them to all 
sorts of cruel indignities. They were, however, 
permitted to retain their religion, their civil 

• Hayes, 706. 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 17 

laws, and in large measure the right of local 
self-government. They had their own magis- 
trates and thus controlled the local administra- 
tion. These concessions helped to keep alive 
national sentiment among the subject peoples, 
and furnished them with a governmental ma- 
chinery that could be employed against their 
oppressors when the opportunity for revolt 
should arise. 9 The Turkish Government was 
thus supplying its Christian subjects with 
grievances and at the same time giving them 
the means whereby their discontent could find 
effective expression. Under such circum- 
stances, revolts could be expected at all favor- 
able opportunities. 

The first of the Christian peoples to win their 
independence were the Serbs . of Montenegro. 
They claim never to have been conquered by 
the Moslem invaders, but their independence 
was not formally recognized by the Turkish 
Government until 1799. 

In 1804 there was an unsuccessful revolt in 
Serbia. Another uprising eleven years later 
was partially successful, but it was' not until 
1830 that Serbia was recognized by Turkey as 
an autonomous principality. 

The Greeks rose against their oppressors in 
1821, and carried on against them for about 
eight years a war that was characterized by 

9 Hazen, Europe Since 1815, 603, 



18 The Causes of the European War 

barbarous practices on both sides. Finally, 
France, Great Britain, and Eussia intervened 
and demanded of Turkey that she grant local 
autonomy to Greece. This demand was re- 
fused, and the allied powers attacked Turkey, 
destroying her fleet in the battle of Navarino. 
Two years later, Turkey yielded and by the 
treaty of Adrianople with Eussia (September, 
1829) recognized Greece as an entirely inde- 
pendent state. The independence of the new 
state was placed under the guarantee of the 
liberating powers, France, Eussia, and Great 
Britain, and in 1833 Otto, the son of the King 
of Bavaria, was placed on the throne as the 
first ruler of the Hellenic Kingdom. 

The Eumanians are a mixed race, composed 
of Slavic, Gothic, Tartar, and Latin elements. 
They are proud of the name Euman (Eoman) 
and claim to be descendants of colonists settled 
north of the Danube (Dacia) by the Eoman 
emperors. By the treaty of Adrianople, the 
provinces Moldavia and Wallachia (now Eu- 
mania) were practically, though not nominally, 
taken out from under the control of Turkey 
and placed under the protection of Eussia. At 
the close of the Crimean War, in which Eussia 
was defeated by France and England, Eussia 
had to give up her protectorate over these two 
provinces and agree, by the treaty of Paris 
(1856), that thenceforth they should be "inde- 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 19 

pendent under the suzerainty of the Porte. ' ' 10 
This arrangement, however, was not satisfac- 
tory to the Rumanians, who wanted the two 
provinces united into one nation and to be en- 
tirely free from Turkish control. In 1859 Mol- 
davia and Wallachia each elected the same man 
as prince and so virtually became one principal- 
ity. lt Later the two assemblies were merged 
into one, and in 1862 the Sultan recognized these 
changes." u 

In 1876 the Christians in the province of Bul- 
garia revolted against the Ottoman officials and 
put some of them to death. The Turks in their 
effort to put down the revolt committed awful 
atrocities. Their acts of savage cruelty aroused 
public sentiment all over Europe. Even in Eng- 
land, the traditional friend of the Porte, senti- 
ment was so strong that the Disraeli ministry 
could do nothing in support of the Ottoman Gov- 
ernment. Mr. Gladstone, then in retirement, 
1 ' urged that the Turks be expelled from Europe 
■ bag and baggage. ' ' ' 12 Serbia and Montenegro 
joined the Bulgarians and declared war on Tur- 
key. 

The Russian people sympathized warmly with 
their kinsmen and co-religionists of the Balkans, 
and many of them enlisted in the army as vol- 
unteers against the Turk. Pressure was thus 

ioHazen, 615. 
" Ibid., 618. 
isHazen, 622. 



20 The Causes of the European War 

being brought to bear on Alexander II to inter- 
vene. He did not want war, declaring that he 
had no intention or desire to take Constanti- 
nople, but felt that Europe ought to put a stop 
to the Balkan troubles. He also said that he 
would have to undertake the task singlehanded 
if the other nations would not join him. Fi- 
nally, after long delays and fruitless diplomatic 
negotiations, Eussia issued a declaration of war 
against Turkey on April 24, 1877. After the 
defeat of Turkey, the treaty of San Stefano was 
signed in 1878. By this treaty Serbia, Monte- 
negro, and Rumania were declared independ- 
ent ; Bulgaria became an autonomous state with 
a good deal of territory, Eastern Eumelia and 
most of Macedonia being given to her; and 
Turkey retained in Europe "only a narrow 
broken strip across the peninsula from Con- 
stantinople west to the Adriatic." 

All of the countries except Russia and Bul- 
garia were dissatisfied with the treaty. Both 
Serbia and Greece wanted a part of the Mace- 
donian territory that had been given Bulgaria. 
But the most effective opposition came from 
the great powers. Great Britain and Austria- 
Hungary contended that Russia could not 
change the Balkan map without the consent of 
the other powers, and Germany supported this 
contention. Austria-Hungary had an ambition 
to expand toward the iEgean, and both she and 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 21 

Great Britain were afraid that Russia would 
become too powerful in the Balkans and extend 
her authority to the Mediterranean. By a 
threat of war, Eussia was frightened into yield- 
ing, and a conference of the powers was held 
at Berlin. The treaty of Berlin (signed July, 
1878) was thus substituted for that of San Stef- 
ano (signed March, 1878). By the treaty of 
Berlin, Montenegro, Serbia, and Eumania be- 
came independent; Bulgaria was made an au- 
tonomous principality tributary to Turkey. 
Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia were, however, 
left out of Bulgaria, Macedonia being restored 
to Turkey and Eastern Bumelia being made an 
autonomous state under Turkish control. Bos- 
nia and Herzegovina were turned over to Aus- 
tria-Hungary to be administered by her, though 
they were still to be nominally a part of the Ot- 
toman Empire. It is needless to say that the 
Bulgars were dissatisfied with this arrangement 
and were determined to modify it as soon as 
they could with safety. This they did in 1885 
when Eastern Rumelia was united with Bul- 
garia. 13 

These important changes had all been made in 
southeastern Europe without any serious men- 
ace to the general peace. But early in the twen- 
tieth century, the Balkans gave promise of 
trouble between the rival groups. By this time 

13 Hazen, 620-27. 



22 The Causes of the European War 

it appeared that Germany and Austria-Hungary 
had entered upon a policy of economic and po- 
litical expansion toward the ^Egean and had an 
ambition to bring the Ottoman Empire within 
their sphere of influence. These efforts had 
been rewarded with considerable success. Ser- 
bia had been under the tutelage of Austria-Hun- 
gary from 1878 to 1903, when King Alexander 
was assassinated and a new ruler, who was 
friendly to Eussia, was placed on the Serbian 
throne. The rulers of Bulgaria and Eumania 
were Germans and the crown prince of Greece 
was a brother-in-law of the Kaiser, William II. 
Germany had obtained from Rumania an im- 
portant railroad concession and from Turkey 
the right to build a railroad to Bagdad and the 
Persian Gulf. German officers went to Turkey 
to train her soldiers, and the Teutonic powers 
showed that they intended to bolster up Turkey 
and support her against her enemies. Germany 
had thus supplanted Great Britain as the pro- 
tector of the Ottoman dominions. Out of this 
policy there had grown up in the Balkans a 
serious rivalry between Russia and the Teutonic 
powers. 

This rivalry reached the danger point in Oc- 
tober, 1908, when Austria-Hungary formally 
annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Turkish 
provinces which she had been administering 
since 1878. It was a favorable time for such an 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 23 

act of aggression, for conditions in the Ottoman 
Empire were unsettled as a result of a revolu- 
tion that had been carried out in the previous 
summer. At about the same time, Bulgaria sev- 
ered the weak bond that held her to the Turkish 
Empire by declaring her absolute independence. 
Both of these acts were a clear violation of the 
treaty of Berlin, but Turkey, conscious of her 
weakness, was induced to acquiesce in this loss 
of territory. 

The powers, however, did not consider that 
Turkey alone was concerned with this infraction 
of a treaty to which they were signatories. 
Italy, Great Britain, Russia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia were all displeased at Austria's action. 
Serbia had hoped that as long as the provinces 
maintained a nominal connection with the Turk- 
ish Empire, some stroke of fortune might cause 
them to fall to her. 14 She was especially anx- 
ious to have them because they would give her 
an outlet to the Adriatic and would enable her 
to round out her dominions if she should ever 
become the Greater Serbia of her dreams, a 
kingdom which would include as subjects the 
Serbs of the then Austro-Hungarian provinces 
as well as those of her own country. 

Russia, too, was very much excited over the 
annexation. She felt that not only were the 
interests of her protege, Serbia, compromised, 

"Stowell, 21 . 



24 The Causes of the European War 

but that her own position in the Balkans was 
also jeopardized. She determined to support 
Serbia, and since the diplomatic negotiations of- 
fered no satisfactory adjustment of the differ- 
ences, she began to mobilize her army. 

At this juncture Germany declared in favor of 
Austria-Hungary and announced her willing- 
ness to give the latter country military assist- 
ance if necessary. Germany was free to take 
this stand because the Young Turk party, which 
was responsible for the July revolution and 
which had gotten control of the government, had 
shown signs of preferring Great Britain to Ger- 
many as their country's protector. This fickle- 
ness on the part of the Ottoman Government 
gave Germany the opportunity of disciplining 
her new friend and at the same time of doing a 
good turn for her old ally. Eussia had not as 
yet recovered from the military weakness ex- 
hibited in the Eusso-Japanese War, and Great 
Britain and France, being unwilling to go to 
war over this quarrel, advised her to yield. 
She, therefore, withdrew her opposition, and 
Serbia, under pressure from the Entente pow- 
ers, declared on March 31, 1909, that she acqui- 
esced in the annexation of the provinces as a 
fait accompli. 

The crisis was thus passed without war, but a 
feeling of humiliation and bitterness was left in 
the hearts of the Serbs and Bussians, Smart- 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 25 

ing under this feeling, "the Eussian Govern- 
ment began to reorganize its army, to construct 
strategic railways, and to do everything in its 
power to insure Russia against a like humilia- 
tion in the future. ' ' 15 

In the early fall of 1912, war broke out be- 
tween Turkey and the Balkan states of Monte- 
negro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The time 
was favorable for joint action against the Otto- 
man Empire, for that power had been weak- 
ened by the Turco-Italian war and by internal 
troubles in Albania and Macedonia. The Chris- 
tians in Macedonia had been oppressed for 
years, and conditions were not improved when 
the Young Turks came into power in 1908. A 
spirit of discontent began to manifest itself in 
secret revolts and assassinations, which was ag- 
gravated by the ineffective efforts of the Turk- 
ish officials to allay it. These unjust and unwise 
measures caused the Serbs, the Bulgars, and 
Greeks in Macedonia to suspend their hatred of 
each other and thus made it easier for the Greek 
and Bulgarian Governments to bury their dif- 
ference and act together against the common 
enemy. The Albanians, despite their historic 
friendship for the Porte, were also chafing under 
recent grievances. Revolts broke out in 1910 
and 1911, in which the Montenegrins made com- 
mon cause with the insurgents. This brought 

is Hayes, II, 708. 



26 The Causes of the European War 

on a friendly feeling between the Northern Al- 
banians and the Serbs of Serbia and Montene- 
gro. 

Conditions were thns favorable for a union 
of the Balkan states against Turkey. Such an 
alliance was entered into in February, 1912. It 
comprised Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Bul- 
garia, and the object of it was the liberation of 
the Balkan Christians from Ottoman misrule 
and the expulsion of Turkey from Europe. The 
formation of this alliance did not mean an im- 
mediate break with the Porte, and it was not un- 
til October 17 that the three larger Balkan states 
formally declared war on Turkey. 

In the meantime, the powers had made an 
effort to prevent war. They agreed to act in 
concert and announced (October 8) to the Bal- 
kan allies that they would not approve of a 
war with Turkey at that time. They promised 
that reforms in the government of European 
Turkey should be made, but were unwilling that 
anything should be done to affect the integrity 
or independence of the Ottoman Empire. In 
case the allies should go to war with the protege 
of the powers, they would be restrained by the 
latter from taking any territory in European 
Turkey. If the powers had been in a position 
to back up these strong words with concerted 
action, the threat would have silenced the allies 
and peace would have been maintained. But 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 27 

the allies were aware of the rivalry between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans, 
and so were not frightened away from their plan 
of dividing the Ottoman dominions in Europe. 

The allies were successful in their military op- 
erations, and Turkey soon showed a willingness 
to negotiate for peace. A truce was declared 
December 3, 1914, and a peace conference was 
held in London, beginning on December 16. 
The belligerents, however, could not agree on 
terms, and hostilities were renewed. 

There was a danger that the Balkan trouble 
would involve other countries and thus bring on 
a general war, a calamity which the European 
Governments seemed anxious to avoid. In or- 
der to keep the conflict within its original limits, 
the French premier, M. Poincare, had tried to 
induce the powers to announce their own ' ' terri- 
torial disinterestedness" in the Balkan quarrel. 
Such a pledge was opposed by the Triple Alli- 
ance, especially Austria-Hungary, who seemed 
to think that her own interests were being threat- 
ened. She was opposed to such changes in the 
map of Europe as would extend Serbia to the 
Adriatic and place strong Slavic states between 
her and Salonica. Serbia had captured Du- 
razzo and insisted on keeping it and a small por- 
tion of the Albanian coast. Besides, Austria- 
Hungary favored the autonomy of Albania and 
Serbia opposed it. Austria-Hungary was so de • 



28 The Causes of the European War 

termined in her opposition to Serbian ambitions 
that she began a general mobilization of her 
military forces. 

The expressions of opinion given out by the 
various governments showed that the Triple Al- 
liance powers took one side of the controversy 
and the Triple Entente powers the other, the 
former being inclined to support Turkey and 
the latter the Balkan allies. There was, there- 
fore, a danger that the Balkan quarrel would 
assume European proportions and thus bring 
on a world war. This calamity was averted 
because the powers were on this occasion sane 
enough to settle their differences of opinion in 
the spirit of compromise. A conference was 
held in London in December, 1912, and it was 
agreed that Albania should be an autonomous 
state and Serbia should have "commercial ac- 
cess to the Adriatic." 

Serbia acquiesced in this compromise, but 
Montenegro gave trouble. The powers in ar- 
ranging the boundaries of Albania finally de- 
cided that they should include Scutari. The 
Montenegrins were, therefore, ordered to raise 
the siege of Scutari ; but instead of obeying this 
command, they went on with the siege and suc- 
ceeded in capturing the city on April 22, 1913. 
Austria-Hungary and Italy threatened to attack 
Montenegro if she did not agree to turn over 
Scutari to Albania. Austria-Hungary's stand 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 29 

aroused great excitement in Russia and war 
between that country and the Dual Monarchy 
seemed imminent, when Montenegro wisely 
yielded and agreed to relinquish her prize 
(May 3). 

A second peace congress was held in May and 
the belligerents all agreed to the treaty of Lon- 
don (May 30). By this treaty, Turkey gave up 
"all of her European possessions except Con- 
stantinople and a small tract of adjacent land 
east of the Maritza River." 16 

Before the treaty with the Porte was signed, 
the allies had begun to quarrel over the spoils. 
Serbia and Bulgaria had agreed by a secret 
treaty signed in March, 1912, upon a plan for 
the division of the territory to be taken from 
the Ottoman Empire. By this scheme Bulgaria 
was to have most of Macedonia with a seaport 
on the iEgean ; and Serbia was to get the greater 
portion of Albania and a seaport on the Adri- 
atic. The creation of Albania into an independ- 
ent state had deprived Serbia of a large part of 
her share, while war had taken such a turn as to 
give Bulgaria more than had been contemplated 
by the treaty. Serbia, therefore, demanded a 
more equitable division than could be effected 
by a literal adherence to this agreement. 
Greece, too, thought Bulgaria's portion was too 
large, it being, she claimed, three-fifths of all 

« Inter. Yr. Bk. for 1913, 696. 



30 The Causes of the European War 

the territory taken from Turkey. She was es- 
pecially anxious to keep Salonica. The outcome 
of the dispute was that Bulgaria soon found 
herself at war with her former allies, Montene- 
gro, Serbia, and Greece. 

Rumania had remained neutral during the 
first Balkan War and expected compensation to 
balance the gains of the other states. She was 
promised Silistria, but was dissatisfied at not 
having gained more territory. When the sec- 
ond Balkan War broke out, she notified Bulgaria 
that she had raised the price of her neutrality. 
Bulgaria hesitated to meet her demands, and 
Rumania joined the list of Bulgaria's enemies. 
Turkey, too, entered the war and recaptured 
Adrianople. 

Bulgaria soon grew tired of the unequal con- 
test and asked (July 21) the King of Rumania 
to intercede with the other rulers for peace. A 
peace conference was held at Bucharest and a 
treaty was signed (August 10) by all the Chris- 
tian belligerents. By the treaty of Bucharest 
Rumania "secured an extension of her south- 
eastern frontier, ' ' 17 and Bulgaria gave up cer- 
tain territories to Greece and Serbia. Later, 
by the treaty of Constantinople (September 
29), Bulgaria had to give up Adrianople and 
other territory to Turkey. Turkey now had 

"Int. Yr. Bk., 1913, 699. 



Some Indirect Causes of the War 31 

twice the area in Europe that had been left her 
by the treaty of London. 

The Balkan wars had left a bitterness of feel- 
ing behind them which might easily lead to other 
trouble. Austria was dissatisfied with the final 
settlement. Serbia had become larger and 
stronger and was thus able to form a more 
effective barrier to her ambitions in the direc- 
tion of the ^Egean. Her disappointment as to 
the results was so keen that she would probably 
have gone to war against Serbia in 1913 if Italy 
had not declined to support her. Montenegro, 
too, felt aggrieved in that Scutari had been 
wrenched from her and added to Albania. Ser- 
bia had a new cause of complaint against Aus- 
tria. The creation of the Kingdom of Albania, 
for which Austria and Italy were responsible, 
cut her off from the sea and robbed her, as she 
considered, of the choicest fruits of her victory 
over Turkey. Then, too, the national aspira- 
tions of the Serbians had been greatly increased, 
because their recent successes had encouraged 
a new hope that her further territorial ambitions 
might be realized. Bulgaria felt that the treaty 
of Bucharest was unfair to her and was hoping 
for an opportunity to revise it. Besides, the 
ill-feeling of the Bulgars toward the Serbs and 
Greeks had been intensified. 



CHAPTER II 

THE ASSASSINATION OF FRANCIS FEEDINAND 

The year 1914, as has already been shown, 
found Austria-Hungary and Serbia living on 
terms that are unsafe for neighbors. Public 
sentiment was inflamed in both countries and 
there was a danger that some unusual occur- 
rence would cause an outburst of feeling and 
bring on war. The event that fanned the smol- 
dering hatreds into a flame was the assassina- 
tion of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir- 
apparent to the throne of Austria-Hungary. 
The crown prince and his wife were killed on 
June 28, 1914, at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, 
by the explosion of a bomb thrown by two 
Serbian subjects of Austria-Hungary. "No 
crime," says the British White Paper, "has 
ever aroused deeper or more general horror 
throughout Europe; none has ever been less 
justified. Sympathy for Austria was univer- 
sal." 1 

The crime owes its significance to the feeling 
aroused in Austria-Hungary and Serbia by it; 
to the alleged complicity of the Serbian people 

iB. w. P., iii. 

32 



Assassination of Francis Ferdinand 33 

and Government in the crime; and to Serbia's 
inability or refusal to satisfy Austria-Hungary 
as to reparation and guarantees for the future. 

According to Austrian sources, public senti- 
ment in Serbia approved the deed of the assass- 
ins. The people rejoiced over it as an act of 
"revenge for the annexation" and hoped that 
it would prove to be the initial step in a move- 
ment that would ultimately lead to ' ' the detach- 
ment from the Dual Monarchy of all territories 
inhabited by South-Slavs and the eventual de- 
struction of that monarchy as a great power. ' ' 2 
Manifestations of joy and exultation were re- 
ported from Belgrade, 3 Nish, 4 and Uskub, the 
populace at the last named place giving "itself 
up to a spontaneous outburst of passion. ' ' 5 

The press of Serbia was also charged with 
responsibility for "the outrage of Sarajevo," 
because the public mind had been inflamed by 
the propaganda conducted by it against Austria 
in the interest of the "Great Serbian" cause. 
This propaganda had not been confined to Ser- 
bia, but had also been carried on, it is alleged, 
in the Serbian districts of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy. 6 The Austrian Eed Book gives ex- 
tracts from twenty-six Serbian newspapers com- 
menting on the assassination to show the atti- 
tude of the press toward this crime. These 

2 A. R. B., 1, 6. s ibid., 3. 

3 A. R. B., 1. 6 Ibid., 7. 
* Ibid., 5, 



34 The Causes of the European War 

press extracts breathe a very hostile feeling to- 
ward Austria, but no one of them attempts to 
justify the murder. 7 The statements that come 
nearest to a justification of this act are the fol- 
lowing : 

The Piemont of July 1 said : 

The fact that Princip (one of the assassins) car- 
ried out his act of vengeance on the sacred national 
holiday of Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day), the day fixed 
for the carrying on of maneuvers, makes the desperate 
deed of the young martyr appear more intelligible 
and natural. 

(The paper was confiscated by the police because 
of this article, but the confiscation was annulled on 
the following day by the Belgrade court of first re- 
sort.) 

The Pravada of July 4 said : 

All murders and attacks heretofore committed in 
Austria have had one and the same origin. The op- 
pressed peoples of the monarchy were obliged to re- 
sort to this kind of protest, because no other way was 
open to them. In the chaos of a reign of terror it is 
natural and understandable that the era of murderous 
attacks should become popular. 

The Mali Journal of July 7 said : 

A scion of the Middle Ages was murdered in 
Sarajevo a few days ago. He was murdered by a boy 
who felt the suffering of his enslaved fatherland to 
the point of paroxysms of emotion — the suffering 
which the despoilers of the lands of his fathers had 
inflicted upon it. "What has official Austria- Hungary 
done thereafter? It has replied with general mas- 
sacres, plunderings, and destruction of Serb life and 

' A, R, B,, 19, enclosure 9. 



Assassination of Francis Ferdinand 35 

property. By such exploits only those who are worth- 
less distinguish themselves. The cowards are always 
great heroes when they are certain that nothing will 
happen to them. Only compare Princip and Ga- 
brinovitch with these heroes, and the great difference 
will be noted at once. Civilization and justice in 
Austria-Hungary are a great, gross falsehood. 

In defense of his government, M. Pashitch, 
Serbian prime minister, pointed out that "as 
soon as news of the crime arrived, the Serbian 8 
court and the government expressed not only 
their condolence, but also their heartfelt repro- 
bation and their horror at such a crime. All the 
festivities that were to take place that day in 
Belgrade were suspended." M. Pashitch fur- 
ther declares that the abhorrence of this unfor- 
tunate event was not confined to the govern- 
ment circles but was shared by all classes of 
the people, as the commission of this crime was 
against the best interests of Serbia. 9 In a tele- 
gram (July 14) to all the royal legations the 
prime minister said, in part : 

Absolute calm rules in Belgrade; no demonstra- 
tion has taken place this year; nobody has had the 
intention of provoking any disorder. Not only do the 
Minister of Austria-Hungary and the members of his 
staff walk freely in the city, but no insult either 
through acts or through words has been offered to any 

s In quoting from the documents, I have frequently changed 
"v" to "b" in the spelling of "Serbia" and "Serbian." This 
liberty has been taken in the interest of uniformity; for the 
different state papers do not employ the same method in the 
spelling of these words. 

a S. B. B., 30, 8. 



36 The Causes of the European War 

Austro-Hungarian subject, as the newspapers of 
Vienna claim, and no Austro-Hungarian subject has 
seen his house attacked or its windows broken ; no 
Austro-Hungarian subject has had any motive to lodge 
the slightest complaint. All this false news is spread 
only with the object of disturbing and irritating pub- 
lic opinion in Austria-Hungary against Serbia. 10 

Insist on the fact that public opinion in our coun- 
try is relatively calm and that on our side nobody' 
wishes to provoke or wound Austria-Hungary. 11 

The Serbian minister at London also called 
attention to the fact that both the assassins were 
Austro-Hungarian subjects; that one of them 
had been suspected by the Serbian authorities 
who desired to expel him ; and that he had been 
protected by the Austrian authorities who con- 
sidered him innocent and harmless. 12 

Serbian documents virtually concede that feel- 
ing in Austria-Hungary was inflamed by utter- 
ances of the Serbian press. On July 1 the Ser- 
bian minister at Vienna wrote to his home gov- 
ernment as follows : "I beg you to do what is 
necessary in order that demonstrations be pre- 
vented at home, and that the utterances of the 
press of Belgrade be restrained as much as pos- 
sible." 13 

The minister referred to the subject again on 
July 6 in the following words: "The feeling 
against Serbia continues to increase in military 
and governmental circles, in consequence of ar- 

io Ibid., 21. 12 B. W. P., 30. 

ii S. B. B. } 20. is S. B. B., 9. 



Assassination of Francis Ferdinand 37 

tides in our papers which the Austro-Hungarian 
Legation at Belgrade zealously exploits. ' ' u 

The Serbian officials, however, contended that 
the hostility of the Serbian press was provoked 
by the attitude of the Austrian and Hungarian 
newspapers which "began the polemic" and had 
for two years "been wounding the Serbs and 
Serbia in their most delicate sensibilities": that 
Austria was intentionally giving undue publicity 
to the radical utterances of rather irresponsible 
publications; and that, as the press is free in 
Serbia, the Government has no means other 
than the courts to employ in curbing the press, 
though it has advised the press of Belgrade "to 
remain calm and limit itself to the denial and 
the refutation of false and distorted news." 15 

Serbia also brings serious counter-charges 
against the Austro-Hungarian press. She 
complains that the newspapers of Vienna and 
Budapest sent out false news in order to arouse 
feeling at home and to hold up Serbia in a false 
light before the nations of the world. They ac- 
cused Serbia, it is alleged, of the crime of Sara- 
jevo in order to rob her of the good name that 
she had with the European powers. As an ex- 
ample of unfair treatment by the news service, 
the Serbian minister at Vienna cites an account 
of the assassination given by the Vienna dailies 

I* Ibid., 15. 

is S. B. B., 12, 30. 



38 The Causes of the European War 

on June 28. These papers, he said, ' ' announced 

in big type that the two perpetrators of the 

crime were Serbians, in such a way as to make 

the people believe that they were meant for 

Serbians from Serbia. ' ' 16 

The British White Paper also speaks of the 

storm of anti-Serbian feeling which swept Austria 
Hungary after the Sarajevo murders. 

Anti-Serb riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. 
The members of the Serb party in the Provincial Coun- 
cil of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with 
cries of ' ' Serbian assassins. ' ' Mobs in Vienna threat- 
ened the Serbian Legation. The Austrian Press, al- 
most without exception, used the most unbridled lan- 
guage, and called for the condign punishment of 
Serbia. There were signs that the popular resent- 
ment was shared and perhaps encouraged by the 
Austrian Government. 17 

Austria-Hungary contends that Serbia could 
have ' ' averted the serious steps she had reason 
to expect" from Austria, "if she had spon- 
taneously begun within her own territory pro- 
ceedings against the Serbian accomplices in the 
murderous attack of the 28th of June, and (had 
disclosed) the threads of the plot, leading, as it 
has been proved, from Belgrade to Sarajevo. 
Until to-day (July 23), the Serbian Government, 
in spite of much notorious circumstantial evi- 
dence pointing to Belgrade, not only has failed 
to do anything of that sort, but even has en- 
deavored to efface the existing traces." 18 

is S. B. B., 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 16. 

17 B. W. P., iii-iv. is A. R. B., 2, 9; B. W. P., 3. 



Assassination of Francis Ferdinand 39 

In answer to this charge, the Serbian Govern- 
ment says that " Serbia, in the very first 
days that followed the horrible crime, declared 
that it condemned the crime and that it was 
ready to open an inquiry on its territory if the 
complicity of certain of its subjects was proved 
during the trial opened by the Austro-Hungar- 
ian authorities. ' ' 19 The prime minister also 
said that the Government had promptly ex- 
pressed its readiness to hand over to justice 
any of its subjects "who might be proved to 
have played a part in the Sarajevo outrage." 

Serbia excuses her failure to take any steps 
against the accomplices of the murderers on 
the ground that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment had " never asked any help whatever of 
the Serbian Government concerning the matter. 
It had (has) not asked either an investigation 
or a trial in the case of any of the accomplices. 
Once only had (has) it asked for information 
concerning the present residence of some stu- 
dents expelled from the primary normal school 
of Pakrac, who had passed over to Serbia to go 
on with their studies. All the information 
which could be collected concerning this has 
been transmitted to the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment. ' ' 20 

The trial of the assassins brought out evi- 

i» Russian Orange Book, 6; S, B, B., 5; B. W. P„ 30, 
30 S, B. B„ 5, 30, 



40 The Causes of the European War 

dence which, Austria asserts, proved that the 
plot to murder the Archduke had been formed 
in Belgrade ; that the ' ' arms and explosives with 
which the murderers were provided had (has) 
been given them by Serbian officers," and that 
"the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and 
their arms was organized and carried out by the 
chiefs of the Serbian frontier service." 21 In 
support of these charges Austria gives extracts 
from the records of the trial of the assassins. 
These documents report the confessions of the 
murderers and these confessions as thus re- 
ported confirm the Austrian allegation. 22 

21 A. R. B., 7. 

22 A. R. B., 19, enclosure 8. , . ..' 



CHAPTER III 

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERBIA 

On July 23, 1914, Austria-Hungary sent an 
ultimatum to the Serbian minister for foreign 
affairs, demanding an answer in forty-eight 
hours. The Austrian minister was to add ver- 
bally that he was instructed to leave Belgrade 
at the expiration of the " time-limit ... in the 
event that within that period" he had not re- 
ceived an " unconditional and favorable re- 
sponse from the Royal Serbian Government. ' ' * 

The Entente powers were taken by surprise 
when they learned the contents of the note. 
According to the English ambassador at Vienna, 
the Austro-Hungarian Government had main- 
tained the strictest silence during the time just 
preceding the delivery of the note at Belgrade, 
and the representatives of Italy, Russia, and 
France, as well as himself, were kept in igno- 
rance by the Austro-Hungarian Government as 
to what demands would be made on Serbia. 
The Russian ambassador was so completely in 
the dark as to Austria's plans that he had left 
Vienna about the 20th of July for a two-weeks' 

i A. R. B., 7; E. O. B., 1. 

41 



42 The Causes of the European War 

vacation. The French ambassador on July 22 
received from the Austro-Hungarian foreign 
office the impression that "the note which was 
being drawn up would be found to contain noth- 
ing with which a self-respecting state need hesi- 
tate to comply. ' ' 2 

The note addressed to Serbia starts out by 
reminding Serbia of her promise of March 31, 
1909, henceforth to regard the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a fait accompli and 
to renounce her attitude of protest and opposi- 
tion and "to live in (the) future on good neigh- 
borly terms" with Austria-Hungary. This 
pledge, it is charged, has not been kept ; on the 
contrary, "the history of recent years, and in 
particular the painful events of the 28th June 
last, have shown the existence of a subversive 
movement with the object of detaching a part 
of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the 
Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth 
under the eye of the Serbian Government, has 
gone so far as to make itself manifest on both 
sides of the Serbian frontier in the shape of acts 
of terrorism and a series of outrages and mur- 
ders. . . . 

"The Eoyal Serbian Government has done 
nothing to repress these movements. It has 
permitted the criminal machinations of various 
societies and associations directed against the 

2 b. w. P., 161. 



Austro-Hung avian Note to Serbia 43 

Monarchy and has tolerated unrestrained lan- 
guage on the part of the press, the glorifica- 
tion of the perpetrators of outrages, and the 
participation of officers and functionaries in 
subversive agitation. It has permitted an un- 
wholesome propaganda in public instruction. 
In short, it has permitted all manifestations of 
a nature to incite the Serbian population to 
hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its in- 
stitutions." It is also claimed that the confes- 
sions of the assassins on trial for the murder 
of the Archduke prove the complicity of Ser- 
bian officials in the crime of Sarajevo. 3 
The note continues as follows: 

This culpable tolerance of the Eoyal Serbian Gov- 
ernment had not ceased at the moment when the 
events of the 28th June last proved its fatal conse- 
quences to the whole world. 

It results from the depositions and confessions of 
the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th 
June that the Sarajevo assassinations were planned in 
Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which 
the murderers were provided had been given to them 
by Serbian officers and functionaries belonging to the 
Narodna Odbrana, and finally that the passage into 
Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized 
and carried out by the Chiefs of the Serbian frontier 
service. 

The above mentioned results of the preliminary in- 
vestigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment to pursue any longer the attitude of ex- 
pectant forbearance which it has maintained for years 
in the face of machinations hatched in Belgrade, and 

3 See p. 40. 



44 The Causes of the European War 

thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. 
The results, on the contrary, impose upon it the duty 
of putting an end to the intrigues which form a per- 
petual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy. 

To achieve this end, the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment finds itself compelled to demand from the 
Royal Serbian Government a formal assurance that it 
condemns this dangerous propaganda against the Mon- 
archy — in other words, the whole series of tendencies, 
the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Mon- 
archy territories belonging to it — and that it under- 
takes to suppress by every means at its disposal this 
criminal and terrorist propaganda. 

In order to give a solemn character to this under- 
taking the Royal Serbian Government shall publish 
on the front page of its ' ' journal official, ' ' of the 26th 
of July (13th July) the following declaration: 

The Royal Government of Serbia condemns 
the propaganda directed against Austria- 
Hungary, of which the final aim is to de- 
tach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
territories belonging to it, and it sincerely 
deplores the fatal consequences of these crim- 
inal proceedings. 

The Royal Government regrets that Serbian 
officers and functionaries have participated 
in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus 
compromised the good neighborly relations 
to which the Royal Government was solemnly 
pledged by its declaration of the 31st of 
March, 1909. 

The Royal Government, which disapproves 
and repudiates all idea of interfering or at- 
tempting to interfere with the destinies of 
the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of 
Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty for- 
mally to warn officers and functionaries, and 
the whole population of the Kingdom, that 



Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia 45 

henceforward it will proceed with the utmost 
rigor against persons who may be guilty of 
such machinations, which it will use all its 
efforts to prevent and suppress. 

This declaration shall simultaneously be communi- 
cated to the royal army as an order of the day by 
His Majesty the King, and published in the Official 
Bulletin of the army. 

The Royal Serbian Government further undertakes : 

1. To suppress any publication which incites to 
hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy and the general tendency of which is directed 
against its territorial integrity; 

2. To dissolve immediately the society called Na- 
rodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propa- 
ganda, and to proceed in the same manner against all 
other societies and their branches in Serbia which 
engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the 
necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved 
from continuing their activity under another name 
and form; 

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruc- 
tion in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and 
the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or 
might serve, to foment the propaganda against Aus- 
tria-Hungary ; 

4. To remove from the military service, and from 
the administration in general, all officers and func- 
tionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right 
of communicating to the Royal Government ; 

5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of repre- 
sentatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in 
the suppression of the subversive movement directed 
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy ; 

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories 



46 The Causes of the European War 

to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian ter- 
ritory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment will take part in the investigation relating 
thereto ; 

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major 
Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan 
Ciganovitch, a Serbian State employee, who have 
been compromised by the results of the magisterial in- 
quiry at Sarajevo ; 

8. To prevent by effective measures the cooperation 
of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms 
and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and pun- 
ish severely the officials of the frontier service at 
Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the 
perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their 
passage across the frontier; 

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government 
with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utter- 
ances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and 
abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, 
did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to 
express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility 
to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally, 

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government 
without delay of the execution of the measures com- 
prised under the preceding heads. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the 
reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 
o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July. 

A memorandum dealing with the results of the 
magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo with regard to the 
officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached 
to this note. 4 

On the same day on which this note was 
sent to Serbia, the Austro-Hungarian minister 
for foreign affairs sent instructions to the 

4 A. R. B., 7. 



Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia 47 

Austro-Hungarian ambassadors at the various 
European capitals to bring the contents of the 
note to the governments of the powers and at 
the same time present a statement, prepared by 
the foreign office, explaining why Austria-Hun- 
gary had felt compelled to take such action 
against Serbia. These ambassadors were also 
to say that the Austro-Hungarian Government 
held at the disposal of the powers a dossier 
"recording the Serbian machinations and show- 
ing the connection between these machinations 
and the murder on the 28th of June." 5 This 
dossier was sent to the powers on July 25.° 
The following is a summary of the document : 

There has been going on in Serbia for a long 
time a propaganda looking to the detachment 
of the Southern Slav provinces of the Dual 
Monarchy in order to unite them with Serbia. 
This movement reached its climax at the time 
(1908) of the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina by Austria-Hungary. The entire press 
at that time clamored for war with Austria and 
"associations were formed in preparation for 
a struggle." The Narodna Odbrana was the 
most important of these associations. It was 
formed as a private organization, but it was 
dominated by the Government because of the 
state functionaries on its roll of membership. 

5 A. R. B., 8. 
e Ibid., 19. 



48 The Causes of the European War 

The object of the society was to recruit and 
equip ' l bodies of volunteers for the coming war 
with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy." The 
activities of the society were open and were 
supported by the Government. In this way the 
"guerilla warfare against Austria-Hungary 
was organized/' 

"This period of aggressiveness was termi- 
nated by the declaration" of March 31, 1909, 
when Serbia declared her willingness to acqui- 
esce in the annexation. The movement against 
Austria now seemed to be at an end. But the 
"aspirations hostile to the Dual Monarchy re- 
mained in operation," and the propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary continued and grew 
more active. Secret intrigues were now car- 
ried on in the Southern Slav provinces of the 
Dual Monarchy and Austro-Hungarian subjects 
were ' ' corrupted to betray their country. ' ' 

The newspapers were especially active in 
this work. "They habitually referred to the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an 
act of robbery committed against Serbia and 
requiring remedy." These sheets "were 
smuggled into the (Dual) Monarchy through 
well organized secret channels." 

The Narodna Odbrana is the center of this 
agitation. It preaches to the people that Aus- 
tria-Hungary is trying to crush Serbia, and is 
therefore Serbia's greatest enemy. It pledges 



Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia 49 

its members to preach to the people untiringly 
and unceasingly "that the waging of a war of 
extermination against Austria-Hungary . . . 
is an imperative necessity." There are other 
societies affiliated with the Narodna Odbrana. 
They too are dominated by "army officers, pro- 
fessors, and state officials." One of these is 
the Sokol Society. Its aims nominally are 
"athletic" as those of the Narodna Odbrana 
are "cultural," but one of the real aims is the 
"liberation of the brothers across the Drina." 
The Narodna Odbrana appeals not only to the 
subjects of Serbia but to all Southern Slavs. 
It tries to incite them to the work of destruc- 
tion of the Dual Monarchy. It also keeps in 
touch with the "brothers outside of Serbia." 

"Princip and Grabez (assassins of the Grand 
Duke) are types of the youth whose minds had 
been poisoned in school by the teaching of 
the Narodna Odbrana." Milan Ciganovitch 
and Major Voija Tankositch (Serbians al- 
leged to have aided the assassins) were leaders 
of the Narodna Odbrana. The Serbian Gov- 
ernment is responsible because it has allowed 
this hostility of the press and this activity of 
the associations against another state to go on 
and has not suppressed the "activities of men 
holding high positions in the state administra- 
tion," "who poisoned the national con- 
science." 7 
t A, R. B„ 19, enclosure. 



50 The Causes of the European War 

Along with this paper were sent documents 
proving, it was alleged, the claims of the dos- 
sier. It is difficult to make extracts from these 
that would adequately summarize the evidence, 
and so the reader is referred to the documents 
themselves. (See Austrian Red Book, 19, en- 
closures 1-6.) 

Before sending the note to Serbia, Austria- 
Hungary asked the advice of Germany as to 
what should be done. Germany, according to 
her own statement, replied as follows : 

The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of 
this view of the situation and asked our opinion in 
the matter. We were able to assure our ally most 
heartily of our agreement with her view of the situa- 
tion and to assure her that any action that she might 
consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to 
the movement in Serbia directed against the existence 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our 
approval. We were fully aware in this connection 
that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary 
against Serbia would bring Russia into the question 
and might draw us into a war in accordance with our 
duty as an ally. However, recognizing the vital in- 
terests of Austria-Hungary which were at stake, we 
could neither advise our ally to a compliance that 
would have been inconsistent with her dignity, nor 
could we deny her our support in this great hour of 
need. We were all the more unable to do this inas- 
much as our interests also were seriously threatened 
as a result of the continuous Serbian agitation. If 
Serbia, with the help of Russia and France, had been 
allowed to imperil the existence of the neighboring 
monarchy any longer, this would lead to the gradual 
downfall of Austria and would result in submissicm 



Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia 51 

to Slavic sway under the Russian scepter, thus making 
the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe 
untenable. A morally weakened Austria breaking 
down as the result of the advance of Russian Pan- 
Slavism would no longer be an ally on whom we could 
count and upon whom we could rely, such as we need 
in view of the attitude of our eastern and western 
neighbors, which has constantly grown more threaten- 
ing. We therefore gave Austria an entirely free hand 
in her action against Serbia. We have taken no part 
in the preparations. 8 

The German Government, however, denied 
all knowledge of the contents of the note until 
after it was sent. 9 But this denial has not been 
fully credited by Germany's opponents. They 
contend that the German Government knew be- 
forehand just what action Austria would take 
and could have prevented her from going as 
far as she did. 10 

sG. w. B. 

9B. W. P., 18, 25. 

io R. O. B., 18; F. Y. B., 35. 

The French minister at Munich in an official communication 
to the French acting foreign minister (July 23) said: "The 
(Bavarian) President of the Council said to me to-day that 
the Austrian note, the contents of which were known to him, 
was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be ac- 
cepted by Serbia." 

The North German Gazette said (September 21, 1914) that 
the statement charging the Bavarian Government with fore- 
knowledge of Austria's note to Serbia "has been shown to 
be an invention by the official Dementi of the Royal Bavarian 
Government." See F. Y. B., 21; War Chronicle, Dec, 1914, 
19. 

The British ambassador at Vienna in a dispatch to his 
Government (July 30) said: "Although I am not able to 
verify it, I have private information that the German Am- 
bassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultima- 
tum to Serbia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to 
the German Emperor." B. W. P., 95. 



52 The Causes of the European War 

Even though it disclaimed all responsibility 
for the contents of the note, yet the German 
foreign office supported Austria-Hungary in 
the stand that she had taken. Austria could 
not, it contended, draw back, now that ' ' she had 
launched that note." 11 Besides, according to 
the German ambassador at Paris, Germany 
"approved the point of view of Austria," and 
now that the bolt was shot, "could only allow 
herself to be guided by her duties as an ally. * ' 12 
"Unless the Austro-Hungarian Government," 
said the German chancellor officially, on July 
23, "wishes definitely to give up all claim to 
its position as a great power, there is nothing 
for it to do but back up its demands on the Ser- 
bian Government by strong pressure and, if 
necessary, by recourse to military measures, in 
which case the choice of means must be left to 
it. . . . Considering the conditions, the acts as 
well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government cannot but be looked upon as jus- 
tified." 13 

The Serbian prime minister considered that 
the ' ' claims of Austria-Hungary were such that 
the government of no independent country 
could accept them entirely. ' ' He hoped, there- 
fore, that England would induce Austria to 
moderate her demands. 14 Serbia objected to 

11 B. W. P., 25. is B. W. P., annex 1. 

12 R. 0. B., 19. i* S. B. B., 35. 



Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia 53 

the note not only on account of the alleged un- 
reasonableness of its demands, but also be- 
cause of the shortness of the time limit. The 
Crown Prince Alexander, in a telegram to the 
Czar, on July 24, declared that some of these 
demands could not be met without changes in 
legislation, which would require some time. 
He also asked if Eussia would not come to the 
aid of his country, as the latter might be at- 
tacked by Austria as soon as the time limit ex- 
pired. 13 Kussian help had also been solicited 
on the very day that the Austrian note was pre- 
sented. Dr. Patchou, Serbian minister for for- 
eign affairs ad interim, had on that day asked 
the help of Eussia, stating at the same time 
to the Eussian charge d'affaires at Belgrade 
that "no Serbian Government would (will) be 
able to accept the demands of Austria." 16 

Great Britain and Eussia also thought that 
the terms laid down by Austria-Hungary were 
unreasonable. Sir Edward Grey said on July 
24 that Austria had demanded more than he 
had ever known one state to ask of another 
independent state. 17 Eussia took a decided 
stand in opposition to the demands of the ulti- 
matum to Serbia. M. Sazonof, her foreign 
minister, considered that Austria had decided 
to make war on Serbia and was using her al- 
ls S. B. B., 37; R. O. B., 6. w B. W. P., 5. 
i6 R. O. B., 1. 



54 The Causes of the European War 

leged grievances as a pretext. He expressed 
himself to this effect to the Austrian ambassa- 
dor at St. Petersburg, and declared that Serbia 
would no longer be mistress of her own house 
if she submitted to the proposed cooperation 
"of Imperial and Royal (Austro-Hungarian) 
officials in the suppression of the revolutionary 
movements." 1S 

Russia also suggested that the Entente pow- 
ers unite against the stand that Austria-Hun- 
gary had taken against Serbia. On the day 
(July 24) that the Austrian note was received 
at St. Petersburg, the Russian minister for for- 
eign affairs had a conference with the British 
and French ambassadors. At this meeting he 
stated that Austria-Hungary would never have 
made such unreasonable demands on Serbia if 
Germany had not been consulted. He wanted 
Great Britain and France to declare their will- 
ingness to support Russia in preventing Austria- 
Hungary from intervening in the internal af- 
fairs of Serbia. The French ambassador de- 
clared France's willingness to fulfill her obli- 
gations to her ally and urged the English am- 
bassador to promise that his Government would 
join in a declaration of solidarity. Sir G. 
Buchanan, the English ambassador, declared 
(and his position was later approved by Sir 
Edward Grey) that his country could not take 

i8A. R. B., 14. 



Austro-Hung avian Note to Serbia 55 

a stand that would involve her in war over 
Serbia, as her interests there were nil, and pub- 
lic sentiment would not sanction a war over 
Serbia. He received the impression that Eus- 
sia and France were "determined to make a 
strong stand even if Britain should refuse to 
join them." 19 

M. Sazonof next clay renewed the request that 
England declare her intention to support Bus- 
sia. Such a declaration, he thought, would pre- 
vent war, as Germany, in his opinion, did not 
want to fight ; but unfortunately she was count- 
ing on Britain 's neutrality, and if the latter did 
not now take a firm stand beside France and 
Eussia, "rivers of blood would flow." M. Sa- 
zonof was of the opinion that Austria's action 
was directed against Eussia, and her real aim 
was to "overthrow the present status quo in 
the Balkans" and establish "her own hege- 
mony there." "Eussia could not," he said, 
"allow Austria to crush Serbia and become 
the predominant power in the Balkans, and if 
she felt (feels) secure of the support of France 
she would (will) face all the risks of war." 
Despite all this, however, Sir Gr. Buchanan de- 
clined to promise for his country a declaration 
of "solidarity" with France and Eussia, but, 
on the contrary, urged prudence upon the Eus- 
sian foreign minister. He expressed to him 
19 b, w. P., 6, 24. 



56 The Causes of the European War 

"the earnest hope that Eussia would not pre- 
cipitate war by mobilizing" until Sir Edward 
Grey had had time to use his "influence in 
favor of peace," for he thought that if "Rus- 
sia mobilized, Germany . . . would probably 
declare war at once." M. Sazonof assured 
him ' ' that Russia had no aggressive intentions, 
and she would take no action until it was forced 
upon her. ' ' 20 

This statement regarding her peaceful inten- 
tions was a true expression of Russia's atti- 
tude, according to the opinion of the French 
ambassador at St. Petersburg. The Russian 
Government, he said on July 24, was anxious to 
preserve peace but would be forced by public 
sentiment to intervene if Austria should offer 
violence to Serbia. 21 

Germany, as has been seen, supported Aus- 
tria-Hungary in the position that she had taken. 
Besides, Germany contended that the quarrel 
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary con- 
cerned these two countries alone and that the 
other nations should not take a hand in it. She 
was anxious that the dispute be localized, fear- 
ing grave consequences in case another power 
should intervene. 22 England was willing to re- 
gard the Austro-Serbian quarrel as of no con- 
cern of hers if "it did not lead to trouble be^ 

20 B. W. P., 17. 22 F. Y. B„ 28, 

?i F. Y. B., 31, 38. 



Austro-Hung avian Note to Serbia 57 

tween Austria and Russia. ' ' 23 France, too, 
according to Austrian sources, was willing that 
the dispute be localized. 24 M. Sazonof, on the 
other hand, declared that the trouble was not 
solely a question between Austria and Serbia, 
but was a matter of concern for all Europe, ' ' in- 
asmuch as the compromise arrived at in con- 
sequence of the Serbian declaration in 1909 
had been brought about under the auspices of 
the whole of Europe." As early as July 24, 
he made it perfectly clear to both the British 
and Teutonic ambassadors that his Government 
could not remain indifferent to "any action 
taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia. ' ' 25 

The shortness of the time limit mentioned 
in the ultimatum, in the opinion of the Entente 
powers, made it more difficult to adjust the 
differences between Austria and Serbia. Such 
an opinion was expressed by the French am- 
bassador at St. Petersburg on July 24, 26 and 
the time limit was opposed by Sir Edward Grey 
from the beginning. He thought it a "matter 
for great regret that a time limit, and such 
a short one, had been insisted upon" and that 
"a time limit was generally a thing to be used 
only in the last resort, after other means had 
been tried and failed." 27 

23 b. w. p., 11. 

2* A. R. B., 13. 

25 A. R B., 16; B. W. P., 7; G. W. B., annex 4. 

28 F. Y. B., 31. 

2TB. W. P., 3, 5. 



58 The Causes of the European War 

M. Sazonof, acting on the suggestion of the 
British ambassador at St. Petersburg, 28 took 
the initiative in asking that the time limit be 
prolonged. On July 24 he telegraphed a re- 
quest to the Austro-Hungarian Government 
for an extension of the time limit, giving as a 
reason the opportunity which would thus be 
afforded for the powers to examine the data 
on which Austria-Hungary had based her de- 
mands on Serbia. If the powers "found that 
some of the Austrian requests were well- 
founded, they would be in a position to advise 
the Serbian Government accordingly." The 
Russian Government also asked the courts of 
London, Rome, Berlin, Paris, and Bucharest to 
support its request. England, France, and 
Italy instructed their ambassadors at Vienna to 
join in the effort to secure an extension of the 
time limit. 29 

Germany was also invited by Great Britain to 
cooperate with the other powers in the attempt 

28 As soon as the Austrian ultimatum reached him, M. 
Sazonof asked for a conference with the French and British 
ambassadors. At this meeting (held July 24), the British 
ambassador declared that the "important point was to induce 
Austria to extend the time limit." The "French ambassador, 
however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind 
to act at once or that she was bluffing," and, therefore, the 
time was too short to carry out the British ambassador's 
suggestion. The dispatch describing this conference clearly 
implies that no steps toward an extension of the time limit 
had been taken at that time. B. W. P., 6. 

29 B. W. P., 13, 40; R. O. B., 4; F. Y. B., 39. 

The instructions to the Italian ambassador, however, came 
too late to be of any practical value. 



Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia 59 

to secure a prolongation of the time limit. Von 
Jagow, German secretary of state for foreign 
affairs, at once telegraphed to the German am- 
bassador at Vienna instructing him, according 
to the report of the British ambassador, to 
"pass on" to the Austro-Hungarian foreign 
office the request of London. 30 The French 
ambassador, however, received the impression 
that the telegram was "to the effect that he 
(the German ambassador at Vienna) should ask 
Count Berchtold (Austro-Hungarian minister 
for foreign affairs) for this extension." 31 It 
is evident, however, that Von Jagow did not 
enthusiastically support the effort in favor of 
an extension of the time limit. He expressed 
(July 25) to the Russian charge d'affaires at 
Berlin the opinion that all such "demarches 
were too late," and doubted the wisdom of Aus- 
tria's "yielding at the last moment," being 
"inclined to think that such a step on her part 
might increase the assurance of Serbia." 32 

Count Berchtold was away from Vienna and 
so Russia's request did not reach him promptly. 
On the 25th he replied and declined the re- 
quest. 33 

30 B. W. P., 18. 32 R. 0. B., 14; F. Y. B., 43. 

si F. Y. B., 41. 33 A. R. B., 20. 



CHAPTER IV 

SERBIA 's REPLY TO AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

There was a danger that Austria, not receiv- 
ing a satisfactory reply from Serbia, might at- 
tack the latter, and Europe would thus be con- 
fronted with a war before diplomacy had had 
time to arrange the terms of a settlement. Sir 
Edward Grey's fears on this score were allayed 
when the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister ex- 
plained to him, through the Austro-Hungarian 
ambassador at London, that the note to Serbia 
"was not an ultimatum but a demarche with a 
time limit, and that if the Austrian demands 
were not complied with within the time limit 
the Austro-Hungarian Government would break 
off diplomatic relations and begin military 
preparations, not operations." 1 

The German ambassador at London thought 
that a negative reply from Serbia might mean 
immediate action by Austria. In order to give 
the latter power an excuse for postponing ac- 
tion he suggested (July 24) that "a reply fa- 
vorable on some points ' ' be sent at once by Ser- 
bia. 2 

iA. R. B., 17; B. W. P., 14. 
2B. W. P., 11. 

60 



Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hungary 61 

This policy was acceptable to the Entente 
powers, for they were willing to advise Serbia 
to send a conciliatory reply to Austria. Be- 
fore the Serbian note was sent, the French for- 
eign minister had expressed the hope that Ser- 
bia's answer would be favorable enough to 
prevent a break with Austria, and, according 
to the Austrian ambassador at Paris, had ad- 
vised Serbia to go as far towards meeting Aus- 
tria-Hungary's demands as she could without 
compromising her sovereignty. 3 The British 
White Paper says that the Entente powers ad- 
vised "Serbia to go as far as possible to meet 
Austria"; and we know that Sir A. Nicholson, 
British under secretary of state for foreign af- 
fairs, on July 23 expressed to the Serbian min- 
ister at London the hope that ' ' the Serbian Gov- 
ernment would endeavor to meet the Austrian 
demands in a conciliatory and moderate 
spirit." 4 Sir Edward Grey thought (July 24) 
that Serbia should give satisfaction to Aus- 
tria if any of her officials had been implicated 
in the plot. As "for the rest," he said, " (the) 
Serbian Government must reply to Austrian de- 
mands as they consider best in Serbian inter- 
ests. ' ' 5 The French foreign minister said on 

3B. W. P., 16; A. R. B., 13. 

* B. W. P., VI, and No. 30. 

5 Apparently, this statement was in substance made to the 
Serbian minister at London July 24. The British minister 
at Belgrade was instructed on this same day to express this 
opinion of the British foreign minister to the Serbian Govern- 



62 The Causes of the European War 

July 27 that "the powers, particularly Eussia, 
France and England, have by their urgent ad- 
vice induced Belgrade to yield. ' ' 6 

Serbia made her reply to the Austrian note, 
on July 25, just before the forty-eight hour 
time limit expired. It was as follows : 



The Royal Serbian Government has received the 
communication of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment of the 10th (23rd) of this month, and it is per- 
suaded that its reply will remove any misunderstand- 
ing that threatens to spoil (gater) the good relations 
between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the 
Kingdom of Serbia. 

The Royal Government is conscious that the pro- 
tests which have been made both in the tribune of 
the national Skupshtina and in the declarations and 
acts of the responsible representatives of the State, 
protests which were cut short by the declaration of 
the Serbian Government under date of 18-31 March, 
1909, have not been renewed in regard to the great 

ment, but only after he had advised with his Russian and 
French colleagues. It was too late, now, the Russian foreign 
minister thought, to make such a representation to the Ser- 
bian Government. Besides, he said, Serbia was ready to pun- 
ish any of her subjects that should be proved guilty of a 
share in the crime. The British minister at Belgrade con- 
sulted his colleagues, but found that they had not received 
istructions to act with him. Consequently, he had not, up to 
July 25 ( the very day of the Serbian reply ) , given any ad- 
vice to the Serbian Government. He thought, however, that 
the Russian Government had "already urged the utmost mod- 
eration on the Serbian Government." It seems, therefore, 
that Sir Edward Grey's suggestion of July 24 was conveyed 
from the British, French, and Russian cabinets to the Serbian 
Government by some channel other than that of the British 
minister at Belgrade. F. Y. B., 56; B. W. P., 12, 17, 22, 
46. 

cF. Y. B., 61. 



Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hungary 63 

neighboring Monarchy on any occasion, and that since 
this time both on the part of the Royal Governments 
which have succeeded one another and on the part 
of their agents no attempt has been made with the ob- 
ject of changing the state of affairs, either political 
or judicial, created in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
Royal Government note that in this respect the Im- 
perial and Royal Government has made no representa- 
tion except as regards a schoolbook, on the subject of 
which the Imperial and Royal Government received 
an entirely satisfactory explanation. 

Serbia has numerous times given proofs of her 
pacific and moderate policy during the Balkanic crisis, 
and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice she made 
in the exclusive interest of European peace that this 
peace was preserved. 

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible 
for manifestations of a private character such as the 
articles in newspapers and the peaceful work of socie- 
ties, manifestations which take place in almost all 
countries as an ordinary thing, and which as a general 
rule escape official control, all the less that the Royal 
Government at the time of the solution of the whole 
series of questions which arose between Serbia and 
Austria-Hungary has shown a great care and has suc- 
ceeded in this fashion in settling the greatest number 
of them to the profit of the progress of the two neigh- 
boring countries. 

It is for this the Royal Government has been pain- 
fully surprised by the affirmations according to which 
persons in the Kingdom of Serbia had taken part in 
the preparation of the attentat committed at Sarajevo. 
It expected to be invited to collaborate in the investi- 
gation of everything bearing upon this crime, and it 
was ready, in order to prove by acts its entire cor- 
rectness, to act against all persons in regard to whom 
communications should be made to it. 

Bowing, then, to the desire of the Imperial and 
Royal Government, the Royal Government is disposed 



64 The Causes of the European War 

to hand over to the courts &ny Serbian subject with- 
out regard to his situation or his rank of whose com- 
plicity in the crime of Sarajevo proofs should be 
furnished. 

It undertakes especially to publish on the first page 
of the official journal under date of 13-26 July the 
following declaration : 

The Royal Government of Serbia condemns all 
propaganda which might be directed against Austria- 
Hungary, that is to say, the ensemble of the tendencies 
which have the ultimate object of detaching from the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories which form 
part of it, and it sincerely deplores the dreadful con- 
sequences of these criminal actions. 

The Royal Government regrets that certain Serbian 
officers and functionaries should have taken part, ac- 
cording to the communication of the Imperial and 
Royal Government, in the above-mentioned propa- 
ganda and thereby compromised the relations of good 
neighborliness to which the Royal Government had 
solemnly pledged itself by its declaration of 18-31 
March, 1909. 

The Royal Government, which disapproves and re- 
pudiates any idea of or attempt at interference in the 
destinies of the inhabitants of any part of Austria- 
Hungary whatever, considers it is its duty to formally 
warn officers, functionaries, and all the population of 
the kingdom that henceforward it will proceed with 
the utmost rigor against persons who should render 
themselves guilty of such actions, which it will use 
all its efforts to prevent and to repress. 

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of 
the royal army by an order of the day in the name 
of his Majesty the King by his Royal Highness the 
Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in 
the next official bulletin of the army. 

The Royal Government undertakes further: 



Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hungary 65 

(1) To introduce at the first regular session of the 
Skupshtina a clause in the law dealing with the press 
by which the most severe punishment will fall upon 
any provocation to hatred and disdain of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy as well as upon any publica- 
tion whose general tendency would be directed against 
the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. 

It undertakes, at the time of revision of the Con- 
stitution which is soon to come, to introduce into 
Article 22 of the Constitution an amendment of such 
a character that the foregoing publications can be 
confiscated, which is actually, under the categorical 
terms of Article 22 of the Constitution, an impossi- 
bility. 

(2) The Government possesses no proof, and the 
note of the Imperial and Royal Government does not 
furnish it with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" 
society and the other similar societies have committed 
up to the present any criminal act of this kind by any 
one of their members. Nevertheless the Royal Gov- 
ernment will accept the demand of the Imperial and 
Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna 
Odbrana society and any other society which should 
act against Austria-Hungary. 

(3) The Serbian Royal Government undertakes to 
eliminate without delay from the public instruction in 
Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment a 
propaganda against Austria-Hungary when the Im- 
perial and Royal Government shall furnish it with 
the facts and proofs of this propaganda. 

(4) The Royal Government similarly accepts to re- 
move from the military service those whom the judicial 
inquiry shall prove to have been guilty of acts directed 
against the integrity of the territory of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy ; it expects that the Imperial and 
Royal Government will communicate to it later the 
names and the acts of these officers and functionaries 
for the purposes of the procedure which will follow. 

(5) The Royal Government must acknowledge that 



66 The Causes of the European War 

it does not clearly understand the sense and the mean- 
ing of the demand of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment contending that Serbia should undertake to ac- 
cept upon its territory the collaboration of the agents 
(officers) of the Imperial and Royal Government. 

But it declares that it will admit any collaboration 
which would fit in with the principles of international 
law and the criminal procedure, as well as accord with 
good neighborly relations. 

(6) The Royal Government, it goes without saying, 
considers it its duty to open an inquiry against all 
those who are or who, eventually, might have been 
mixed up in the plot of 15th June, and who should be 
found on the territory of the kingdom. As for the 
participation in this inquiry of agents of the Austro- 
Hungarian authorities who should be delegated to 
this effect by the Imperial and Royal Government, 
the Royal Government cannot accept it, for it would 
be a violation of the Constitution and of the law upon 
criminal procedure. However, in the concrete cases, 
communications on the results of the inquiry in ques- 
tion could be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents. 

(7) The Royal Government proceeded, on the eve- 
ning of the receipt of the note, to the arrest of Com- 
mander Voija Tankositch. As for Milan Ciganovitch, 
who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
and who up to the 15th June was employed as aspirant 
in the Administration of the Railways, he has not yet 
been found. The Imperial and Royal Government is 
requested to be so good as, in the accustomed form, 
to make known the soonest possible the presumptions 
of culpability, as well as the eventual proofs of culpa- 
bility, which have been gathered up to this day by 
the inquiry at Sarajevo, for the purpose of the ul- 
terior inquiries. 

(8) The Serbian Government will strengthen and 
extend the measures taken to prevent the illegal traf- 
fic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes 
without saying that it will order immediately an in- 



Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hungary 67 

quiry and will severely punish the frontier function- 
aries on the Schabatz-Loznica Line who have been 
derelict in their duty and allowed the authors of the 
crime of Sarajevo to escape. 

(9) The Royal Government will willingly give ex- 
planations regarding the statements which its func- 
tionaries both in Serbia and abroad have made after 
the attentat in interviews and which according to the 
affirmation of the Imperial and Royal Government 
have been hostile toward the Monarchy, as soon as the 
Imperial and Royal Government shall have communi- 
cated to it the passages in question of these state- 
ments and as soon as it shall have demonstrated that 
the statements employed were in effect made by the 
said functionaries, although the Royal Government 
itself will undertake to collect proofs and convictions. 

(10) The Royal Government will inform the Im- 
perial and Royal Government of the execution of the 
measures comprised in the preceding points in so far 
as that has not already been done by the present note, 
as soon as each measure shall have been ordered and 
executed. In case the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment should not be satisfied with this reply, the Ser- 
bian Royal Government, considering that it is the 
common interest not to precipitate the solution of 
this question, is ready as always to accept a pacific un- 
derstanding by leaving this question either to the de- 
cision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, 
or to the Great Powers which took part in the elabora- 
tion of the declarations which the Serbian Govern- 
ment made on the 18-31st March, 1909. 7 

The reply of Serbia went beyond the expecta- 
tions of the Entente powers "in its moderation 
and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfac- 
tion to Austria. ' ' 8 The French director of the 

7 International Conciliation, Pamphlet 84, No. 13. 
8B. W. P., 46; R. 0. B., 33. 



68 The Causes of the European War 

political department thought that its concilia- 
tory attitude would "produce the best impres- 
sion in Europe, ' ' 9 and the foreign minister ex- 
pressed himself as believing that as Serbia had 
yielded on nearly all points, a little mutual 
goodwill would bring about an agreement. 10 
Sir Edward Grey considered that Serbia had 
subjected herself to the greatest humiliation 
that he had ever known a country to undergo. 
He was therefore disappointed when Austria 
received the note as a flat refusal when she 
should, in his opinion, have accepted it as a 
basis for negotiation. 11 

As soon as Sir Edward Grey received a fore- 
cast of the note, he asked that Germany would 
try to influence Austria-Hungary to take a 
favorable view of the reply, 12 and the Italian 
foreign minister joined him in this request. 13 
The German Government " passed on" the re- 
quest to Austria, but declined to urge it. 14 

Serbia's reply was not acceptable to Austria. 
A comparison of the Serbian and Austrian 
notes shows that Serbia declined to meet the 
demand that Austro-Hungarian officials be al- 
lowed to participate in the trial of alleged "par- 
ticipants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who 
were (are) on Serbian territory." As to de- 
mand 5, that Austro-Hungarian officials be al- 

9 R. O. B., 27. 12 B. W. P., 27. 

io F. Y. B., 75. is B. W. P., 63. 

11 B. W. P., 46, 48. 14 B. W. P., 34. 



Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hungary 69 

lowed in Serbia to "cooperate in the suppres- 
sion of a movement directed against the ter- 
ritorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy," Serbia declared her willingness "to 
accept every cooperation which does not run 
counter to international law and criminal law, 
as well as to the friendly and neighborly re- 
lations." Austria-Hungary claimed that on 
other points, too, the Serbian answer failed to 
meet the requirements of her note, and that the 
whole statement was an effort to deceive the 
powers, as Serbia knew that the promises given 
would not be kept. 15 The German ambassador 
at Vienna was of the same opinion. 16 

Austria-Hungary, therefore, broke diplomatic 
relations at once 17 and notified France, July 
27, that she would on the next day take steps to 
make Serbia give satisfaction. 18 Germany sup- 
ported Austria in this policy, and believed the 
latter had a right to "secure full guarantees 
that Serbia's promises should (shall) be also 
turned into deeds." 19 According to Russian 
and French sources, however, the Austrian and 
German ambassadors at Paris were surprised 
that the reply had not satisfied the Austrian 
Government, 20 and Sir Edward Grey stated that 

"A. R. B., 34, enclosure and 39; B. W. P., 48. 

i«B. W. P., 32. 

" A. R. B., 24. 

i« F. Y. B., 75. 

i» G. W. B., annex 22; R. O. B., 43. 

20 R. O. B., 27; F. Y. B., 57. 



70 The Causes of the European War 

the German secretary of state admitted that 
" there were some things in the Austrian note 
that Serbia could hardly be expected to ac- 
cept." 21 

21 B. W. P., 46. 



CHAPTER V 

EFFOETS TO PEEVENT WAE 

The danger of a rupture between Austria- 
Hungary and Serbia became imminent as soon 
as the former announced her refusal to give 
the latter a longer time in which to meet her 
demands. As Europe was divided into two 
rival groups, each composed of great powers 
tied together by alliances, a war between Serbia 
and Austria-Hungary would almost inevitably 
widen into a general conflict. The great prob- 
lem, therefore, that confronted European 
diplomacy was to settle the Austro-Serbian 
quarrel without war or, if this could not be 
done, to prevent this local quarrel from widen- 
ing into a European conflict. 

Two solutions were proposed. One was to 
allow Austria to punish Serbia but to prevent 
the trouble from spreading to other countries. 
The other was to settle the difficulty without a 
war between Serbia and Austria. A great war 
could therefore be avoided if the Austro-Ser- 
bian conflict could be either localized or pre- 
vented. Germany was the champion of "local- 
ization," 1 Russia of prevention 2 of war. 

i G. W. B., annex, 1 and 13; B. W. P., 9, 46; R. 0. B., 18. 
2F. Y. B., 83; B. W. P., 56. 
71 



72 The Causes of the European War 

The difficulties of this problem were greater 
than were those raised by the annexation (1908) 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hun- 
gary. Now, as then, both Eussia and Serbia 
were in violent opposition to the policy of the 
Dual Monarchy. Now, as then, the friends of 
Eussia, France and Great Britain, were not 
sufficiently interested to go to war solely over 
an Austro-Serbian quarrel. Then Eussia and 
Serbia were finally induced to yield to Austria- 
Hungary. Both Serbia and Eussia, however, 
considered that their grievance now against the 
Habsburg Government was greater than it had 
been on the former occasion ; for if the Austrian 
demands were met in their entirety the inde- 
pendence of Serbia would, in their opinion, un- 
questionably be compromised. Besides, Eussia, 
at the time of the annexation crisis, did not feel 
that she had the military strength to risk a war 
with Germany and Austria; now she was more 
hopeful as to the state of her military prepared- 
ness. In 1908-9 there was plenty of time for 
negotiations; now there were only a few days 
in which to settle the quarrel. 

These difficulties would have taxed the diplo- 
matic skill of a Bismarck or a Talleyrand; but 
Europe at this time could not point to any great 
names in the list of her official diplomats. In 
fact, the inefficiency exhibited by European 
diplomacy during this great crisis is one of the 



Efforts to Prevent War 73 

most unfortunate circumstances connected with 
the entire war. The diplomats, however, took 
up the task before them and worked energetic- 
ally at the problems confronting them. Efforts 
to prevent war were made both before and after 
Serbia's reply to the Austrian ultimatum was 
delivered. 

Germany's plan for solving the problem was 
to induce Eussia to stand aside and allow Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Serbia to settle their own 
quarrel. 3 If Serbia were unsupported by a 
great power she would, of course, have to yield 
and there would be no war. Germany, there- 
fore, early in the dispute, made an effort to se- 
cure the neutrality of Russia toward a possible 
conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. 
Before Austria had sent her note to Serbia, the 
German ambassador at London had asked Sir 
Edward Grey to exercise a " moderating influ- 
ence at St. Petersburg." After the note was 
sent, Sir Edward Grey in a conversation with 
the German ambassador said (July 24) that, "in 
view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the 
Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, 
and the wide scope of the demands upon Ser- 
bia," he "felt quite helpless as far as Eussia 
was concerned," and he "did not believe any 
power could exercise influence alone." 4 

Later (July 26) Germany asked that France 

*G. W. B., annex 13. *B. W. P., 10, 11. 



74 The Causes of the European War 

unite with her in trying to influence Eussia to 
moderation. France regarded this proposal as 
an effort to separate her from her ally and com- 
promise her in the eyes of Russia. The same 
effort was made by Germany in London on or 
before July 27. Paris and London replied that 
Eussia had "given proof of the greatest modera- 
tion, especially in urging upon Serbia to accept 
all that was possible of the Serbian note." Ac- 
cording to these Governments, the lack of mod- 
eration had been shown by Vienna and it was 
there that action should be taken. After this 
rebuff, Germany apparently gave up ' ' the idea 
of pressure upon Eussia only" and inclined 
rather "toward mediatory action both at St. 
Petersburg and at Vienna." 5 

Sir Edward Grey was in favor of the joint 
1 ' mediation of the four Powers ... in the Ser- 
bian question, namely, England, France, Italy, 
and Germany, this mediation to be exercised sim- 
ultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburg." 
We find him and the French ambassador at Lon- 
don on July 24 agreeing that it would be wise for 
the English Cabinet to ask Germany to take the 
initiative in an effort at mediation between Aus- 
tria and Serbia. Sir Edward Grey expressed 
at this time "his desire to leave no stone un- 
turned to avert the crisis." 6 The policy of 

s F. Y. B., 56; B. W. P., 46; R. O, B., 35, 53. 
e F. Y. B., 32, 34. 



Efforts to Prevent War 75 

joint mediation was approved by Kussia and 
Italy, and the French foreign minister declared 
his willingness "to cooperate in any conciliatory 
action at Vienna. ' ' 7 Germany, however, was 
opposed to intervention between Austria and 
Serbia, but Herr von Jagow, German foreign 
minister, said (July 25) that he was ready to 
join in with Sir Edward Grey's plan of media- 
tion ' ' if the relations between Austria and Rus- 
sia became threatening. ' ' 8 

As Austria had broken off relations with Ser- 
bia, these two powers were now on the verge of 
war and if this calamity were to be avoided 
either the former must modify her demands or 
the latter must grant them unqualifiedly. Italy 
was the only power that seemed to make a seri- 
ous effort to induce Serbia to comply with Aus- 
tria's demands. The Italian minister for for- 
eign affairs expressed the opinion on July 27 
that it would have been wiser if Serbia had ac- 
cepted Austria-Hungary's terms in their en- 
tirety. He was satisfied that Austria-Hungary 
would not agree to modify these terms, and he 
doubted if Germany would urge her to do so. 
The wise thing, therefore, was for Serbia to 
yield. Austria-Hungary, he thought, would be 

7 The Russian foreign minister said ( July 25 ) that "if Ser- 
bia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready 
to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, 
France, Germany, and Italy." 

B. W. P., 17, 35; F. Y. B., 34. 

SB. W. P., 18; G. W. B., annex 13. 



76 The Causes of the European War 

satisfied if Serbia would now agree to comply 
with the provisions of the Austrian note. Ser- 
bia could save her dignity by accepting the note 
under the advice of the four powers. She could 
then say that she had yielded at the suggestion 
of Europe rather than at the behest of Austria- 
Hungary. 9 

The Serbian charge d'affaires at Rome ex- 
pressed the opinion that if Austria would ex- 
plain articles 5 and 6 of her note, ' ' Serbia might 
still accept the whole note." It was not ex- 
pected that Austria-Hungary would make these 
explanations to Serbia, but she might give them 
to the " powers engaged in discussions, who 
might then advise Serbia to accept without con- 
ditions.' ' The Italian foreign minister re- 
quested the English ambassador at Rome to re- 
port this information to his Government. The 
former was very anxious that a discussion of 
this phase of the question should be undertaken 
at once, and seemed to want England to ap- 
proach Austria-Hungary on the subject, though 
there is no clear statement of such a wish. 10 
Sir Edward Grey's reply to this proposal was 
that he would not take up the question with 
Austria-Hungary as that power had shown an 
unwillingness to ''accept any discussion on basis 
of Serbian note." 11 The British foreign min- 

9F. Y. B., 72; B. W. P., 57. 
io B. W. P., 64. 
« B. W. P., 81. • 



Efforts to Prevent War 11 

ister did, however, present Italy's plan to the 
German ambassador, but made no proposal of 
his own. 12 

The Eussian foreign minister had declared 
(July 26) that certain of the demands made 
by Austria-Hungary could not be met by Serbia 
without changing her laws and also incurring 
the risk of exciting mob violence against the 
Government. 13 Three days later, after she had 
ordered partial mobilization and war between 
herself and Austria seemed imminent, Eussia 
showed herself very anxious to avoid a conflict. 
At that time Sir G. Buchanan, English ambassa- 
dor at St. Petersburg, asked the Eussian foreign 
minister if he would object to the suggestion of 
Italy that Serbia promise the powers to meet 
fully the demands of Austria-Hungary. His 
reply was that "he would agree to anything ar- 
ranged by the Four Powers, provided it was ac- 
ceptable to Serbia" — that he was not "more 
Serbian than Serbia." M 

The published correspondence of the various 
governments does not show that the negotia- 
tions along this line proceeded any further, nor 
does it explain why they ceased at this point. 
It is charged that Austria did not expect nor 
want Serbia to accept her proposals. The Ser- 
bian ambassador at Vienna considered, he says, 
on July 24, that war with Austria was inevitable, 

12 B. W. P., 90. i* b. w. P., 78. 

13 R. 0. B., 25. 



78 The Causes of the European War 

even if Serbia should accede to all of Austria's 
demands. 15 The French ambassador at Vienna 
thought that the military party in Austria did 
not want Serbia to yield. 16 On July 27, the 
British ambassador expressed the opinion that 
the Austro-Hungarian Government was anxious 
for war with Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian 
note had been "so drawn up as to make war 
inevitable. " 17 Germany, too, according to a 
Russian source, did not want the breach between 
Serbia and Austria to be healed. The Eussian 
charge d'affaires at Berlin contended that up 
until July 28 the Wolf Bureau had not published 
the contents of the Serbian note, for fear that it 
would have a conciliatory effect on the people. 18 

Two plans for the prevention of war had now 
failed, but there was left the possibility of in- 
ducing Austria-Hungary ' ' either to approve the 
response from Belgrade or else to accept it as a 
basis for discussions." To bring about one of 
these results was the aim of Sir Edward Grey. 
At first his efforts seem to have been directed to- 
ward the former objective and later toward the 
latter. 19 

The Entente Governments felt that Germany 
was the only power that could influence Austria 
to abate her demands. The "key of the situa- 
tion," according to M. Sazonof, Russian foreign 

is S. B. B., 52. is R. O. B., 46. 

io F. Y. B„ 27. 19 A. R. B., 20, 38, 43. 

n B. W. P., 41. 



Efforts to Prevent War 79 

minister, ' ' was in Berlin. ' ' The first important 
move would have to be made by Germany. So 
on July 25 Sir Edward Grey expressed to the 
German ambassador at London the hope that his 
Government would "be able to influence the Aus- 
trian Government to take a favorable view" of 
the Serbian note, if it should prove to be as con- 
ciliatory as the forecast of it indicated. The 
German foreign office "passed on" the desire of 
Britain, but, according to her contention, ap- 
parently made no effort to influence Austria- 
Hungary to adopt the suggestion. Germany 
gave as a reason for her hesitancy in pressing 
Austria the danger that Austria would come 
out with a fait accompli. On July 29 the secre- 
tary of state for foreign affairs seemed dis- 
tressed and said that Austria-Hungary had done 
what he feared. He also felt that by passing on 
England's suggestion he had hastened a declara- 
tion of war. 20 

Sir Edward Grey's other plan was that Bus- 
sia and Austria-Hungary agree to abstain from 
military operations until the four powers not 
directly concerned — Italy, Great Britain, France, 
and Germany — could arrange a satisfactory 
agreement. The ambassadors representing 

20 B. W. P., vi; 25, 27, 34, 54, 76; G. W. B., annex 15; 

A. R. B., 43, 44. 

The German under-secretary of state waa of the opinion 
that his Government, by merely submitting to Austria-Hun- 
gary the British proposal, gave it a qualified endorsement. 

B. W. P., 34. 



80 The Causes of the European War 

those four Governments at London should keep 
in touch with each other and by their joint efforts 
try to work over the Serbian concessions and 
change them into terms that would be acceptable 
to both sides. A proposal to this effect was 
made by him July 26, and the other three powers 
were invited to take part in the conference. 21 
France, 22 Italy, and Russia 23 agreed to the plan. 
Germany, while opposed to mediation between 
Austria and Serbia, said that she accepted the 
principle of mediation between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Russia, but was opposed to the con- 
ference proposed by Grey on the ground that it 
would be a court of arbitration and could not be 
called except at the request of these two powers. 
Besides, she favored a direct interchange of 
views between Austria and Russia, and thought 
that nothing else should be done until the result 
of these negotiations was known. The British 
ambassador at Berlin explained that Sir Edward 
Grey's plan did not contemplate a court of arbi- 
tration but only an informal discussion as to 
what could be done, no suggestion to be con- 
sidered that had not previously been consented 
to by Austria-Hungary and Russia. 24 The 

21 A. R. B., 38, 41; B. W. P., 36. 

22 F. Y. B., 70. 

23 B. W. P., 49, 55. 

The Russian foreign minister said that "he was perfectly 
ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for 
a conference/' 

2* G. W. B., annex 12, 13; B. W. P., 43, 46, 67. 



Efforts to Prevent War 81 

French ambassador at Berlin expressed his re- 
gret at Germany's refusal. He said that Sir 
Edward Grey's plan went beyond the question 
of form — the main point in his plan was the co- 
operation of the four powers in the interest of 
peace ; that this cooperation could take place in 
the form of ' ' common demarches at Vienna and 
at St. Petersburg." 25 Austria, however, de- 
clined the proposal and Sir Edward Grey agreed 
that direct negotiations between Austria and 
Russia were preferable to his plan of a confer- 
ence, if a direct interchange of views between 
Vienna and St. Petersburg could be effected. 26 
The plan of a conference, therefore, fell into 
abeyance for the time being, the powers awaiting 
the outcome of the direct negotiations, which 
had already been started. 

Eussia had taken the initiative in opening 
these negotiations. In an interview (July 26) 
with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at St. 
Petersburg, M. Sazonof, the Eussian foreign 
minister, suggested an exchange of views be- 
tween the Eussian and Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernments "in order to redraft certain articles 
of the Austrian note." "This method of pro- 
cedure would perhaps enable us (the two Gov- 
ernments) to find a formula which would prove 
acceptable to Serbia, while giving satisfaction 

25 f. Y. B., 74. 

as B. W. P., 67; G. W. B., S., 775. 



82 The Causes of the European War 

to Austria in respect to the chief of her de- 
mands." He asked at this time that Austria- 
Hungary take back her ultimatum to Serbia and 
modify her terms, and he would guarantee the 
result. 27 M. Sazonof at first was hopeful as to 
the result of these pourparlers; and this first 
meeting between him and Count Szapary had, 
according to English sources, made a good im- 
pression at Vienna. 28 The Eussian ambassador 
at Berlin (July 27) asked Von Jagow, the Ger- 
man secretary of state, to persuade the Austro- 
Hungarian Government to accept Russia's pro- 
posal to negotiate with reference to the Serbian 
question. Von Jagow 's attitude was one of ac- 
quiescence in the plan, but he declined to advise 
Austria-Hungary to yield, even though the am- 
bassador urged him to take a more decided 
stand in favor of the proposal. 29 

This plan, however, failed, for Count Berch- 
told, Austro-Hungarian secretary of state for 
foreign affairs, told the Russian minister at 
Vienna (July 28) that Austria could not with- 
draw from the position that she had taken nor 
could she " enter upon any discussion of the 
terms of the Austro-Hungarian note. ' ' 30 

The proposal for the mediation of the four 
powers was also rejected by Austria-Hungary. 

w R. O. B., 25; F. Y. B., 54. 29 R. O. B., 38. 
28 p. Y. B., 80. 30 R. 0. B., 45. 



Efforts to Prevent Wwr 83 

She declared war on Serbia July 28, 31 and next 
day made a formal statement as to her reasons 
for so doing. The Serbian Government, she 
said, had "proceeded to the mobilization of the 
Serbian forces before it replied to her (our) 
note, and subsequently had (has) allowed three 
days to elapse without showing any disposition 
to modify its point of view. ' ' The Austro-Hun- 
garian minister had also previously charged Ser- 
bia with having attacked Austrian frontier 
guards on July 27. 32 

The efforts to prevent war had failed, but all 
negotiations between Russia and Austria were 
not at an end. Eussia had partially mobilized 
but was still anxious to come to an agreement 
with Austria. Both the Russian foreign minis- 
ter and the German ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg favored an "interchange of views between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia." M. Sazonof 
also thought well of Sir Edward Grey's plan of 
a conference of the four powers. Both plans 
for peace could, in his judgment, be wisely pros- 
ecuted simultaneously. 33 

si A. R. B., 37. 

32 A. R. B., 41, 44. 

33 R. 0. B., 49; B. W. P., 118. 



CHAPTER VI 

EFFORTS TO ISOLATE THE WAR 

The effort to prevent war having failed, the 
policy of "isolation" now offered the only hope 
for peace. Efforts in this direction had already 
been made. These had no chance of success un- 
less Russia could be induced to stand aside and 
acquiesce in the punishment of Serbia, or Aus- 
tria-Hungary could be persuaded to stop hostili- 
ties against Serbia and moderate her demands. 
Therefore, the great problem still was how to 
bring Austria-Hungary and Russia to an agree- 
ment. 

Despite Russia's determination to stand by 
her protege, there was still a possibility that the 
war between Austria and Serbia would not drag 
in the other European nations. Both Russia 
and the Teutonic powers seemed anxious to 
avoid a general war. The German chancellor 
said, as late as the evening of July 29, that he 
was still " 'pressing the button' as hard as he 
could" at Vienna. 1 The French minister at St. 
Petersburg more than once spoke of the anxiety 
of the Russian Government for peace. 2 Accord- 

i B. W. P., 71, 97, 107. 
2 F. Y. B., 31, 38, 54. 

84 



Efforts to Isolate the War 85 

ing to the British White Paper, Russia wanted 
a period of peace to develop her internal re- 
sources. 3 It is true that the Russian ambassa- 
dor at Vienna had declared officially (July 27) 
to the Austro-Hungarian Government that in 
case war broke out between the Dual Monarchy 
and Serbia "it would be impossible to localize 
it, for Russia was not prepared to give way 
again, as she had done on previous occasions." 4 
The Teutonic authorities, however, seemed to 
think that Russia would not go to war at this 
time. She was having revolutionary troubles at 
home, and her military preparedness, it was 
thought, was not adequate, despite assurances to 
the contrary given out by the Russian Govern- 
ment. 5 Britain and France had no interest in 
the Austro-Serbian dispute unless it grew into a 
Russo-Austrian quarrel. 6 

The German Emperor felt that Russia ought 
not to interfere with Austria's purpose to chas- 
tise Serbia. His position was that the trouble 
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was lo- 
cal and that the latter was justified in secur- 
ing such guarantees as would force Serbia to 
turn her promises into deeds. Inasmuch as 
Austria-Hungary had promised to annex no ter- 
ritory from Serbia, Russia could afford to stand 
aside as a disinterested spectator. 7 

3 B. W. P., viii. 6B. W. P., 48; A. R. B., 38. 

* B. W. P., 56. ' G. W. B., annex 22. 

sB. G. B. (2), 12; B. W. P., 32; F. Y. B., 96. 



86 The Causes of the European War 

Kussia, however, took an entirely different 
view of her obligations to Serbia. Both senti- 
mental and political considerations urged her to 
protect Serbia. Public sentiment, therefore, 
would not allow the Government to stand aside 
and see the little Slavic state humiliated. The 
feeling in Russia was that Russians could not 
desert their brethren in Serbia. 8 Besides, the 
Russian Government felt that the real cause of 
the trouble was Austria's desire to be supreme 
in the Balkan peninsula. If Russia allowed Ser- 
bia 's independence to be compromised, she con- 
sidered that she would lose her position in the 
Balkans, and the hegemony of these states would 
in the future belong to Austria-Hungary. 
Therefore, she had, as has been seen, announced 
in the very beginning that if France would sup- 
port her, she would intervene in case Serbia 
were attacked. 9 It seems that Austria-Hun- 
gary, too, felt that her future with reference to 
the Balkan states was at stake, for Count Mens- 
dorff, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at 
London, told Sir Edward Grey on July 29 that 
1 ' Serbia had always been considered as being in 
the Austrian sphere of influence" prior to the 
Balkan War. 10 

Austria's promise to respect the integrity of 
Serbia did not satisfy Russia, even though it 

» Ibid., annex 18. 

» F. Y. B., 103; B. W. P., 17; R. 0. B., 10; G. W. B., annex 4. 

i«B. W. P., 91. 



Efforts to Isolate the War 87 

was afterwards ratified by Germany. 11 Be- 
sides, this promise was later (July 27) condi- 
tioned on the localization of the war between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia. There was a dan- 
ger, as England pointed out, that public senti- 
ment in Austria might make it impossible for the 
Austro-Hungarian Government to redeem its 
pledge. 12 Russia, however, insisted on the 
maintenance of the independence as well, as the 
integrity of Serbia and she contended that the 
enforcement of Austria 's demands would reduce 
the little state to a condition of vassalage under 
the Dual Monarchy. This would disturb the 
equilibrium in the Balkans and would thus touch 
Russia 's interests. Therefore, the Russian Gov- 
ernment could not, in the opinion of M. Sazonof, 
afford to allow Serbian independence to be jeop- 
ardized. 13 

Austria-Hungary declared (July 30) that she 
had repeatedly promised to respect the sover- 
eignty of Serbia and accused the Russian Gov- 
ernment of having suppressed information re- 
garding these assurances. This charge was em- 
phatically denied by the Russian ambassador at 
Paris. 14 In support of Austria's claim regard- 
ing her promises as to the independence of 
Serbia, we have the following evidence : Count 

"Ibid., 97. 

12 A. R. B., 32; B. W. P., vi-vii. 

"A. R. B., 47; B. W. P., 55, 90, 97, 111. 

14 A. R. B., 50; R. 0. B„ 75. 



88 The Causes of the European War 

Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian minister for for- 
eign affairs, instructed the Austro-Hungarian 
ambassador at St. Petersburg (July 25) to in- 
form M. Sazonof, the Eussian foreign minister, 
that clause 5 of the Austrian note was "not in- 
tended as an infringement on Serbia's sover« 
eignty." 15 The Austro-Hungarian ambassa- 
dor stated (July 29) to M. Sazonof that his Gov- 
ernment had no intention to violate the sover- 
eignty of Serbia. The British ambassador at 
Vienna stated (July 29) that Austria had de- 
clared in St. Petersburg that she had no desire 
to destroy the independence of Serbia. 16 

These promises, however, rested for their ful- 
fillment only on the good faith of Austria-Hun- 
gary, as the guarantee of her ally, Germany, did 
not cover the independence of Serbia. Eussia's 
fears were not allayed by these declarations : for 
her foreign minister considered that the Dual 
Monarchy was already trying to compromise the 
sovereignty of Serbia by insisting on the en- 
forcement of its demands. 17 On July 28 he told 
the English ambassador at St. Petersburg that 
Eussia would not be satisfied with any assur- 
ances that Austria -Hungary might give as to the 
integrity and independence of Serbia if Serbia 
should be invaded. 18 

The Italian ambassador at Vienna thought 

is A. R. B., 27. 17 A. R. B., 47. 

16 A. R. B., 47; B. W. P., 79 is B. W. P., 72; A. R. B., 55 



Efforts to Isolate the War 89 

(July 29) that if Austria-Hungary would convert 
into a binding engagement the declaration that 
she had made, promising not to destroy the inde- 
pendence or integrity of Serbia, "Eussia might 
be induced to remain quiet. ' ' 19 Two days later, 
Sir Edward Grey suggested that, as Eussian dis- 
trust of Austria's assurances as to the integrity 
and independence of Serbia and Austrian dis- 
trust of Serbian promises had been a bar to an 
agreement, the powers should offer to guaran- 
tee to Austria that she should receive full satis- 
faction from Serbia and to guarantee to Eussia 
that Austria would not interfere with the integ- 
rity and independence of Serbia. Sir Edward 
Grey's proposal carried with it the provision 
that Germany would sound Austria-Hungary as 
to her agreement with such a plan and he would 
sound Eussia. The plan was presented to the 
German secretary of state on July 31, after the 
German ultimatum had been sent to Eussia. 
He expressed sympathy with the idea but de- 
clared that his Government could not consider 
any proposal until after it had heard from Eus- 
sia. 20 

In the meantime other efforts at mediation 
had been made. On July 29 the French ambas- 
sador at Berlin suggested that after Austria had 
entered Serbia and chastised her and thus satis- 
fied her own military prestige, the moment might 

is b. w. P., 79. 20 b. w. P., in, 121. 



90 Tlie Causes of the European War 

then be favorable for mediation of the four pow- 
ers. The German under-secretary of state 
seemed to think the idea worthy of consideration 
and thought it a very different proposition from 
the plan of a conference offered by Sir Edward 
Grey. 21 

M. Sazonof, the Eussian foreign minister, on 
that same day asked Sir Edward Grey to renew 
his proposal of the conference and to endeavor 
to induce Germany's cooperation. This re- 
quest came at a time when Russia was "mobil- 
izing partially in her southern provinces," 22 
and Austro-Hungarian troops were bombarding 
Belgrade. As Germany had on July 28 (re- 
ceived July 29) given England assurances that 
she was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. 
Petersburg, 23 Sir Edward Grey on the 29th took 
up with the German ambassador, in accordance 
with the wish of the Eussian Government, the 
question of renewing the plan of joint mediation. 
He asked the German Government to suggest a 
plan of mediation that would be acceptable to it, 
inasmuch as it had objected to the conference 
previously proposed by him on the ground that 
it was too formal. ■ ' Mediation was ready, ' ' he 
said, "to come into operation by any method 
that Germany thought possible if only Germany 
would 'press the button' in the interests of 
peace." 

2i B. W. P., 76. 23 B. W. P., 71. 

22 B. W. P., 70, 78; also vi-vii. 



Efforts to Isolate the War 91 

Sazonof 's offer of mediation was conditioned 
on a suspension of hostilities against Serbia by 
Austria; otherwise, he said, " mediation would 
only allow matters to drag on and give Austria 
time to crush Serbia." Sir Edward Grey 
thought that it was now ''too late for all mili- 
tary operations against Serbia to be sus- 
pended" ; but he wanted Austria to promise that 
after she had taken Belgrade her armies would 
not advance farther pending the mediation of 
the powers. It was understood, however, that 
Austria-Hungary was to hold the territory oc- 
cupied until she "had complete satisfaction from 
Serbia." 24 

The German Government promised (July 30) 
to endeavor to influence Austria-Hungary to ac- 
cept mediation on the terms laid down by the 
British foreign office, and the chancellor said 
that on the evening of that day he begged Aus- 
tria to reply to Sir Edward Grey's proposal. 
As yet Austria-Hungary had made no reply, but 
her foreign minister promised to take the wishes 
of the Emperor next morning (July 31 ). 25 

On this same July 30 there occurred at 2 a. m. 
a memorable meeting between M. Sazonof, the 
Eussian foreign minister, and the German am- 
bassador at St. Petersburg. When the German 
ambassador saw that Russia's determination 

2*B. W. P., 70, 78, 84, 88. 
25 B. W. P., 08, 100, 103, 112. 



92 The Causes of the European War 

was unshaken and that war was inevitable, he 
1 * completely broke down. ' ' " He appealed to M. 
Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could 
telegraph to German Government as a last 
hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and 
handed to German ambassador a formula in 
French, of which following is translation: 'If 
Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Ser- 
bia has assumed character of question of Euro- 
pean interest, declares herself ready to elimi- 
nate from her ultimatum points which violate 
principle of sovereignty of Serbia, Eussia en- 
gages to stop all military preparations. ' " 26 

At Great Britain's request, Russia agreed to 
modify her offer, leaving it to the powers to 
decide what satisfaction Serbia could give Aus- 
tria without compromising her independence. 27 
On July 29 Austria-Hungary, acting on the ad- 
vice of Germany, renewed negotiations with 
Russia 28 and two days later she announced her 
willingness, despite the change in the situation 
due to Russian mobilization, to consider Sir Ed- 
ward Grey's proposition to mediate between her- 
self and Serbia. The conditions laid down by 
her foreign minister were as follows : 

Our acceptance, however, is subject to the condi- 
tion that our military action against Serbia shall 
nevertheless proceed and that the British Cabinet shall 

26 b. W. P., 97. 

27 B. W. P., 103, 120. 

28 B. W. P., 110, 96; A. R. B., 49; G. W. B., S., 777. 



Efforts to Isolate the War 93 

induce the Russian Government to stop the mobiliza- 
tion directed against us. It is understood that in this 
case we would at once cancel our defensive military 
counter-measures in Galicia, which had been forced 
upon us by Russia's mobilization. 29 

29 A. R. B., 51. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE WAR AREA BROADENS 

Hopes of peace were now aroused. These, 
however, were soon dashed to the ground, for 
Germany at this time, July 31, sent an ultimatum 
to Russia, demanding the cessation of her mo- 
bilization within twelve hours. 1 No reply being 
received, Germany began to mobilize, and on 
August 1 war between Germany and Russia was 
declared. 2 All hope of a peaceful settlement of 
the dispute now ended. Germany charges that 
Russian mobilization was the cause of this final 
failure of the efforts for peace. 3 The Entente 
powers, on the other hand, blame it on the Ger- 
man ultimatum. They claim that it was entirely 
unnecessary, as the Russo-British plan for me- 
diation provided for a general suspension of 
hostilities. 

Inasmuch as Russian mobilization figures as 
an important cause of the war, it is necessary 
to give in brief the steps that led to Russian 
and German mobilization. On July 26 Ger- 
many heard through her military attache at St. 

1R.O. B., 76. s G. W. B., S. I, 779. 

2R. 0. B., 70; B. W. P., 117; G. W. B. 5 24. 
94 



The War Area Broadens 95 

Petersburg that Russia had begun mobilization. 
In consequence of this report, the German Gov- 
ernment declared to the Russian Government 
that " preparatory military measures by Rus- 
sia" would force Germany to mobilize against 
both Russia and France, inasmuch as Germany 
knew of France's obligations to Russia. 4 Ger- 
many was assured by Russia on the 27th that 
mobilization had not begun, though preparations 
for it had been made. It was stated, however, 
that mobilization against Austria-Hungary 
would begin if Serbia's frontier was crossed, but 
that under no circumstances would it extend to 
the districts next to Germany's frontier. A like 
statement was made to Austria-Hungary July 
28. 5 

After Austria-Hungary had declared war on 
Serbia, Russia (July 29) announced her decision 
to mobilize in the four southern districts near 
Austria-Hungary. At the same time she de- 
clared that her military movements were not di- 
rected against Germany, nor was there any ag- 
gressive action intended against Austria-Hun- 
gary. Russia had no intention to make a sud- 
den attack on Austria-Hungary, but her troops 
would be kept under arms to be ready in case 
her interests in the Balkans were menaced. 
Such measures had to be taken by her, she 

* G. W. B., exhibit 7 ; also S., 774. 
*G. W. B., exhibit 11; A. R. B., 42. 



96 The Causes of the European War 

contended, inasmuch as Austria could mobilize 
more quickly than she could and already had the 
start of her. 6 

Several reasons for this action were given by 
Eussia. She was offended because Austria had 
completely ignored her in the Serbian dispute. 
Other reasons were that Austria had gone to 
war with Serbia and had mobilized more exten- 
sively than this war warranted, giving rise to 
the impression that these movements were di- 
rected against Eussia. She declared that Aus- 
tria had already mobilized half of her army, and 
that this mobilization was proceeding on the 
Eussian frontier, according to information re- 
ceived by the Eussian ambassador at Berlin. 
Then, too, Austria-Hungary had declined to con- 
tinue the conversations that had been going on 
between the two powers. 7 Austria-Hungary, 
however, contended that she had not mobilized 
against Eussia but only against Serbia, but 
would now have to mobilize against Eussia, not 
as a hostile act, but as a response to Eussia 's 
mobilization. She, therefore, ordered a general 
mobilization on July 31. 8 

When Germany learned that Eussia had par- 
tially mobilized, she notified the latter power 
that if she did not cease her military prepara- 
tions, she (Germany) would order mobilization. 

eR. O. B., 49; A. R. B., 47. 

7B. W. P., 95; F. Y. B., 95; R. O. B., 51, 77; A. R. B., 47. 

s A. R. B., 50, 52. 



The War Area Broadens 97 

Russia felt that she could not accede to this de- 
mand, and, therefore, had no alternative but to 
hasten military preparations and consider that 
war was inevitable. On July 31 Russia ordered 
a general mobilization. The reason alleged for 
this action was that Austria had determined not 
to yield to the intervention of the powers and 
was moving troops against Russia as well as 
Serbia. Besides, she had reason to believe that 
Germany was making active military prepara- 
tions and Russia could not afford to let her get 
the start. 9 Sazonof, the Russian foreign min- 
ister, told the English ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg on July 30 that he had absolute proof that 
Germany was making military and naval prep- 
arations against Russia. 10 The German chan- 
cellor as late as July 31 declared that his Gov- 
ernment had made no preparations for mobili- 
zation. The German White Book also charges 
that between July 29 and 31 there appeared re- 
newed and cumulative evidence concerning Rus- 

9R. 0. B., 58; F. Y. B., 100; B. W. P., 113. 

It will be seen from the citations given that the Russian 
order for general mobilization became effective July 31. This 
is also the date given in the Austrian and German official 
statements ( see S., pp. 7, 779 ) . The Belgian minister at St. 
Petersburg is quoted in the German White Book as saying 
(July 30) that the order for general mobilization was pub- 
lished at 4 a. M., July 30. He also made the following state- 
ment: "To-day in St. Petersburg one is fully convinced, and 
even the assurance has been given, that England will stand 
by the side of France. This support is of quite extraordinary 
weight, and has in no small degree contributed to give the 
war partv the upper hand" See S., 819. 

io B. W. P., 97; R. O. B., 61, 62. 



98 The Causes of the European War 

sian mobilization. Concentration of troops on 
the east Eussian frontier and a declaration of a 
state of war over all important parts of Rus- 
sia's west frontier allowed no further doubt that 
Russian mobilization was in full swing, while 
such measures were all being denied on word of 
honor. 11 

The order of mobilization on the part of Rus- 
sia did not cause an immediate break in the rela- 
tions with Austria-Hungary. For the Russian 
ambassador at Vienna was still exchanging 
views with the Austro-Hungarian minister for 
foreign affairs on the 31st, after Russia's order 
for mobilization had been promulgated. 12 Rus- 
sia maintained that mobilization in her case did 
not necessarily mean war, as she could remain 
mobilized for months without making war. 

' ' This was not the case (with Germany) . She 
had the speed and Russia had the numbers," 
and she did not propose to sacrifice that advan- 
tage by delay. 13 So at midnight July 31, the 
German ambassador at St. Petersburg declared 
to the Russian Government that Germany would 
mobilize if Russia did not commence demobili- 
zation in twelve hours, not only against Ger- 
many but also against Austria. The German 
chancellor took the position that a general mo- 
bilization on the part of Russia necessarily 

ii G. W. B., S., 777-8; exhibits 23, 24. 

12 R. O. B., 66. 

13 B, W. P., 138. 



The War Area Broadens 99 

meant a mobilization against Germany. 14 Rus- 
sia made no answer to this demand, and Ger- 
many declared war on Russia on the evening of 
August l. 15 Five days later Austria-Hun- 
gary followed her ally in a declaration of war 
against Russia. 16 

France and Germany were the next countries 
to go to war. The documents show conflicting 
accounts as to which power first began military 
preparations and it is hard to say which country 
took the initiative as to mobilization. The ques- 
tion of priority of mobilization, however, was 
of no great significance as a cause of war, for 
France was bound by treaty obligations to Rus- 
sia, and let it be known before Russia and Ger- 
many went to war that she would stand by her 
ally. As early as July 27, the French ambassa- 
dor at Berlin informed Von Jagow, German for- 
eign minister, that the relations of Germany and 
Austria were no closer than those of France and 
Russia. 17 On July 29 the French premier de- 
clared that Russia could count on his country, as 
France would fulfill all her obligations as Rus- 
sia's ally. He was anxious, however, for peace 
and wanted England to renew her offer of the 
mediation of the four powers. 18 The French 
ambassador at London told Sir Edward Grey 

1* R. O. B., 70; G. W. B., 23, 24. 

is R. 0. B., 76. " F. Y. B., 74. 

i« R. O. B., 79. i» F. Y. B., 101 ; R. O. B., 55. 



100 The Causes of the European War 

this same day that France "was bound tolielp 
Russia if Russia was attacked." 19 

Two days later (July 31), M. Jules Cambon, 
the French ambassador at Berlin, was informed 
by Von Jagow that his Government, owing to the 
general mobilization of the Russian army, had 
proclaimed Kriegsgefahrzustand (the state of 
danger of war). M. Cambon was also at the 
same time notified of Germany's demand on Rus- 
sia that the latter cease mobilization. 20 The 
French military authorities regarded this proc- 
lamation as tantamount to mobilization. It was, 
they said, "mobilization under another name." 
As the French frontier forces were faced by 
eight German corps, they were in imminent dan- 
ger of attack by the latter. For these reasons 
the French Government in the afternoon of Aug- 
ust 1 ordered a general mobilization, stating at 
the same time that it was taking this action 
purely for defensive purposes. The French 
troops were stationed ten kilometers from the 
frontier and were not to attack the Germans. 21 

In the evening of July 31, M. Viviani, the 
French foreign minister, was asked by the Ger- 
man ambassador at Paris to state "what the 
attitude of France would be in case of war be- 
tween Germany and Russia. ' ' The French Gov- 
ernment understood this inquiry, it declared, 

is B. W. P., 87. 21 B. W. P., 136, 140. 

20 F. Y. B., 116. 



The War Area Broadens 1Q1 

to carry with it an intimation that Germany 
would recall her ambassador from Paris if a 
satisfactory answer were not given next day. 
The French foreign office regarded this as an 
extraordinary request and took the position that 
it did not have to announce its intentions to any 
power other than an ally. 22 Therefore, when 
the inquiry was renewed next day, the French 
premier replied that "France would do that 
which her interests dictated." 23 

This answer was, of course, not satisfactory 
to Germany, but her ambassador was not re- 
called until August 3, on which day war was 
formally declared on France by Germany. 24 
France maintained diplomatic relations with 
Austria-Hungary a week longer, and did not de- 
clare war on this power until August 12. 25 

Montenegro sympathized warmly with Serbia 
and decided early to help her against her ene- 
mies. She, therefore, declared war against Aus- 
tria-Hungary on August 8 and against Germany 
four days later. 

22 G. W. B., exhibit 25; F. Y. B., 117; B. W. P., 126. 

23 G. W. B., exhibit 27. 

24 F. Y. B., 147, 148. 

25 A. R. B., 63, 65. 



CHAPTER VIII 

GREAT BRITAIN DECLARES WAR ON THE TEUTONIC 
POWERS 

Great Britain was anxious that a European 
conflict be avoided, 1 and, as has been seen, sug- 
gested several plans for settling the questions at 
issue. She was willing to support both the pol- 
icy of isolation championed by Germany and the 
policy of prevention championed by Russia. 
She was the only great power whose hands were 
not tied by alliances. Her understanding with 
France and Russia did not impose upon her a 
treaty obligation to enter the war if either or 
both of these powers should be drawn into the 
conflict. Nor is there the slightest intimation 
in all the correspondence that France and Rus- 
sia considered that she was bound by the terms 
of the Triple Entente to take sides with them 
against their enemies. Britain, therefore, de- 
clared herself interested in the quarrel only in 
so far as it jeopardized the peace of Europe and 
thereby menaced her own security. 

Her attitude toward the Austro-Serbian quar- 
rel was in keeping with this general policy. 

l B. W. P., 1, 3. 

102 



Great Britain Declares War 103 

While she regarded the demands of Austria- 
Hungary as unreasonable and considered that 
Serbia's "reply went farther than could have 
been expected to meet Austrian demands," 2 still 
she declined to discuss the merits of the case, 
declaring that she would concern herself with 
the dispute only to the extent that it affected the 
peace of Europe. She was interested in Aus- 
tria's ultimatum solely because of the trouble 
between Austria and Russia that might grow out 
of it. This stand was taken as early as July 24, 
and it was known to all the interested powers. 3 

Russia and France were anxious for Great 
Britain to join them "in making a communica- 
tion to Austria to the effect that active inter- 
vention by her in the internal affairs of Serbia 
could not be tolerated," believing that by such 
joint action war might be averted. She declined 
to join in such a declaration, although she was 
asked to do so by the Russian foreign minister 
and the French ambassador at St. Petersburg as 
early as July 24. 4 Russia thought that Ger- 
many was counting on England's neutrality, and 
that this was the reason for her supporting 
Austria-Hungary in her militant policy. Sir 
Edward Grey contended that Germany had no 
right to assume that Great Britain would stand 
aside in any event. He said that this impres- 

2B. W. P., 5, 46, 116, 119. 4B. W. P., 6, 24. 
3 B. W. P., 3, 10, 6, 24, 11. 



104 The Causes of the European War 

sion ought to be dispelled by the orders given 
(July 27) to the fleet concentrated at Portland 
' 'not to disperse for maneuver leave." 5 He 
was careful, however, to announce that these na- 
val orders were not to be construed as a pledge 
that Britain would assist Eussia and France in 
case they should be drawn into war. As late as 
July 29, Sir Edward Grey stated to the French 
ambassador at London that his Government 
would not take part in the Serbian dispute, nor 
even in a war between Russia and Austria, for 
that would only be a struggle over the hegemony 
of the Balkans. But if Germany or France were 
brought in and the hegemony of Europe were in- 
volved, that would present a problem the solu- 
tion of which Great Britain had not yet deter- 
mined upon. This announcement was also made 
to Germany. 6 

Germany was undoubtedly anxious that Great 
Britain remain neutral if she and Austria were 
involved in a war with France and Russia. On 
July 29 Germany made her first bid for British 
neutrality. The chancellor promised that if 
England would pledge her neutrality during the 
4 'European conflagration" that now seemed 
probable, Germany would give assurances that 
the neutrality of Holland and the integrity of 
France would be respected. These assurances, 
however, did not cover the neutrality of Belgium 

s B. W. P;, 47. « B. W. P., 87, 89. 



Great Britain Declares War 105 

and the colonial possessions of France. 7 Sir 
Edward Grey declined to bind his country to 
11 neutrality on such terms." 8 

While Great Britain did not give Germany a 
promise of neutrality, at the same time she re- 
fused to pledge support to France. This atti- 
tude of indecision she maintained despite the 
opinion of the President of France that the 
peace of Europe was depending on her action. 
On July 30 he declared to the British ambassa- 
dor at Paris that if England should now an- 
nounce her intention of coming "to the aid of 
France in the event of a conflict between France 
and Germany, . . . there would be no war, for 
Germany would at once modify her attitude. ' ' 9 
The Italian minister for foreign affairs also 
thought that Britain's attitude would have great 
influence on Germany. He told the English am- 
bassador at Rome on July 30 that he had reason 
to believe that "Germany was now disposed to 
give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she 
seemed convinced that we (Great Britain) should 
(would) act with France and Eussia, and was 
most anxious to avoid issue with us (Great 
Britain)." 10 

Next day, Sir Edward Grey told the German 
ambassador at London that he would support at 
Paris and St. Petersburg any reasonable pro- 

i B. W. P., 85. 9 B. W. P., 99, 

sB. W. P., 101. io B. W. P., 106. 



106 The Causes of the European War 

posal put forward by Germany, and if France 
and Eussia would not accept such a proposal, he 
would ' ' have nothing more to do with the conse- 
quences. ' ' On the other hand, if no such propo- 
sition was made and France became involved in 
the war, then England would be drawn in. 11 On 
this very day Austria-Hungary declared her 
willingness to discuss "the substance of the 
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia." 12 "Austria's 
readiness to discuss was the result of German 
influence at Vienna, ' ' according to the claim of 
the German secretary of state. 13 Whether Ger- 
many gave this conciliatory advice to Austria- 
Hungary of her own volition or whether she 
was induced to do it by the stiffening attitude 
of Great Britain is not revealed in the published 
correspondence. 

By the morning of July 31, Sir Edward Grey 
had warned the German ambassador that his 
country would intervene in case "France and 
Germany became involved in war" as a result of 
the failure of Germany to put forward a reason- 
able proposal showing her desire for peace. 14 
Later, on the same day, however, he declined to 
give a pledge of intervention to France but 
promised to reconsider this decision whenever 
any new development should warrant it. " The 
preservation of the neutrality of Belgium," said 

11 B. W. P., 111. is B. W. P., 138. 

12 B. W. P., 133; A. R. B., 51. i* B. W. P., Ill, 119. 



Great Britain Declares War 107 

he, "might be, I would not say a decisive, but 
an important factor, in determining our atti- 
tude." 15 

In the afternoon of the same day Sir 
Edward Grey telegraphed an inquiry to both 
Germany and France as to whether each would 
respect the neutrality of Belgium "so long as no 
other power violates it. ' ' 16 France replied at 
once that she would respect the neutrality of 
Belgium. 17 The reply of the German Govern- 
ment was not satisfactory. Von Jagow, the 
secretary of state, said that he could not answer 
until after he had consulted the Emperor and the 
chancellor. Besides, the British ambassador at 
Berlin got the impression that Von Jagow 
thought any reply given by him might reveal to 
some extent the German plan of campaign in 
case war should break out, and, therefore, he 
might not give any answer at all. According to 
the understanding of the British ambassador, 
Von Jagow seemed also to think that Belgium 
had already committed hostile acts against Ger- 
many in that she had held up a consignment of 
corn for the latter country. 18 

Next morning (August 1), Sir Edward Grey 
had a telephone conversation with Prince Lich- 
nowsky, German ambassador at London, in 
which, according to the understanding of the 

is B. W. P., 116, 119. it B. W. P., 125. 

is B. W. P., 114. is B. W. P., 122. 



108 The Causes of the European War 

ambassador, Sir Edward Grey asked if Ger- 
many would agree not to ''attack France in a 
war between Germany and Russia in case France 
should remain neutral.' ' Prince Lichnowsky 
expressed the belief that his Government would 
be willing to enter into such an engagement and 
telegraphed the inquiry, as he interpreted it, to 
Berlin. 

Prince Lichnowsky, however, had, according 
to the London Times, received a very erroneous 
impression of the terms of the proposed engage- 
ment. " There was no question," says this 
paper, "of French neutrality in the event of a 
Russo-German war." This famous telephone 
conversation took place at 11 :30 a. m., and, ac- 
cording to the information received by the 
Times, Lichnowsky 's misunderstanding was 
corrected in an official conference immediately 
afterward. In this "official conversation . . . 
it was plainly pointed out that ... if Germany 
fought France must fight also." "Prince Lich- 
nowsky at once said that he had been under a 
misapprehension, and telegraphed to Berlin a 
correction of his previous telegram. ' ' No such 
telegram appears in the list of dispatches offi- 
cially published by the German Government. 
The Times charges that it was left out with the 
intent to deceive the neutral public and thus 
make out a case of perfidy against England. 
The North German Gazette, on the other hand, 



Great Britain Declares War 109 

denies the existence of such a telegram, and, fur- 
thermore, states that the private secretary of 
Sir Edward Grey called on Prince Lichnowsky 
later in the day (at 1:15 p.m.) and said that 
the foreign " minister desired to make proposals 
to him (me) regarding England's neutrality, 
even for the event that we (Germany) should go 
to war with Eussia as well as with France." 19 

Sir Edward Grey's testimony as to the mis- 
understanding supports the contention of the 
Times. In the latter part of August, 1914, he 
made in the House of Commons the following 
statement : 

The circumstances were as follows: It was re- 
ported to me one day that the German Ambassador 
had suggested that Germany might remain neutral in 
a war between Russia and Austria and also engage 
not to attack France if we would remain neutral and 
secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that if 
the German Government thought such an arrange- 
ment possible I was sure we could secure it. 

It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador 
meant was that we should secure the neutrality of 
France if Germany went to war with Russia. This 
was quite a different proposal, and as I supposed it 
in all probability to be incompatible with the terms 
of the Franco-Russian Alliance, it was not in my 
power to promise to secure it. 

Subsequently, the Ambassador sent for my private 
secretary and told him that as soon as the misunder- 
standing was cleared up he had sent a second telegram 
to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the 

is London Times, August 27, 1914, quoted in Stowell, 334, 
note; see also S., 824. 



110 The Causes of the European War 

first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first 
telegram has been published. This second telegram 
does not seem to have been published. 20 

The misunderstanding was apparently not 
cleared up until after the German Emperor had 
made his reply, which was, in part, as follows: 
"On technical grounds my mobilization which 
had already been proclaimed this afternoon, 
must proceed against two fronts, east and west 
as prepared. . . . But if France offers me neu- 
trality, which must be guaranteed by the British 
fleet and army, I shall of course refrain from 
attacking France and employ my troops else- 
where. . . . The troops on my frontier are in 
the act of being stopped by telegraph and tele- 
phone from crossing into France." In the 
chancellor's telegram to the German ambassa- 
dor, the same day, he said: "We guarantee 
that our troops will not cross the French fron- 
tier before 7 p. m. on Monday, 3rd inst., if Eng- 
land has consented to our proposal by that 
time." 

Next day, Prince Lichnowsky telegraphed the 
chancellor that Sir Edward Grey's "suggestions 
were prompted by a desire to make it possible 
for England to keep permanent neutrality, 
but as they were not based on a previous under- 
standing with France and made without knowl- 

20 London Times, August 29, 1914, quoted in Stowell, 330- 
331. 



Great Britain Declares War 111 

edge of our mobilization, they have been aban- 
doned as absolutely hopeless. " 21 

No mention is made in the British White 
Paper of this effort on the part of Germany to 
secure the neutrality of France. Sir Edward 
Grey, however, does tell of an important inter- 
view held with Prince Lichnowsky on this same 
day, in which the price of England's neutrality 
was asked by Germany. The foreign minister 
in a telegram (August 1) to the British ambas- 
sador at Berlin gives the following account of 
this meeting: 

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the 
reply of the German Government with regard to the 
neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great 
regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected 
feeling in this country. If Germany could see her 
way to give the same assurance as that which had 
been given by France it would materially contribute 
to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other 
hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of 
Belgium by one combatant while the other respected 
it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public 
feeling in this country. I said that we had been dis- 
cussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I 
was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memoran- 
dum of it. 

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise 
not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to 
remain neutral. 

I replied that I could not say that ; our hands were 
still free, and we were considering what our attitude 
should be. All I could say was that our attitude 

21 For these telegrams see S., 820-26. 



112 The Causes of the European War 

would be determined largely by public opinion here, 
and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very 
strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that 
we could give a promise of neutrality on that condi- 
tion alone. 

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could 
not formulate conditions on which we would remain 
neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of 
France and her colonies might be guaranteed. 

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any 
promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I 
could only say that we must keep our hands free. 22 

On this same day (August 1), after he had 
been advised by the British ambassador at Ber- 
lin that the German foreign office would post- 
pone its reply to the English inquiry regarding 
the neutrality of Belgium probably indefinitely 
and certainly until after the chancellor and the 
Emperor had been consulted, Sir Edward Grey 
told the French ambassador at London that lie 
would ask the cabinet to promise that the British 
fleet would oppose an attack on the French coast 
by the German navy. 23 

The Cabinet had a memorable meeting next 
day (Sunday). After this session, Sir Edward 
Grey made the following report to the French 
ambassador : 

I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the 
German fleet comes into the Channel or through the 
North Sea to undertake hostile operations against 
French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give 
all the protection in its power. 

22 B. W. P., 123. 23 F. Y. B., 126; B. W. P., 122. 



Great Britain Declares War 113 

This assurance is of course subject to the policy 
of His Majesty's Government receiving the support 
of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His 
Majesty's Government to take any action until the 
above contingency of action by the German fleet takes 
place. 2 * 

According to the London Times, the Cabinet 
up to this time had been divided in opinion as 
to what policy should be pursued, but Germany's 
action regarding Belgium and Luxemburg had 
turned the scale decisively in favor of support- 
ing France if her coast were attacked. 25 Nor 
was this belief confined to the members of the 
party in power, as is shown by the following 
letter, written by the leader of the Parliament- 
ary opposition before the Cabinet had reached a 
final decision : 

2d August, 1914. 
Dear Mr. Asquith, — Lord Lansdowne and I feel it 
our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as 
in that of all the colleagues whom we have been able 
to consult, it would be fatal to the honor and security 
of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting 
France and Russia at the present juncture; and we 
offer our unhesitating support to the Government in 
any measures they may consider necessary for that 
object. — Yours very truly, 

A. Bonar Law. 28 

24 B. W. P., 148. 

25 London Times, Aug. 5, 1914; see Stowell, 342-3. 

26 London Times, Aug. 15, 1914, quoted in Stowell, 343. 
The Times also thought that public opinion endorsed this ac- 
tion. An editorial August 3 says that England's safety and 
interests demand that she stand by France as she had success- 
fully done in 1905 and 1911. If not, she will be isolated^ 



114 The Causes of the European War 

On Monday, August 3, Sir Edward Grey made 
a speech before the House of Commons, stating 
what assurances he had given the French Gov- 
ernment and his reasons for so doing. He de- 
clared that England was not obliged by any en- 
gagements to come to the aid of France, but that 
she had for some years been bound to France 
by the ties of a growing friendship. This 
friendship imposed upon Britain the obliga- 
tion to see that France's helpless coasts 
were not battered down by a hostile fleet. 
For France, relying on this friendship, had con- 
centrated her fleet in the Mediterranean and 
thus left her western and northern coasts un- 
guarded. Under these circumstances, therefore, 
he considered that public sentiment would not 
allow the English Government to stand aside 
and allow a friendly neighbor's coasts to be 
" bombarded and battered" in a war not of her 
own seeking. 

"It is a question of destroying the security of the Mediter- 
ranean, through which England's route to Egypt and India 
and the bulk of her food supplies pass." The independence 
of Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg is necessary to guard 
England's control of the Channel. "By naval agreement with 
France, England has guaranteed French coasts in the north 
against German attack. The French fleet has been concen- 
trated in the Mediterranean to help our Mediterranean squad- 
ron in protecting the freedom of our communications with Egypt 
and India. If once the German armies are allowed to crush 
France, not only will England be unable to preserve the in- 
dependence of Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, but Ger- 
many will be able to annex French territory up to Dunkirk, 
Calais, and Havre, compel Holland and Belgium to cede to her 
their colonies, establish herself within striking distance of 
Australia and New Zealand, and threaten the safety of our 
trade routes on every sea." 



Great Britain Declares War 115 

Besides, Britain's self-interests demanded, in 
his opinion, that France be informed as to what 
aid she could count on from England. For if 
Great Britain should promise no aid to France, 
the French fleet would have to be withdrawn 
from the Mediterranean. The English fleet in 
the Mediterranean was not as strong as the com- 
bined fleets of other nations. If Britain should 
later become involved in the war, she would 
either lose control of the Mediterranean route 
or else be compelled to send thither ships badly- 
needed to protect her own coasts. Besides, it 
looked as if Britain would be dragged into the 
war. In fact, he believed that nothing but an 
unconditional promise of neutrality would save 
her from that fate. Great Britain, of course, 
could not afford to make such a dishonorable 
promise ; for if she did, her people would sacri- 
fice their "respect and good name and reputa- 
tion before the world and should not escape the 
most serious and grave economic conse- 
quences." 27 

By the fourth of August, the King of Belgium 
had made an appeal to Great Britain ' ' for diplo- 
matic intervention on behalf of Belgium," whose 
neutrality was threatened by Germany. In re- 
sponse to this appeal, Sir Edward Grey sent a 
protest to the German Government and de- 
manded immediate assurances that " the demand 

27 London Times, Aug. 3, 1914, quoted by Stowell, 345- 
351. 



116 The Causes of the European War 

made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with 
and that her neutrality will be respected by Ger- 
many." 28 On the same day the German for- 
eign secretary telegraphed to the German am- 
bassador at London as follows : 

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on 
the part of the British Government with regard to 
our intentions, by repeating most positively formal 
assurance that, even in the ease of armed conflict 
with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense what- 
ever, annex Belgian territory. 

In giving his reason for the violation of Bel- 
gian neutrality, the German foreign secretary 
said : 

Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German 
army could not be exposed to French attack across 
Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely 
unimpeachable information. Germany had conse- 
quently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for 
her a question of life or death to prevent French ad- 
vance. 29 

On this same day (August 4), Sir Edward 
Grey, having learned that Belgian territory had 
been invaded by the Germans, sent an ultimatum 
to Germany. In his telegram to the British am- 
bassador at Berlin he said : 

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that Ger- 
man Government will be compelled to carry out, if 
necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered 
indispensable. 

as B. W. P., 153. 29 b. W. P., 157. 



Great Britain Declares War 117 

We are also informed that Belgian territory has 
been violated at Gemmenich. 

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact 
that Germany declined to give the same assurance 
respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply 
to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and 
Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a 
satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this 
morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If 
not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and 
to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to 
take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality 
of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which 
Germany is as much a party as ourselves. 30 

Upon receiving this telegram, Sir E. Goschen, 
the British ambassador at Berlin, went to the 
Imperial foreign office and delivered the ulti- 
matum to Von Jagow, German secretary of 
state. A little later on the same evening Sir E. 
Goschen had an interview with the German 
chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg. Both Von 
Jagow and the chancellor were very much agi- 
tated and apparently were greatly pained at 
England's decision to join the ranks of Ger- 
many's enemies. This last interview between 
the British ambassador and the chancellor has 
been dramatically described by the former as 
follows : 

During the afternoon I received your further tele- 
gram of the same date, and, in compliance with the 
instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to 
the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secre- 

30 b. W. P., 159. 



118 The Causes of the European War 

tary of State that unless the Imperial Government 
could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that 
they would proceed no further with their violation 
of Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been 
instructed to demand my passports and inform the 
Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government 
would have to take all steps in their power to uphold 
the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a 
treaty to which Germany was as much a party as 
themselves. 

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he 
could give no other answer than that which he had 
given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety 
of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that 
the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. 
I gave His Excellency a written summary of your 
telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 
12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Govern- 
ment would expect an answer, asked him whether, in 
view of the terrible consequences which would neces- 
sarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last mo- 
ment that their answer should be reconsidered. He 
replied that if the time given were even twenty-four 
hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said 
that in that case I should have to demand my pass- 
ports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. 
In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow 
expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his 
entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had 
been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, 
through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said 
that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me 
also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but 
that he must understand that under the circumstances 
and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment could not possibly have acted otherwise than 
they had done. 

I then said that I should like to go and see the 
Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I 



Great Britain Declares War 119 

should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged 
me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. 
His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted 
for about twenty minutes. He said that the step 
taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a 
degree ; just for a word — ' ' neutrality, ' ' a word which 
in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a 
scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war 
on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than 
to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direc- 
tion had been rendered useless by this last terrible 
step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had de- 
voted himself since his accession to office had tumbled 
down like a house of cards. What we had done 
was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from be- 
hind while he was fighting for his life against two 
assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all 
the terrible events that might happen. I protested 
strongly against that statement, and said that, in the 
same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to 
understand that for strategical reasons it was a mat- 
ter of life and death to Germany to advance through 
Belgium and violate the latter 's neutrality, so I would 
wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a 
matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great 
Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement 
to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if 
attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, 
or what confidence could any one have in engagements 
given by Great Britain in the future? The Chan- 
cellor said, "But at what price will that compact have 
been kept. Has the British Government thought of 
that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I 
could that fear of consequences could hardly be re- 
garded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, 
but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently over- 
come by the news of our action, and so little disposed 
to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to 
the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he 



120 The Causes of the European War 

said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's 
enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last 
moment he and his Government had been working with 
us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace be- 
tween Austria and Russia. I said that this was part 
of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart 
just at the moment when the relations between them 
had been more friendly and cordial than they had 
been for years. 31 

Soon after this interview, an extra edition of 
the Berliner Tageblatt came out stating that 
Great Britain had declared war on Germany. 
A mob then formed, attacked the British em- 
bassy, overpowered the police force, and began 
smashing the windows with cobble stones. Sir 
E. Goschen telephoned to the foreign office for 
protection, and Von Jagow at once arranged for 
a larger police force to clear away the mob. 
The German foreign office regretted the occur- 
rence very much and made a satisfactory apol- 
ogy to Sir E. Goschen. Next morning the Brit- 
ish ambassador received his passports and on 
the following day left for England by way of 
Holland. War against Germany was declared 
by Great Britain that same day ; the declaration 
against Austria-Hungary was not made until 
August 12. 32 

3i B. W. P., 160. 

32 B. W. P., 160; S., 1017. 

Note: — It will be remembered that Germany had also vio- 
lated the neutrality of Luxemburg by sending troops to occupy 
the duchy as early as August 2. The German chancellor 
contended that "the military measures taken in Luxemburg do 
not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only 



Great Britain Declares War 121 

intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. 
Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any dam- 
age caused by using the railways which are leased to the 
empire." See B. W. P., 129. 

Now the perpetual neutrality of Luxemburg had been guar- 
anteed by the powers in 1867, and this act of Germany's was 
a clear violation of the obligation inherited from Prussia, 
which was one of the powers signatory to the convention of 
1867. England, however, was not willing to regard the in- 
vasion of Luxemburg as a casus belli. She contended that 
the responsibility for the maintenance of the neutrality of 
Luxemburg was collective and was to be discharged only by 
the joint action of all the guaranteeing powers. 

The case of Belgium, however, was, according to Sir Edward 
Grey, different from that of Luxemburg. England's obliga- 
tion to uphold Belgium's neutrality was individual, not col- 
lective, and imposed upon her the duty of requiring the ob- 
servance of the convention of 1839, "without the assistance 
of the other guaranteeing powers." F. Y. B., 137. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OP BELGIUM 

In 1814-15, the European powers met in the 
Congress of Vienna to remake the map of Eu- 
rope, which had been disarranged by Napoleon. 
At that time Germany was divided and weak, 
and France had proved herself aggressive and 
strong. It was feared that this weakness of 
Germany would in the future invite the aggres- 
sion of France, and Europe would thus be 
thrown again into the turmoil of a general war. 
To prevent this the powers planned the creation 
of a strong state between France and Germany 
by uniting Belgium with Holland. 

The union, however, was an unnatural one 
from the beginning; historic tradition was 
against it. Except for a short time during the 
Napoleonic era, the two parts had been sepa- 
rated for more than two centuries and had thus 
grown apart. Besides, the peoples of the two 
countries differed from each other in language, 
race, religion, and economic conditions. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that friction developed 
between the northern and southern halves and 

the Belgians grew more and more tired of the 

122 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 123 

union. The revolution of July, 1830, in France 
encouraged the Belgian malcontents, and in 
August, 1830, the Belgians revolted against Hol- 
land and demanded a separate government un- 
der the Dutch king. These demands were re- 
fused and Belgium declared her independence, 
electing Leopold of Coburg king. 

It could hardly be expected that this annul- 
ment of the arrangement of 1815 would be coun- 
tenanced by the great powers, and the Holy Alli- 
ance powers were at first in favor of forcing Bel- 
gium back into the union with Holland. But the 
independence of Belgium was favored by the 
British foreign minister and the new French 
king, Louis Philippe, who owed his throne to a 
similar revolution and could not afford to allow 
the absolute monarchies to thwart the wishes of 
the Belgian people. France, therefore, declared 
that if they intervened in favor of the Dutch, 
she would intervene in favor of the Belgians. 
Besides, Russia's hands were soon tied by a re- 
volt in Poland, and Prussia and Austria had to 
keep their eyes on their Polish subjects and 
eastern boundaries. Consequently, the powers 
had to consent to the independence of Belgium. 
The powers held conferences in London and in 
1831 agreed to guarantee the perpetual neutral- 
ity of Belgium. This agreement was super- 
seded by another treaty signed in 1839, which 
also guaranteed the perpetual neutrality of Bel- 



124 The Causes of the European War 

gium; Prussia, England, France, Austria, and 
Russia were the parties to this agreement. The 
neutrality article was as follows : 

Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, 
II and IV, shall form an Independent and perpetually 
Neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such 
Neutrality towards all other states. 1 

The German Empire was not, of course, a sig- 
natory to the treaty, as it had not come into ex- 
istence at this time. However, the obligation 
as to Belgium's neutrality incurred by Prussia 
in 1839 was binding on the German Empire in 
1914, for it had inherited the treaty obligations 
of the states out of which it was formed. "In 
many instances the German Government has 
claimed the benefit of treaty rights previously 
enjoyed by the separate states of the Empire. ' ' 2 

On August 9, 1870, at the time of the Franco- 
German War, England and Prussia, "being de- 
sirous ... of recording in a solemn Act their 
fixed determination to maintain the Independ- 
ence and Neutrality of Belgium, as provided in 
Article VII of the Treaty" of 1839, signed a new 
treaty, "which, without impairing or invalidat- 
ing the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty 
(treaty of 1839), shall be subsidiary and acces- 
sory to it. ' ' This treaty was to last until twelve 

i Stowell, 602. 
aStowell, 385. 

It is needless to say that the opinion expressed in this 
paragraph is not accepted by all pro-German publicists. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 125 

months after the ratification of a treaty of peace 
between France and the North German Confed- 
eration. It was further agreed that "on the 
expiration of that time the Independence and 
Neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High 
Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, 
continue to rest as heretofore on Article 1 of the 
Quintuple Treaty of the 19th April, 1839." 3 

A few German apologists contend that subse- 
quent events had deprived the neutrality pro- 
vision of the Quintuple Treaty of its binding 
force and, therefore, it had by 1914 become a 
dead letter. Publicists are, however, nearly 
unanimous in contending that it was still alive 
both in spirit as well as in letter. 4 It ought to be 
remembered, however, that the German Govern- 
ment in giving its reasons for invading Belgium 
did not claim that the neutrality agreement was 
no longer binding, but admitted that the inva- 
sion was a breach of international law and an 
act of injustice made necessary by the convic- 
tion that France was preparing to lead an army 
into Belgium. 5 Besides, the German Imperial 

s For the main provisions of this treaty see Stowell, 602-3 ; 
or for the full treaty, Hertslet's The Map of Europe by Treaty, 
vol. iv, pp. 1886-88. 

* For the arguments on both sides the reader is referred to 
the fuller works, as the scope and plan of this volume do not 
allow of even a resume of these discussions. For a good, 
short discussion favorable to the view that the treaty of 1839 
was still binding, see Stowell, 382-91. For a more lengthy 
argument against this view, see Fuehr, The Neutrality of 
Belgium, 120-176. 

s See p. 130. 



126 The Causes of the European War 

secretary of state, Herr von Jagow, said in 
1913: " Belgian neutrality is provided for by 
International Conventions and Germany is de- 
termined to respect those Conventions." 6 

On July 24, M. Davignon, Belgian minister 
for foreign affairs, sent instructions to the Bel- 
gian ambassadors in all the countries which had 
promised to guarantee the neutrality of Bel- 
gium, to the effect that Belgium would expect 
that, in the event of war, her neutrality would be 
respected and that she would do all in her power 
to uphold it. These instructions were not to be 
acted upon by the ambassadors until further 
notice. 7 On the first of August, the foreign 
office telegraphed to the ambassadors to carry 
out these instructions. 8 

Next day (August 2) the German ambassador 
at Brussels handed the following note to the 
Belgian foreign minister : 

(Very Confidential.) 

Reliable information has been received by the Ger- 
man Government to the effect that French forces in- 
tend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and 
Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the 
intention of France to march through Belgian ter- 
ritory against Germany. 

The. German Government cannot but fear that 
Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be un- 
able, without assistance, to repel so considerable a 
French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to 
afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Ger- 

fl B. G. B., 12, enclosure. 8 ibid., 16. 

» B. G. B., 2 and enclosure. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 127 

many. It is essential for the self-defense of Ger- 
many that she should anticipate any such hostile at- 
tack. The German Government would, however, feel 
the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of 
hostility against herself the fact that the measures of 
Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own 
protection, to enter Belgian territory. 

In order to exclude any possibility of misunder- 
standing, the German Government make the follow- 
ing declaration: 

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against 
Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared 
in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly 
neutrality towards Germany, the German Govern- 
ment bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to 
guarantee the possessions and independence of the 
Belgian Kingdom in full. 

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-men- 
tioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the 
conclusion of peace. 

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Ger- 
many is prepared, in cooperation with the Belgian 
authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops 
against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for 
any damage that may have been caused by German 
troops. 

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and 
in particular should she throw difficulties in the way 
of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the 
Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or 
other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be 
compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy. 

In this event, Germany can undertake no obliga- 
tions towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment 
of the relations between the two States must be left 
to the decision of arms. 

The German Government, however, entertain the 
distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and 
that the Belgian Government will know how to take 



128 The Causes of the European War 

the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of 
incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the 
friendly ties which bind the two neighboring States 
will grow stronger and more enduring. 9 

The German note was delivered at 7 p. m., and 
the Belgian Government was given only twelve 
hours in which to give her answer. So in the 
early morning of August 3, M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian minister for foreign affairs, handed to the 
German ambassador at Brussels the following 
reply : 

This note has made a deep and painful impression 
upon the Belgian Government. 

The intentions attributed to France by Germany 
are in contradiction to the formal declarations made 
by us on August 1, in the name of the French Gov- 
ernment. 

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian 
neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium in- 
tends to fulfill her international obligations and the 
Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance 
to the invader. 

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 
1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of 
Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and not- 
ably of the Government of His Majesty the King of 
Prussia. 

Belgium has always been faithful to her interna- 
tional obligations, she has carried out her duties in a 
spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing 
undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neu- 
trality. 

The attack upon her independence with which the 
German Government threaten her constitutes a fla- 

9 B. G. B., 20. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 129 

grant violation of international law. No strategic in- 
terest justifies such a violation of law. 

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept 
the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the 
honor of the nation and betray their duty towards 
Europe. 

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played 
for more than eighty years in the civilization of the 
world, they refuse to believe that the independence 
of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the 
violation of her neutrality. 

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Govern- 
ment are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in 
their power, every attack upon their rights. 10 

Next morning Germany announced to Bel- 
gium that inasmuch as her Government had re- 
jected "the well intentioned proposals made to 
(it) them by the German Government, the latter, 
to their deep regret," would be "compelled to 
take — if necessary by force of arms — those 
measures of defence already foreshadowed as in- 
dispensable in view of the menace of France. ' ? " 
This threat was followed up immediately; for 
German troops entered Belgian territory that 
very morning (August 4). 12 Negotiations be- 
tween the two countries were broken off at 
once. 13 

On that same August 4, the Imperial chancel- 
lor made a speech before the Eeichstag, in which 
he said, in part : 

10 B. G. B., 22. 
ii B. G. B., 27. 

12 B. G. B., 40. 

13 B. G. B,, 34. 



130 The Causes of the European War 

Gentlemen, we are now acting in self-defense. Ne- 
cessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Lux- 
emburg and have possibly already entered on Belgian 
soil. 

Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. 

The French Government has notified Brussels that 
it would respect Belgian neutrality as long as the ad- 
versary respected it. But we know that France stood 
ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could 
not. A French invasion in our flank and the lower 
Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were 
forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Govern- 
ments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The injustice — 
I speak openly — the injustice we thereby commit we 
will try to make good as soon as our military aims 
have been attained. He who is menaced as we are and 
is fighting for his All, can only consider the one and 
best way to strike. 14 

Germany was still willing, she said, to ad- 
here to her original promise to Belgium, namely, 
to restore her territory to her after the war. 13 
Three days later (August 9), after Liege had 
fallen, Germany again .approached Belgium 
through the Dutch minister for foreign affairs. 
She renewed the promise to restore her territory 
to her after the war, if Belgium would come 
to terms with her. 16 This offer was flatly de- 
clined by Belgium. 17 

On the same day (August 3) on which Bel- 
gium declined to meet Germany's demands, King 
Albert asked the King of England to have his 

1* See International Conciliation, pamphlet 84. 

is B. G. B., 36. 

16 B. G. B., 60, 62, enclosure, 

" B. G. B., 65. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 131 

Government intervene diplomatically to safe- 
guard the neutrality of his country. 38 The Bel- 
gian Government claims, however, that it did not 
ask for military aid until after its territory had 
been invaded by Germany. 19 In the meantime 
(August 4) Britain announced to Belgium that 
she expected her to uphold her neutrality and 
also promised aid if her neutrality were vio- 
lated. 20 

After Brussels had been captured by the Ger- 
mans, certain documents were found in the Bel- 
gian archives, which were published to support 
the charge of Germany that Belgium had before 
the war surrendered her neutrality. These 
documents show the following: 

(1) In April, 1906, General Ducarme, Chief 
of the Belgian General Staff, reported to the 
Belgian minister of war the results of some con- 
versations that he had had with Lt. Col. Barn- 
ardiston, military attache of the British legation 
at Brussels. At these interviews plans were 
discussed for sending British troops to Belgium 
to aid her against Germany in case war broke 
out. Col. Barnardiston "referred to the anxie- 
ties of the general staff of his country with re- 
gard to the general political situation, in view 
of the possibility of war soon breaking out." 
The discussion covered details as to the num- 

is B. G. B., 25. 20 B. G. B., 28. 

is B. G. B., 78. 



132 The Causes of the European War 

ber of British troops to be furnished, places of 
disembarkation, methods of transportation, etc. 
It is also stated that Col. Barnardiston gave 
General Ducarme much secret information re- 
garding the "military circumstances and the 
situation "of Belgium 's ' i Eastern neighbor. ' ' 
The term "allied forces" was used in the docu- 
ments for the British and Belgian troops. At 
one of these conferences an agreement was 
reached as to a plan of combined operations in 
case Antwerp were attacked by the Germans. 

Col. Barnardiston is represented as saying 
that this plan had the approval of the chief of 
the British general staff; but he insisted that 
these conversations were not binding on his 
Government, and that they were not known by 
any one except the general staff, the English 
minister at Brussels, and himself. He "did 
not know whether the opinion of his sovereign 
had been consulted." 

On the margin of the document was the fol- 
lowing statement: "The entry of the English 
into Belgium shall not take place until after the 
violation of our (Belgian) neutrality by Ger- 
many. ' ' 21 

On April 23, 1912, a similar conversation was 
held between the British military attache in 
Brussels, who was now Lt. Col. Bridges, and 
the Belgian chief of the general staff, who was 

2i B. G. B., appendix 4 (1), S., 845-6. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 133 

now General Jungbluth. At this meeting 
" Lieutenant- Colonel Bridges told the general 
that Great Britain had, available for dispatch 
to the Continent, an army composed of six divi- 
sions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry, 
in all 160,000 men. She had also all that she 
needed for home defence. Everything was 
ready. 

' 'The British Government, at the time of the 
recent events, would have immediately landed 
troops on our territory, even if we had not 
asked for help. 

"The general protested that our consent 
would be necessary for this. The military 
attache answered that he knew that, but that as 
we were not in a position to prevent the Ger- 
mans passing through our territory, Great 
Britain would have landed her troops in any 
event. . . . 

"The general added that, after all, we were, 
besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans 
from going through. ' ' 22 

One of the documents found was a dispatch 
from Baron Greindl, Belgian minister at Ber- 
lin, to the Belgian minister for foreign affairs, 
dated December 23, 1911. The burden of this 
dispatch was that the Belgian Government was 
acting unwisely in making arrangements as if 
the only danger of attack was from the side 

22 B. G. B., 4 (2), Col. Doc, 360-1. 



134 The Causes of the European War 

of Germany. Belgium's neutrality, he thought, 
was in as much danger from the French as the 
German side. He said: " From the French 
side the danger threatens not only in the south 
from Luxemburg; it threatens us along our 
whole common frontier. For this assertion we 
are not dependent only on surmises. We have 
positive facts to go upon. ' ' 23 

Another document found was "a map show- 
ing (it is alleged) the method of deployment of 
the French army. ' ' 24 

These documents were published on October 
13, 1914, by the Norddeutsche Allegemeine 
Zeitung and were also afterwards printed in 
English and commented on by Dr. Bernhard 
Dernburg, German agent in America. These 
two advocates for Germany contend that these 
documents prove that England had intended, in 
case a Franco-German war broke out, to send 
troops to Belgium and thus violate the neutral- 
ity of Belgium ; that Belgium by listening to and 
keeping secret the "whisperings" of Great 
Britain had compromised her neutrality; and 
that she should have notified the other signator- 
ies of the treaty of 1839, especially Germany, 
of the suggestions of England. They charge 
that the negotiations prove that Belgium had 
entered into a convention with Great Britain 

23 B. G. B., appendix 2, Col. Doc, 351. 

24 B. G. B., appendix 5, Col. Doc., 363. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 135 

against Germany, and that the French military 
map, together with other facts mentioned in the 
documents, go to show that France was a party 
to this convention. 25 

Belgium's defense to these charges is as fol- 
lows: 

"It is recognized that Belgium has the right 
to make defensive agreements for putting into 
operation the guarantees given by the guaran- 
teeing powers." Now the arrangement con- 
templated by the Belgian and English officials 
was just such an agreement. These discussions, 
however, did not result in a convention between 
Belgium and Great Britain, and no evidence 
that such a convention existed has been adduced. 
These negotiations went no farther than "the 
submission of a report to the minister of war 
by the chief of the general staff." Even in 
these discussions Belgium did not take the in- 
itiative; she only showed a willingness to dis- 
cuss with the British officials plans for carrying 
out the obligations that Great Britain had as- 
sumed in 1839. But the Belgian Government in 
1906 considered, after these conversations, that 
the general guarantee was adequate and that a 
supplementary agreement as to detailed plans 
for making good the guarantee was not neces- 
sary. ' ' Baron Greindl 's attitude towards Barn- 
ardiston's suggestions proves conclusively that 

25 S., 839-40; Col, Doc,, 364, 



136 The Causes of the European War 

he knew that these suggestions had not resulted 
in any convention." 

As to the conversation between Colonel 
Bridges and General Jungbluth, the Belgian 
Chief of Staff protested against the opinion of 
the English colonel that Britain would have 
landed troops in Belgium without her consent, 
since, in his opinion, Belgium could not have pre- 
vented the Germans from passing through the 
country. General Jungbluth insisted that Bel- 
gium's consent was necessary and that Belgium 
was " ' perfectly well able ' to stop the Ger- 
mans ; that is to say, to make them lose sufficient 
time to deprive them of the advantage of a sud- 
den attack." In taking this stand, " General 
Jungbluth defended her (Belgium's) freedom 
and neutrality." 

The French military map, it is contended, was 
not connected with the other documents and is, 
therefore, no evidence that France was a party 
to an alleged convention between England and 
Belgium. It only proves that the general staff 
of Belgium was on the look-out for information 
regarding the "military plans of neighboring 
powers. " 26 As evidence that Great Britain so 
understood the attitude of the Belgian Govern- 
ment, Belgium points to the following official 
statement, published in the London Times, Sep- 
tember 30, 1914: 

?ep, G. B., appendix 5, Col. Doc., 361-5. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 137 

For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian 
army would oppose by force a ''preventive" disem- 
barkation of British troops in Belgium. The Belgian 
Government did not hesitate at the time of the Agadir 
crises to warn foreign ambassadors, in terms which 
could not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to 
compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every 
means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it 
from any and every quarter. 27 

Britain disavows having ever had any inten- 
tion of violating the neutrality of Belgium. Sir 
Edward Grey, however, admits that 

In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great 
Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against 
violation from any side, some academic discussions 
may, through the instrumentality of Colonel Barn- 
ardiston, have taken place between General Grierson 
and the Belgian military authorities as to what assist- 
ance the British army might be able to afford to Bel- 
gium should one of her neighbors violate that neu- 
trality. Some notes with reference to the subject 
may exist in the archives at Brussels. 

At that time there existed, he says, a fear in 
England and Belgium that Germany might at- 
tack France through Belgium as she had the 
year previous " adopted a threatening attitude 
towards France with regard to Morocco. ' ' This 
feeling of apprehension, he asserts, has been 
kept alive by the fact that Germany " since 
1906 has established an elaborate network of 
strategical railways leading from the Rhine to 
the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly- 

27 B. G. B., appendix 6, enclosure 3. 



138 The Causes of the European War 

populated tract, deliberately constructed to per- 
mit of the sudden attack upon Belgium, which 
was carried out two months ago. ' ' 28 

The conversation between the English Colonel 
Bridges and the Belgian chief of staff seems to 
have aroused a fear in Belgium that England 
would be the first power to violate her neutrality. 
Sir Edward Grey was informed of the existence 
of this feeling and spoke of it to the Belgian 
minister on April 7, 1913. He assured him that 
his Government would not be the first to violate 
the neutrality of Belgium, nor did he believe 
that public sentiment in England would ever 
approve of it. He promised the Belgian min- 
ister that his Government would never send 
troops into Belgium as long as her neutrality 
was not violated by any other power. 29 

The lord high chancellor of England also 
denied that his country had ever had any inten- 
tion of violating the neutrality of Belgium. In 
a letter written to the Master of Christ's Col- 
lege, Cambridge, November 14, 1914, he said: 

It is quite untrue that the British Government had 
ever arranged with Belgium to trespass on her coun- 
try in case of war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. 
The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially as 
regards railways, have for some years given rise to 
the apprehension that Germany would attack France 
through Belgium. Whatever military discussions 

ss B. G. B., appendix 3, Col. Doc., 353. 
2»B. G. B., appendix 1, Col. Doc., 350. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 139 

have taken place before this war have been limited 
entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to 
defend France if Germany attacked her through Bel- 
gium. The Germans have stated that we contemplated 
sending troops to Belgium. We had never committed 
ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the Con- 
tinent, and we had never contemplated the possibility 
of sending troops to Belgium to attack Germany. 30 

It is charged by the Germans that " French 
and British troops had marched into Belgium 
before the outbreak of war"; also, that "British 
military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a 
French fortress near the Belgian frontier, be- 
fore the outbreak of the war and that this is evi- 
dence of an intention to attack Germany through 
Belgium. 5 ' In answer to the first of these 
charges, the London Times prints (September 
30, 1914) an official statement as follows : 

The German press has been attempting to per- 
suade the public that if Germany herself had not 
violated Belgian neutrality France or Great Britain 
would have done so. It has declared that French and 
British troops had marched into Belgium before the 
outbreak of war. We have received from the Bel- 
gian Minister of War an official statement which de- 
nies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the 
one hand, that "before August 3 not a single French 
soldier had set foot on Belgian territory," and again, 
"it is untrue that on August 4 there was a single Eng- 
lish soldier in Belgium." 

In answer to the second accusation, the lord 
chancellor said (November 14) : 

so B. G. B., appendix 6, enclosure 1, Col. Doc, 365-6. 



140 The Causes of the European War 

The Germans have stated that British military- 
stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress 
near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the 
war, and that this is evidence of an intention to at- 
tack Germany through Belgium. No British soldiers 
and no British stores were landed on the Continent till 
after Germany had invaded Belgium, and Belgium 
had appealed to France and England for assistance. 
It was only after this appeal that British troops were 
sent to France; and, if the Germans found British 
munitions of war in Maubeuge, these munitions were 
sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak 
of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of 
Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the 
British Government. 31 

si B. G. B., appendix 6, enclosures 1, 3. 

Mr. Alexander Fuehr, in his book on the neutrality of Bel- 
gium, says that German officials took many affidavits of 
French captives to the effect that French troops bad invaded 
Belgium on July 31. Three of these affidavits are given at 
length in the appendix. They state that several French regi- 
ments had crossed the Belgian frontier on that date. It is 
needless to say, however, that such evidence is of little, if any, 
value.— Fuehr, 230-235. 



CHAPTER X 

JAPAN AND TUEKEY DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT 

When the great European conflict broke out, 
Germany held Kiaochou, a district on the north- 
ern coast of China. She had gotten possession 
of this territory by first seizing (1897) and then 
leasing it from China. The murder of two 
German missionaries by the Chinese had fur- 
nished the occasion for thus getting a foot-hold 
in the Far East. Nor were the Germans slow 
to take advantage of the good fortune that had 
placed this territory in their possession. The 
city of Tsingtau, in this district, was modern- 
ized and strongly fortified by them and thus 
made into an important naval base. All of this 
was calculated to excite the jealousy and rivalry 
of Japan. 

Now, Japan was a power that had to be 
reckoned with in the Far East, not only because 
of her own strength but also because that 
strength had been doubled by an alliance with 
England. The first treaty between these two 
countries was signed in 1902, and had been re- 
newed in 1905 and again in 1911. The object 
of the alliance was to maintain "the general 

141 



142 The Causes of the European War 

peace in the regions of eastern Asia and of 
India," and to insure "the independence and 
integrity of the Chinese Empire and the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunities for the commerce 
and industry of all nations in China." Each 
of the contracting parties was bound to assist 
the other if it should become "involved in a 
war concerning these matters ' ' with two nations 
at once. If either ally should be at war with 
only one power, the other should remain neu- 
tral. 1 

When the European war first broke out, Japan 
expressed the hope (August 4, 1914) that it 
would be confined to Europe and that she would 
be able to maintain a strict neutrality. She 
declared, however, at this early date, that "in 
the event of Great Britain becoming involved 
in the conflict and the object of the Anglo- Japa- 
nese Agreement of Alliance be at stake, Japan 
may take such measures as are necessary to ful- 
fill her obligations under that Agreement. ' ' 2 
Germany on August 12 announced to the Japa- 
nese Government that her East Asiatic squadron 
had been "instructed to avoid hostile acts 
against England in case Japan remains neu- 
tral." 3 

The account of Japan's subsequent action can 

i See Hazen, 700. For the full text of the treaty of 1911, 
see Publications of Amer. Ass'n. for Inter. Conciliation, Series 
No. Ill, Document No. 85, pp. 29-30. 

2 Inter. Con., No. 85, p. 33. s S., 814, 



Japan and Turkey Brawn In 143 

best be given in the words of Baron Kato, her 
minister for foreign affairs. In a speech be- 
fore the Imperial Diet, September 5, 1914, he 
said in part : 

It is plain from the foregoing statement that the 
Imperial Government from the outset earnestly hoped 
that the effect of the European war would not extend 
over to the Far East. As was related above, however, 
Great Britain was at last compelled to take part in 
the contest, and early in August the British Govern- 
ment asked the Imperial Government for assistance 
under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 
Alliance. German men-of-war and armed vessels 
were then prowling the seas of Eastern Asia to the 
serious menace of our commerce and that of our Ally, 
while in Kiaochou, her leased territory in China, 
Germany was busy with warlike preparations, ap- 
parently with the purpose of making it the base of 
her warlike operations in Eastern Asia. Grave anxi- 
ety was thus felt as to the maintenance of the peace 
of the Far East. 

As you all are aware the Agreement of Alliance 
between Japan and Great Britain has for its object, 
the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace 
in Eastern Asia, insuring the independence and in- 
tegrity of China as well as the principle of equal op- 
portunities for the commerce and industry of all na- 
tions in that country, and the maintenance and de- 
fense respectively of the territorial rights and of the 
special interests of the contracting parties in Eastern 
Asia. Therefore inasmuch as she is asked by her Ally 
for assistance at the time when the commerce in East- 
ern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain regard alike 
as one of their special interests, is subjected to con- 
stant menace, Japan, which regards that alliance as 
the guiding principle of her foreign policy, cannot 
but comply with such request and do her part. Be- 



144 The Causes of the European War 

sides in the opinion of the Government the possession 
by Germany, whose interests are opposed to those of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, of a base of her power- 
ful activities in one corner of the Far East is not only 
a serious obstacle to the maintenance of permanent 
peace of Eastern Asia, but is also in conflict with the 
more immediate interests of our own Empire. The 
Government, therefore, resolved to comply with the 
British request and if necessary in doing so to open 
hostilities against Germany and after the Imperial 
sanction was obtained, they communicated this resolu- 
tion to the British Government. Full and frank ex- 
change of views between the two Governments fol- 
lowed and it was finally agreed between them to take 
such measures as may be necessary to protect the gen- 
eral interest contemplated by the Agreement of Al- 
liance. 

Japan had no desire or inclination to get herself 
involved in the present conflict. She only believed 
that she owed it to herself to be faithful to the Al- 
liance and strengthen its foundation by ensuring the 
permanent peace of the East and by protecting the 
special interests of our two allied Powers. Desiring, 
however, to solve the situation by pacific means, the 
Imperial Government gave on August 15th the fol- 
lowing advice to the German Government: 

"Considering it highly important and necessary, 
in the present situation, to take measures to remove 
all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East 
and to safeguard the general interests contemplated 
by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and 
Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring 
peace in Eastern Asia, establishment of which is the 
aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese 
Government sincerely believe it their duty to give ad- 
vice to the Imperial German Government to carry out 
the following two propositions: 

"1st. To withdraw immediately from the Japan- 
ese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and 



Japan and Turkey Drawn In 145 

armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once 
those which cannot be so withdrawn. 

"2nd. To deliver on a date not later than Sep- 
tember 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, 
without condition or compensation, the entire leased 
territory of Kiaochou with a view to eventual restora- 
tion of same to China. 

"The Imperial Japanese Government announce, at 
the same time, that, in the event of their not receiving 
by noon August 23, 1914, the answer of the Imperial 
German Government signifying an unconditional ac- 
ceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial 
Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take 
such action as they may deem necessary to meet the 
situation. ' ' 4 

The time limit of the ultimatum expired at 
noon August 23. According to Baron Kato's 
statement, the Japanese Government had re- 
ceived no answer from Germany up to the last 
moment. The German Government did, how- 
ever, on the 23rd state orally to the Japanese 
charge d'affaires that it had "no reply to make 
to the demands of Japan." Diplomatic nego- 
tiations were at once broken off, and war was 
declared by Japan on the same day. 5 Four days 
later Austria-Hungary broke relations with 
Japan by recalling her ambassador from Tokio. 6 

At the beginning of the war "the English 
Government ordered the seizure of two dread- 
noughts that were being built for Turkey in 
British yards." Turkey regarded this as an 

winter. Con., No. 85, pp. 33-35. 

s G. W. B., 30. e A. R. B., 69. 



146 The Causes of the European War 

unfriendly act, especially as she had made great 
sacrifices for this addition to the strength of her 
navy, having borrowed money for it at the rate 
of twenty per cent. Britain maintained that she 
needed these vessels for her own protection, but 
would reimburse the Ottoman Government for 
all financial losses entailed by their seizure and, 
furthermore, would return them at the end of 
the war. The British ambassador at Constan- 
tinople, apparently, did not feel right over this 
act of his Government, for he spoke of it as 
" Turkey's one concrete and substantial griev- 
ance against Great Britain. ' ' 7 

Despite this grievance, the Porte announced 
its intention to remain neutral. Mobilization 
had been decided upon early in August, but this 
had been done "only because it would take 
months to complete, and because the Govern- 
ment wished not to be taken by surprise in case 
of aggression by Bulgaria, though they had 
also been alarmed by rumors of action by Rus- 
sia. ' ' 8 If this neutrality were maintained, 
Great Britain promised (August 7) not "to alter 
the status of Egypt" provided Egypt should 
remain quiet and "no unforeseen circum- 
stances" should arise. 9 

This policy of neutrality was soon subjected 

7 B. C. (13), 1, 2, 4, 34; B. C. (14), p. 3; R. 0. B. (2), 
10; Turkish Official Documents, International Conciliation, 
pamphlet 86, 5. 

SB. C. (13), 3. 9B, C. (13), 5. 



Japan and Turkey Drawn In 147 

to a severe strain. On August 10 two Ger- 
man warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, to 
find shelter from attack by the Allied fleet, came 
into the Dardanelles. Sir Edward Grey de- 
manded that these ships be not allowed to re- 
main in Turkish waters longer than twenty-four 
hours or else be interned. Instead of intern- 
ing them, the Ottoman Government contended 
that it had bought them and promised to allow 
the officers and crews to return to Germany. 
The grand vizier said that the "purchase was 
due to our (England's) detention of Sultan 
Osman (one of the ships taken over by the 
Government). They must have ships to bar- 
gain with regard to question of the islands on 
equal terms with Greece, and it was in no way 
directed against Russia." Sir Edward Grey 
was willing to acquiesce in the transfer, pro- 
vided it were bona fide and the crews were re- 
turned to Germany at once. 10 

The grand vizier claimed that Turkey did not 
have enough sailors to man these boats until her 
transport returned from London. He promised 
that if he were given a little time, gradually he 
would get rid of the German crews. The whole 
trouble, he said, was caused by the seizure of 
the Ottoman war ships by the British Govern- 
ment. As England had not paid for the vessels, 
his people looked upon the act as robbery and 

10 B. C. (13), 8, 9, 11. 



148 The Causes of the European War 

as an indication that she intended "to as- 
sist Greece in aggressive designs against 
Turkey." 11 

The grand vizier, however, was unable to 
make good his pledge that the German crews 
would gradually be sent home. On the con- 
trary, the Germans on the Goeben and Breslau 
were reenforced by others who came from time 
to time and found places in the navy and the 
forts in strategic positions near Constantinople. 
German gold and war materials also were sent 
to the Turkish capital. The Ottoman Govern- 
ment was thus, in the opinion of the British am- 
bassador, entirely under the control of the Teu- 
ton foreigners. 12 

The British foreign office was very patient 
with the grand vizier despite his failure to 
make good his promises. The British and Rus- 
sian ambassadors believed that he was sincere 
and really desirous of maintaining neutrality, 
but that he was not able to take a determined 
stand against the Germans. The Sultan, "a 
majority of the ministry, and a considerable sec- 
tion of the Committee of Union and Progress" 
were, in the opinion of the English ambassador, 
"opposed to so desperate an adventure as war 
with the Allies." But Enver Pasha, the min- 
ister of war, seemed to be the dominating in- 

11 B. C. (13), 20. 

12 R. O. B. (2), 36, 37, 39, 76, 86, 87, 88; B. C. (13), 31, 
39, 40, 43, 46, 47, 76; B. C. (14), pp. 2, 3, 4; Turk. Doc. 



Japan and Turkey Brawn In 149 

fluence in the ministry and he was for war. 
"Dominated by a quasi-Napoleonic ideal, by 
political Pan-Islamism, and by a conviction of 
the superiority of the German arms, (he) was 
from the first a strong partisan of the German 
alliance. ' ' 13 

The press was also very hostile to the Eng- 
lish. As the country was under martial law, the 
press was under a censorship, and, therefore, its 
utterances might be taken as an expression of 
the sentiments of the Government. Sir Louis 
Mallet, British ambassador at Constantinople, 
complained that not only was news in favor of 
the Allies suppressed, but that slander and 
vituperation against the Entente was indulged 
in without censorial restraint. The newspapers, 
not only of the capital but also of the prov- 
inces, were ' ' enthusiastically pro-German. ' ' 14 

The Germans were, of course, trying to do all 
they could to bring Turkey into the war on 
their side. In support of their propaganda, 
they used, according to the contention of Sir 
Louis Mallet, such arguments as the following: 

German success in the European war was said to 
be assured. The perpetual menace to Turkey from 
Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by a timely 

is R. O. B. (2), 36; B. C. (14), p. 1. 

I* B. O. (13), 147, enclosure 1; B. C. (14), p. 3. 

The Russian ambassador at Constantinople said (Septem- 
ber 14) that he had information to the effect that the leading 
papers of the Turkish capital were subsidized by Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. R. 0. B. (2), 53. 



150 The Causes of the European War 

alliance with Germany and Austria. Egypt might be 
recovered for the Empire. India and other Moslem 
countries represented as groaning under Christian rule 
might be kindled into a flame of infinite possibilities 
for the Caliphate of Constantinople. Turkey would 
emerge from the war the one great Power of the 
East, even as Germany would be the one great Power 
of the West. Such was the substance of German mis- 
representations. 15 

Great Britain, on the other hand, could not 
hold out such glowing prospects as an induce- 
ment for neutrality. In fact, it seems that the 
Entente powers made little or no effort at bar- 
gaining with the Porte. 16 Besides, there seems 

is B. C. (14), p. 1; R. O. B. (2), 75. 

is Only one instance of such an attempt is recorded in the 
British official correspondence, and in that case the initiative 
was taken by the Ottoman Government. On August 20 the 
minister of marine approached Sir Louis Mallet with certain 
proposals. These and the answers given to them are re- 
ported by Sir Louis Mallet as follows: 

Firstly, that the Capitulations should be abolished im- 
mediately. I pointed out the difficulty of this, and he sug- 
gested that the Minister of Finance should come and discuss 
the question with me. 

Secondly, he demanded the immediate return of the two 
Turkish battleships acquired by His Majesty's government 
at the commencement of the war. I told him that this was 
impossible, but that I would endeavor to obtain as good 
terms as possible for them, and that I hoped they would not 
be needed during the war, and would soon be returned to 
Turkey; in the meanwhile they should be regarded as a loan 
from Turkey to a friend. 

Thirdly, he asked for renunciation of any interference 
with the internal affairs of Turkey. This need not be taken 
seriously, and is, of course, an absurd proposal. 

Fourthly, he asked that if Bulgaria should intervene 
against the Triple Entente, Western Thrace should be given 
back to Turkey. 

Fifthly, he wanted the restoration of the Greek islands. 
I told him that this was impossible, and he finally agreed to 
the basis arranged just before the present wax broke out. 



Japan and Turkey Drawn In 151 

to have been a fear on the part of the Turkish 
people that Britain had designs against the in- 
tegrity and independence of their country. To 
alleviate these fears, Sir Edward Grey directed 
Sir Louis Mallet " to address the following com- 
munication to the Porte" "as soon as the 
French and Russian ambassadors have received 
similar instructions ' ' : 

If the Turkish Government will repatriate imme- 
diately the German officers and crews of the Goeben 
and Breslau, will give a written assurance that all 
facilities shall be furnished for the peaceful and un- 
interrupted passage of merchant vessels, and that all 
the obligations of neutrality shall be observed by 
Turkey during the present war, the three allied Pow- 
ers will in return agree, with regard to the Capitula- 
tions, to withdraw their extra-territorial jurisdiction 
as soon as a scheme of judicial administration, which 
will satisfy modern conditions, is set up. 

They will further give a joint guarantee in writ- 
ing that they will respect the independence and in- 
tegrity of Turkey, and will engage that no conditions 
in the terms of peace at the end of the war shall 
prejudice this independence and integrity." 

This communication was delivered by the am- 
bassadors of all three of the Entente powers; 

His final proposal was that the Allied Powers should un- 
dertake to oblige the Triple Alliance to accept any agreements 
which might be reached with respect to the Capitulations. 

Sir Louis Mallet did not seem to take these proposals very 
seriously, because, as he frankly told the minister of marine, 
he considered the German admiral master in Constantinople. 
Sir Edward Grey regarded them as excessive, but considered 
"it preferable not to reject them, viewing them as material 
for negotiation." B. C. (13), 24, 28; R, 0, B. (2), 34. 



152 The Causes of the European War 

but the Turkish Government, it seems, "attached 
no importance to the statement. ' ' 17 

On September 9 the Ottoman Government is- 
sued a statement to the powers declaring the 
Capitulations to be abolished after October l. 18 
Thereupon, the ambassadors of the powers, in- 
cluding Austria-Hungary and Germany, "sent 
identic notes to the Sublime Porte stating that 
. . . capitulary regime . . . cannot be abolished 
. . . without consent of contracting parties." 
Therefore, "we cannot recognize executory 
force after that date (October 1) of unilateral 
decision of the Sublime Porte." Sir Edward 
Grey, however, said (September 16) that he was 
"prepared to consider reasonable concessions 
about Capitulations," as long as Turkey main- 
tained neutrality. Russia was also willing to 
agree to concessions as to the Capitulations pro- 
vided Turkey would demobilize and send away 
the German military officers. 19 

England's forbearance toward Turkey con- 
tinued despite the fact that the German crews 
still remained with the two vessels alleged to 
have been purchased from Germany, and also 

17 B. C. (13), 21, 27, 28, 64; R. O. B. (2), 35. 

is The Capitulations were agreements that had been entered 
into by Turkey with the various European powers granting 
to the nationals of the latter who reside in the Ottoman do- 
minions "liberty of residence and of travel, inviolability of 
domicile, freedom of religion, and, to a certain extent, the 
right to be tried by courts of their own nationality." — Inter. 
Year Book. 

w B. C. (13), 73, 77; R. O, B, (2), 55, 56. 



Japan and Turkey Drawn In 153 

despite the fact that the British ambassador 
was satisfied that the so-called sale was ficti- 
tious. Besides, the Entente powers had other 
grievances against the Porte. English mer- 
chant ships had been illegally detained in the 
Dardanelles, 20 and a German ship "anchored op- 
posite the German embassy at Therapia" had 
been used as a wireless station by the Teutons. 21 

On September 27 Turkey committed a more 
important breach of neutrality. The Ottoman 
military authorities on that date closed the 
Dardanelles, giving as a reason that the "sud- 
den actions of (the) British fleet had given rise 
to the belief that an immediate attack was 
contemplated." The Entente ambassadors at 
Constantinople protested to the grand vizier 
against this action and the English ambassador 
assured him that any such belief was unfounded 
and expressed the wish that the Dardanelles be 
opened at once. 22 The grand vizier offered to 
reopen the straits if the British fleet would 
"move a little farther from the entrance to the 
Dardanelles." 23 This Sir Edward Grey was 
unwilling to consent to, as long as "German 
officers and men remain in Turkish waters and 
are in control of (the) Turkish fleet." 24 

The greatest cause of trouble between the 
Porte and the British Government was the 

20 B. C. (13), 12, 26, 34. 23 B. C. (13), 98. 

2i B. C. (14), p. 2. 24 B. C. (13), 102. 

22 B. C. (13), 97; R. O. B. (2), 68. 



154 The Causes of the European War 

preparations alleged to have been made by the 
former for attacking Egypt. The Ottoman Gov- 
ernment contended that the military prepara- 
tions in Syria were only a part of the general 
mobilization movement, "having no other ob- 
ject than to put Turkey on a footing to defend 
her neutrality." The Porte also declared that 
Great Britain had aroused anxiety among the 
Turks as to the observance of her pledge re- 
garding Egypt because she had declared that 
province in a state of war and had brought in 
troops from India. 25 When Bedouins crossed 
(October 28) the Egyptian frontier, the grand 
vizier declared that he did not believe the re- 
port, but that "if it were true he would give 
immediate orders for (the) recall of (the) 
Bedouins. ' ' 26 

25 B. C. (13), 118. 149. 

26 Sir Edward Grey gave the following as a summary of the 
preparations for an attack on Egypt made by the Turkish 
Government : 

The Mosul and Damascus Army Corps have, since their 
mobilization, been constantly sending troops south prepara- 
tory to an invasion of Egypt and the Suez Canal from Akaba 
and Gaza. A large body of Bedouin Arabs has been called 
out and armed to assist in this venture. Transport has been 
collected and roads have been prepared up to the frontier 
of Egypt. Mines have been dispatched to be laid in the 
Gulf of Akaba to protect the force from naval attack, and the 
notorious Sheikh Aziz Shawish, who has been so well known 
as a firebrand in raising Moslem feeling against Christians, 
has published and disseminated through Syria, and probably 
India, an inflammatory document urging Mohammedans to 
fight against Great Britain. Dr. Pruffer, who was so long 
engaged in intrigues in Cairo against the British occupation, 
and is now attached to the German Embassy in Constanti- 
nople, has been busily occupied in Syria trying to incite the 
people to take part in this conflict. B. C. (13), 166, 169, 
173, 176. 



Japan and Turkey Drawn In 155 

Notwithstanding these assurances, the Otto- 
man Government seemed anxious to recover its 
authority over Egypt. The minister of marine 
told the French ambassador (October 22) that 
the Turks felt about Egypt as the " French did 
about Alsace-Lorraine," and that while "they 
would no nothing officially," yet they " would 
shut their eyes to any agitation which was di- 
rected against English occupation of Egypt." 27 

While relations between Turkey and Great 
Britain were thus strained almost to the break- 
ing point, a new cause of trouble arose between 
the Porte and the Eussian Government. On the 
morning of October 29, "two or three Turkish 
torpedo boats raided Odessa harbor and sank" 
one Eussian gunboat and damaged one French 
and three other Eussian boats. 28 The grand 
vizier claimed that the Eussian fleet had pro- 
voked the attack. This the Eussian foreign 
office "categorically denied," and the British 
ambassador said that he had proof that the 
orders for the attack had been given on October 
27, and that these orders came "as the result 
of a conspiracy hatched between the German 
representatives in Constantinople and a small 
and unscrupulous Turkish faction. ' ' 29 

On November 1 the Turkish charge d'affaires 
at St. Petersburg read to M. Sazonof, the Eus- 
sian foreign minister, a telegram from the 

27 B. C. (13), 164. 29 R. O. B. (2), 97; B. C. (14), p. 5. 

28 B. C. (13), 178; R. 0. B. (2), 91. 



156 The Causes of the European War 

grand vizier, which contained the following 
statement : 

Convey to the Minister of Foreign Affairs our in- 
finite regret that an act of hostility, provoked by the 
Russian fleet, has compromised friendly relations be- 
tween the two countries. 

You may assure the Imperial Russian Govern- 
ment that the Sublime Porte will not fail to give an 
appropriate solution to this question, and that it will 
adopt all means necessary to prevent the possible re- 
currence of similar events. 

You may at once declare to the Minister of For- 
eign Affairs that we have decided not to allow the Im- 
perial fleet further passage into the Black Sea, and 
that we hope that the Russian fleet, on its part, will 
not further come to cruise in our waters. 

Sazonof 's reply was, in part, as follows : 

I replied to the Turkish Charge d 'Affaires that I 
categorically denied that the hostile initiative was 
taken by our fleet. Further, that I feared that it is 
now too late, anyhow, to make any sort of negotia- 
tions. If Turkey had announced the immediate ex- 
pulsion of all German soldiers and sailors, it might 
then still have been possible to enter into negotiations 
looking to reparation for the treacherous attack upon 
our coast and the damages caused thereby. I added 
that the communication presented by him in no wise 
affected the situation that had arisen. 30 

It was now too late to negotiate, as M. Sazo- 
nof had observed, for the Entente ambassadors 
had asked for their passports and two days be- 
fore had had their final interview with the grand 
vizier. 31 

so R. O. B. (2), 97. 

*iR. 0. B. (2), 90, 91, 94, 98; B. C. (13), 180. 



CHAPTEE XI 

ITALY ENTERS THE WAB 

The Turoo-Italian War of 1911-12, by which 
Italy gained Tripoli and Cyrenaica, loosened to 
some extent the bond that held her to the Triple 
Alliance. The effect of this war was to weaken 
Turkey at a time when it was Germany's policy 
to strengthen her. It is true that the Teutonic 
Governments did not protest against Italy's ac- 
tion except that Austria-Hungary declared that 
she would regard an Italian attack on European 
Turkey as a violation of Article VII of the 
Treaty of the Triple Alliance ; * but the atti- 
tude of the press showed that the course of 
Italy met with disapproval in both Teutonic 
countries. Besides, Italy's imperialistic aspira- 
tions were encouraged by the success of this 
war, and these aspirations crossed the line of 
Austrian ambition in the Balkans. 

During the negotiations preceding the out- 
break of August, 1914, Italy showed herself 
anxious for the maintenance of peace, and 
readily supported the proposals made to that 
end. When her partners in the Triple Alliance 

1 1. G. B., 6. 

157 



158 The Causes of the European War 

went to war with the other powers, she re- 
mained neutral, contending that her obligations 
by the terms of the alliance bound her to act not 
in an aggressive but only in a defensive war. In 
her opinion, this was not only an aggressive 
war, but the steps leading to it had been taken 
without her advice or knowledge; for she had 
been kept in the dark as to the demands that 
would be made by Austria on Serbia until just 
before the ultimatum reached Belgrade. 2 

Not only did Italy excuse herself for not hav- 
ing aided her allies, but she went further and 
charged that Austria-Hungary by invading Ser- 
bia without her previous consent had violated 
Article VII of the Treaty of Alliance. As early 
as July 25, 1914, her ambassador at Vienna, act- 
ing on instructions from the foreign office, de- 
clared to the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister 
that Italy would have a claim to compensation 
under the terms of Article VII if Austria should 
occupy Serbian territory. A few days later the 
Government raised the question both at Vienna 
and Berlin as to whether the Italian-speaking 
provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
would be ceded to Italy, and threatened to with- 
draw from the Triple Alliance "if adequate 
compensation were not obtained. ' ' 3 

2F. Y. B., 26, 51; B. W. P., 152; R. O. B. (2), 4, 17, 22. 

3 I. G. B., 3; A. R. B. (2), 9. See also speech of Premier 
Antonio Salandra, made June 2, 1915. 

The following articles of the Treaty of Triple Alliance show 
whether Italy was obligated under the terms of the treaty t« 



Italy Enters the War 159 

Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian for- 
eign minister, had expected that the Italian G-ov- 
ernment would demand compensation, and as 
early as July 20 he advised the Austro-Hungar- 
ian ambassador at Kome as to his interpreta- 
tion of Article VII. According to his view, the 

come to the aid of Austria-Hungary and whether Austria- 
Hungary owed Italy compensation because of the former's in- 
vasion of Serbia. 

Article III. If one or two of the high contracting parties 
should be attacked without direct provocation on their part, 
and be engaged in war with two or several Great Powers not 
signatory to this Treaty, the casus foederis shall apply simul- 
taneously to all the high contracting parties. 

Article IV. In the event that a Great Power not signa- 
tory to this Treaty should menace the safety of the states of 
one of the high contracting parties, and that the menaced 
party should be forced to make war on that Power, the two 
others bind themselves to observe toward their ally a benevo- 
lent neutrality. Each one of them in that case reserves to 
herself the right to participate in the war, if she should con- 
sider it appropriate to make common cause with her ally. 

Article VII. Austria-Hungary and Italy, being desirous 
solely that the territorial status quo in the near East be 
maintained as much as possible, pledge themselves to exert 
their influence to prevent all territorial modification which 
may prove detrimental to one or the other of the Powers 
signatory to this Treaty. To that end they shall communi- 
cate to one another all such information as may be suitable 
for their mutual enlightenment, concerning their own dispo- 
sitions as well as those of other Powers. Should, however, 
the status quo in the regions of the Balkans, or of the Turkish 
coasts and islands in the Adriatic and iEgean seas in the 
course of events become impossible; and should Austria- 
Hungary or Italy be placed under the necessity, either by the 
action of a third Power or otherwise, to modify that status 
quo by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, 
such occupation shall take place only after a previous agree- 
ment has been made between the two Powers, based on the 
principle of reciprocal compensation for all advantages, terri- 
torial or otherwise, which either of them may obtain beyond 
the present status quo, a compensation which shall satisfy 
the legitimate interests and aspirations of both parties. 
S., 335-6, 346. 



160 The Causes of the European War 

phrase, "in the regions of the Balkans," re- 
ferred only to Turkish possessions, and, there- 
fore, a military occupation of Serbian territory 
would not give Italy a right to compensation. 
Italy's interpretation, however, was upheld by 
Germany, and by July 31, Count Berchtold 
was willing to accept Italy's interpretation 
of Article VII, provided the latter power would 
1 'observe a friendly attitude toward the pend- 
ing operations of war between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Serbia" and would "carry out her 
duties as an ally in case the present conflict 
should lead to a general conflagration." The 
Italian Government took the position that the 
interpretation of the treaty was not subject to 
conditions and declined to pledge its neutrality 
on such terms. 4 

Later (August 22), the German foreign office 
advised Austria-Hungary to accept unreserv- 
edly Italy's interpretation of Article VII, 
Three days later the Austrian and German am- 
bassadors at Rome announced for their Govern- 
ments an unqualified acceptance of the Italian 
interpretation of the phrase "in the regions of 
the Balkans." Count Berchtold also said that 
this declaration implied a willingness on his 
part "to enter into negotiations with Italy con- 
cerning compensation in the case of a temporary 

* A. R. B. (2), 2, enclosure; 15, 16, 25, 26. 



Italy Enters the War 161 

or permanent occupation of territory in the 
Balkans by (Austria-Hungary)." 5 

Discussions relative to this point seem to have 
fallen into abeyance for a few months but were 
renewed in December, when, according to the 
claim of Baron Sonnino, Italian foreign minis- 
ter, a new situation had been created by the 
Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia without a 
previous agreement with Italy. A serious ef- 
fort was now begun to induce the Teutonic pow- 
ers to compensate Italy for the disturbance of 
the equilibrium in the Balkans occasioned by the 
Austrian invasion of Serbia. The Government 
took the position that "it could never allow the 
integrity and the political and economical inde- 
pendence of Serbia to be jeopardized, as this 
was contrary to its (our) interests as well as to 
the disposition of the treaty." In support of 
the claim for compensation under the provisions 
of the seventh article of the treaty, Baron Son- 
nino, the minister for foreign affairs, cited the 
fact that his country had, in the recent war with 
Turkey, yielded to Austria's protest, based on 
this same article and refrained from attack- 
ing the ports of European Turkey and by so 
doing had incurred considerable military incon- 
venience. 8 

s A. R. B. (2), 42, 44, 45. 
• I. G. B., 3, 6; A. R. B. (2), 74, 75. 

Count Berchtold expressed surprise at this attitude; for he 
claims that Marquis di San Giuliano, Sonnino's predecessor, 



162 The Causes of the European War 

At first Count Berchtold was not willing to 
allow any compensation to Italy, claiming that 
the occupation of Serbia was neither permanent 
nor even temporary, but only " momentary." 
Afterwards (December 20), Count Berchtold ex- 
pressed his willingness to negotiate as to the 
compensation due Italy "in case of temporary 
or permanent occupations in the Balkans by 
Austria-Hungary. ' ' This change of heart had, 
according to evidence received by the Italian 
ambassador at Vienna, been brought about as a 
result of advice from Germany. 7 

The principle of compensation having been 
yielded by Austria-Hungary, it looked as if an 
agreement might be reached. To render the ne- 
gotiations as smooth as possible, Germany sent 
Prince von Btilow, the ex-chancellor, as ambas- 
sador extraordinary to Rome. 

The questions yet to be settled were the 
amount and location of the territory to be given 
and the time of payment. Baron Sonnino let it 
be known that he would not accept territory that 
had to be taken from the Entente Allies, as "this 

had given him assurances "that Italy would not impede Aus- 
tria's military operations," and he only wanted Austria to 
recognize the "applicability of Article VII to the present situ- 
ation." 

7 I. G. B., 3, 4, 5, 7; A. R. B. (2), 75, 78. 

It ought to be said in this connection that Count Berchtold, 
as early as December 13, telegraphed to the Austrian rep- 
resentative at Rome that he had "no material objection" to 
entering upon negotiations with the Italian Government with 
reference to a possible compensation. A. R. B. (2), 76. . 



Italy Enters the War 163 

would be equal to taking part in the conflict. ' ' 8 
Baron Macchio, now Austro-Hungarian repre- 
sentative at Eome, hinted at "compensations 
with regard to Albania, a country so near Italy 
and so easily accessible." Baron Sonnino re- 
plied that Italy had only a negative interest in 
Albania — she was only concerned in keeping 
other powers out ; besides, the acceptance of ter- 
ritory here would embroil her unnecessarily in 
the Balkan troubles and win for her the lasting 
enmity of Serbia and Bulgaria. He said that 
Austria-Hungary ought to cede to his country 
the Italian-speaking districts now belonging to 
the Dual Monarchy. Prince von Biilow was in 
favor of the cession of Trentino and said that 
1 ' Germany was sending to Vienna Count Wedel 
. . . with the intent of inducing the Austrian 
Government to give the Trentino to Italy. ' ' He 
thought, however, that Italy should not ask for 
more, for he believed that Austria would go to 
war rather than surrender Trieste. 9 Austria- 
Hungary was naturally loath to part with her 
posssesions and Baron Burian, her foreign min- 
ister, expressed (January 18) surprise that 
Italy should raise such an embarrassing ques- 
tion ; he still thought that she ought to be willing 
to ' ' accept a discussion regarding the compensa- 
tions relating to territories possessed by other 
warring states. ' ' 10 

si. G. B., 10. 

si. G. B., 8, 10, 11; A. R. B. (2), 90, 98, enclosure. 

io I. G. B., 12. 



164 The Causes of the European War 

On January 26 Prince von Btilow asked Italy 
to formulate her demands. This the Italian for- 
eign minister would decline to do until Austria- 
Hungary should " accept explicitly and defi- 
nitely that the discussions bear on the ground of 
the cession of territory now possessed by the 
(Austro-Hungarian) Empire." 11 The Austro- 
Hungarian Government hesitated, neither ac- 
cepting nor rejecting the basis of discussion de- 
manded by Italy. 

The negotiations were further complicated by 
the demand made by Austria-Hungary on Italy 
for compensation under Article VII for the oc- 
cupation of Valona and the retention of the 
iEgean Islands. Italy denied the right of com- 
pensation because of her action in reference to 
these places and undertook to justify it on the 
ground that the ' ' occupation of Valona had been 
caused by the general state of disorder which 
reigned in Albania," and that the Mgean 
Islands were retained because Turkey had not 
yet complied with all the terms of the treaty 
of Lausanne. Besides, she claimed that Aus- 
tria-Hungary had waived all her claim to com- 
pensation ; for on May 27, 1912, her foreign min- 
ister had declared that he ''would not avail him- 
self in this instance of the right of compensation 

"I. G. B., 15; A. E. B. (2), 99. 

The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister spoke of Italy's 
"preposterous" request as a demand for "a slice of our own 
flesh." 



Italy Enters the War 165 

which was due him," provided Italy would not 
seize any more of the islands. In deference to 
this request, Italy had refrained from seizing 
any of the other islands, though the strategic 
reasons for doing so were very strong. 

After having made this defense, Baron Son- 
nino, on February 12, withdrew all the proposals 
made, declaring that his Government would ' ' in- 
trench itself in the simple interpretation of 
Article VII, declaring that it considers as openly 
contrary to the very article whatever military 
action Austria-Hungary would make from now 
on in the Balkans. ' ' This was a threat to with- 
draw from the Triple Alliance if the Austro- 
Hungarian Government should again attack 
Serbia before an agreement as to compensations 
had been concluded. 12 

While the question of the cession of Austro- 
Hungarian territory was still unsettled a new 
difficulty arose. Austria-Hungary claimed that 
the agreement as to compensation might be in- 
itiated before but could not be consummated 
until after the campaign against Serbia was 
over, as it could not be determined until then 

12 Austria-Hungary contended that Count Berchtold's state 
ment " 'that he would not have availed himself in this in- 
stance of the right of compensation which was due him' ought 
to be interpreted in the sense that he did not intend to avail 
himself of the right of compensation at the moment in which 
the occupation of the islands had occurred . . . but that he 
reserved to avail himself of that right at an opportune mo- 
ment." I. G. B., 20, 21, 22, 23, 24; A. R. B. (2), 95, en- 
closure, 104, 106, 109, enclosure; S., 345. 



166 The Causes of the European War 

how much Austria-Hungary would profit by the 
military operations. Italy contended (Febru- 
ary 22) that Article VII spoke of a "previous 
argeement," which could only mean a definite 
understanding before military operations were 
begun. Any other construction would leave her 
without any guarantee that the agreement initi- 
ated before the campaign would be satisfactorily 
concluded after it. Germany agreed with Italy 
in her interpretation of this part of Article VII, 
and ' ' strongly intervened at Vienna to favor an 
understanding between Austria-Hungary and 
Italy." 13 It was doubtless in consequence of 
this intervention that Austria-Hungary an- 
nounced (March 9) her willingness to enter upon 
negotiations "on the basis of cession of Aus- 
trian territory." 14 

The people in Italy were almost unanimous 
in the conviction that the Government must use 
this opportunity for enabling their country to 
realize its national ambitions. The press was 
now clamoring for war. The Giornale d'ltalia 
declared (March 7) that it would " be extremely 
difficult for Italy longer to remain neutral." 
Baron Sonnino had in his negotiations with Aus- 
tria-Hungary more than once spoken of the na- 
tional aspirations of the Italian people and the 
impossibility of the Government's carrying out 
a policy in opposition to these aspirations. It 

"I. G. B., 27, 31, 38; A. R. B. (2), 109, enclosure. 
"I. G. B., 39; A. R. B. (2), 115. 



Italy Enters the War 167 

would, therefore, naturally be expected that 
Austria would have to come to Italy's terms if 
neutrality were to be maintained. 

On March 10 the Italian foreign minister 
stated that he was willing to specify the de- 
mands of Italy as soon as Austria-Hungary 
should accept certain conditions which he laid 
down as bases for negotiations. One of these 
was the provision that "when the accord shall 
be concluded it should take immediate effect. ' ' 15 

This, the most important of the three condi- 
tions, was not accepted by Austria-Hungary. 
Baron Burian said (March 13) "that it would 
be impossible for the Imperial and Eoyal (Aus- 
tro-Hungarian) Government to admit the pass- 
ing on of any territories of the monarchy before 
the conclusion of peace." He also still held 
that Austria had a claim to compensation be- 
cause of the Italian occupation of Valona and 
the ^Egean Islands. Italy, however, positively 
declined to allow the last-named question to 
come up for discussion. 16 Austria pointed out 
that there were very serious obstacles to the 
transfer of any of her territory to Italy in time 
of war. 

Germany, although she had up to this time 
been urging Austria-Hungary to yield, thought 
that Italy was asking too much. She promised 
to guarantee that "the agreement to be con- 

15 i. G. B., 42. 

16 1. G. B„ 43, 44; A, R. B. (2), 117, enclosure. 



168 The Causes of the European War 

eluded between Italy and Austria-Hungary will 
be put into execution faithfully and loyally im- 
mediately after the conclusion of peace." 17 

Italy, however, feared that the Austrian and 
Hungarian Parliaments would not confirm the 
cession of territory after the war was over, when 
she would have no means of compelling compli- 
ance with the terms of the agreement. As to the 
guarantee of Germany, she considered it "valu- 
able in the case of a victorious Germany, which 
presupposes also a victorious Austria, but would 
have less value in case both should be de- 
feated." 18 Baron Sonnino said that "the ex- 
pectation of an immediate execution would 
strongly influence public opinion toward modera- 
tion in the demands of the cessions, while any 
delay would encourage larger demands." In 
short, he was offering Austria a discount for 
cash. 19 Baron Burian tried to allay Sonnino 's 
fears regarding the future actions of the Aus- 
trian and Hungarian Parliaments by declaring 
that " they could not reject an act which had 
taken place under the ample power possessed by 
his Majesty the Emperor." *> 

As they were deadlocked on this point, Prince 
von Biilow suggested that they take up the other 
question as to the amount of compensation, leav- 

it I. G. B., 46; A. R. B. (2), 125, 128. 
18 1. G. B., 46, 53; A. R. B. (2), 121. 
isl. G. B., 52. 
20 I. G. B., 51. 



Italy Enters the War 169 

ing this one in abeyance without prejudice. 21 
This was done and Austria-Hungary made 
(March 27) an offer of the terms on which she 
was willing to purchase the neutrality of Italy. 22 
These terms being regarded as vague and 
unsatisfactory by Italy, she was invited to make 
counter-proposals. 23 Thereupon Baron Son- 
nino (April 8, 1915) formulated the conditions 
that would be acceptable to his country. They 
were in part as follows : 

(1) Austria-Hungary to cede "the Trentino 
to Italy, with the boundaries which the Italian 
realm had in 1811." 

(2) The boundary between Italy and Austria 
to be corrected, "the cities of Gradisca and 
Goriza being comprised in the ceded territory. ' ' 

(3) "The city of Trieste with its territory" 
to be " constituted into an autonomous and inde- 
pendent state. ' ' 

(4) Austria-Hungary to cede "to Italy the 
group of the Curzolari Islands. ' ' 

(5) Italy to "occupy at once the territories 
. . . ceded to her" ; "Trieste and her territory" 
to be cleared immediately "of the Austro-Hun- 
garian authorities and troops." 

(6) Austria-Hungary to acknowledge "the 
full sovereignty of Italy on Valona and her bay, 
including Sasseno, with as much territory in 

2i I. G. B., 50; A. R. B. (2), 121. 
221. G. B., 56; A. R. B. (2), 131. 
23 1. G. B., 58, 62; A. E. B. (2), 134, 138. 



170 The Causes of the European War 

the 'Hinterland' as may be requested for their 
defense. ' ' 

(7) Austria-Hungary to renounce "com- 
pletely every interest in Albania. ' ' 

There were also some minor clauses contained 
in articles 8 and 9. 

For these concessions Italy agreed to bind 
herself during the present war "to preserve a 
perfect neutrality with regard to Austria-Hun- 
gary and Germany" and to renounce "any right 
to further invoke, for her own advantage, the 
dispositions of Article VII of the Treaty of the 
Triple Alliance," provided "Austria-Hungary 
makes the same renunciation for all that may 
regard the Italian occupation of the Islands of 
the Dodekanese (the iEgean Islands)." 24 

Austria-Hungary was willing to cede ' ' all the 
districts which form what is commonly called 
the Trentino," but would not agree to the 
boundary for these districts laid down by the 
Italian proposals. 25 In his reply to Italy's 
proposals, Baron Burian, Austro-Hungarian 
foreign minister, objected to "a change in the 
frontier line toward the Isonzo," as this "would 
render difficult the military defense of that part 
of the (Austro-Hungarian) Monarchy's frontier, 
and would place the frontier of Italy too near 
to the city of Trieste. To detach this city from 

2*1, G. B., 64; A. R. B. (2), 141. 
25 1. G. B., 60, 71. 



Italy Enters the War 171 

Austria-Hungary would deprive the latter of its 
most important center of maritime traffic and 
put in possession of Italy the principal line of 
communication between that city and Germany. 
Finally, the acquisition of the Curzolari Islands, 
which dominate Dalmatia, would make Italy mis- 
tress of those regions, and the Adriatic Sea 
would become an Italian sea, in the case Italy 
maintained possession of Valona. ' ' 26 

"As to the proposal, contained in Article V, 
according to which the territories ceded by Aus- 
tria-Hungary should be immediately trans- 
ferred to Italy, Baron Burian observed that the 
rearrangements that such a proposal would 
carry with it, which would be impracticable even 
in time of peace for various reasons of general 
administration, . . . would be even more so in 
time of war. On this subject, he added that, 
without quoting other historical examples, it 
was sufficient to remember the procedure 
adopted on the occasion of the cession of Nice 
and Savoy to France in 1860, in which, even 
after the conclusion of peace, a certain number 
of months elapsed between the conclusion of 
the convention and the actual transfer of the 
ceded territories.' ' 

26 Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian representative at 
Rome, in discussing the reply of his government with the 
Italian foreign minister, said: "To Austria-Hungary it 
would be like depriving a human being of air if the Italian 
border were to be pushed to the very gates of Trieste, if a 
free state were to arise which would cut off (Austria-Hun- 
gary's) access to the sea." A. R. B. (2), 147; I. G. B., 71. 



172 The Causes of the Europecm War 

The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister also 
declared that his country could not ' ' disinterest 
itself in Albania, a region so near the sphere of 
its most sensitive interests." 27 In an inter- 
view with the Italian ambassador at Vienna, he 
expressed (April 29) his willingness to discuss 
with the Italian foreign minister ' ' the recipro- 
cal interests in Albania, keeping in mind the 
changed circumstances during the present war, 
and to join with the Royal (Italian) Government 
in a new agreement regarding the same, which 
could, in establishing anew the question on Eu- 
ropean ground, imply also the disinterestedness 
of Austria-Hungary provided that Italy would 
equally disinterest herself in Albania, to the ex- 
ception of Valona and of the sphere of interests 
which would have there their center, and that 
sufficient guarantees should be given against un- 
dertakings or establishments of other powers in 
Albania, an eventuality threatening the political 
and maritime interests of Austria-Hungary as 
well as those of Italy." 28 

It is needless to say that Baron Burian's an- 
swer was unsatisfactory to Italy. He hoped, 
however (if we are to accept the opinion of the 
Italian ambassador at Vienna), that Italy would 
abate her demands, and believed that she would 
not go to war with Austria and Germany even 

2TI. G. B., 60, 71; A. R. B. (2), 144. 
28 1. G. B., 75; A. R. B. (2), 44. 



Italy Enters the War 173 

though her "requests were not accepted integ- 
rally." 29 

If this was the opinion of the Austro-Hun- 
garian foreign minister, he had woefully mis- 
judged the situation in Italy, 30 for at this time 
both the Government and, apparently, the people 
also were determined to go to war rather than 
lose this opportunity of realizing their national 
aspirations. We are not surprised, therefore, 
that Italy decided to end the long and appar- 
ently fruitless negotiations. On May 3, Baron 
Sonnino notified the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment that he was constrained to withdraw all 
his " propositions for an accord" and that 
"Italy, confident in her good right, affirms and 
proclaims that from this moment she resumes 
her entire freedom of action, and declares her 
treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary to be 
void and henceforth of no effect." 31 The Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Government protested against 
this action of Italy, saying that the treaty had 
been renewed to last until 1920, and could not 
be denounced or nullified before that date. 32 

Prince von Biilow and Baron Macchio did not 

29 1. G. B., 74. 

so Baron Macchio thought ( May 2 ) that public sentiment in 
Italy was "three quarters opposed to war." The street dem- 
onstrations of May 16 and 17 at Rome and in the provinces 
in favor of war were, he seemed to think, arranged by the 
resigned cabinet as a political move. A. R. B. (2), 167, 187, 
189, 191. 

sil. G. B., 76. 

32 A. R. B. (2), 200. 



174 The Causes of the European War 

even now cease their efforts to win the neutral- 
ity of Italy, and in this endeavor they were prob- 
ably supported by the Italian ex-premier, Signor 
Giolitti. These efforts were rewarded with an- 
other offer made by Austria-Hungary May 18. 

By the terms of this proposal, Austria-Hun- 
gary would cede to Italy that part of the Tyrol 
''the inhabitants of which are of Italian na- 
tionality," with the same boundaries as in the 
previous offer; and the territory west of the 
Isonzo, including Gradisca, the population of 
which is purely Italian. Trieste would become 
an imperial free city. 

Austria-Hungary would also declare "her 
political disinterestedness with regard to Al- 
bania " ; would not contest Italy's " unrestricted 
sovereignty over Valona and its bay, as well as 
over the sphere of interest surrounding it"; 
and would waive all claims for compensation 
growing out of the Italian occupation of the 
iEgean Islands. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government would 
"issue a solemn proclamation concerning the 
territorial cessions immediately after the con- 
clusion of (the) agreement," and mixed com- 
missions would be appointed "to settle details 
in connection with the cession of the territories 
in question." "Military persons born in the 
territories ceded to Italy" would be "withdrawn 
from the fighting lines of the Austro-Hungarian 



Italy Enters the War 175 

army" immediately after the conclusion of the 
agreement. 

Italy would undertake "to maintain absolute 
neutrality toward Austria-Hungary and Ger- 
many and Turkey as long as this war lasts," 
and would declare "her disinterestedness in any 
territorial or other advantage that might accrue 
to Austria-Hungary as a result either of the 
present military operations or of the treaties 
of peace that shall mark their end. ' ' 

Austria-Hungary and Italy were both to ac- 
cept "the guarantee assumed by Germany for 
the faithful and loyal execution of this agree- 
ment. ' ' 33 

Next day the provision as to mixed commis- 
sions was modified so as to read, in part, as 
follows: "The transfer of the ceded terri- 
tories will take place as soon as the decisions 
taken by aforesaid commissions shall have been 
satisfied; it will be complete within one 
month." 34 Three days later (May 22) Baron 
Macchio was instructed by the Austro-Hun- 
garian foreign office to ask Baron Sonnino if 
he would be willing to sign the above-mentioned 
agreement provided Austria-Hungary "met 
Italy still further on the question of the putting 
of the cessions into effect, without, however, con- 
ceding immediate military occupation." Baron 

as A. R. B. (2), 178, 185, 188, 190, 194. 
s* A. R. B. (2), 192, 195. 



176 The Causes of the European War 

Macchio raised this question in his interview 
with Sonnino next day, but the latter replied that 
this offer had come too late and, that, besides, 
the last proposal, even when finally amended, 
was not satisfactory. 35 

The Italian premier in a speech June 2, 1915, 
referred to these proposals as an eleventh hour 
bid and intimated that he did not believe that 
they had been made in good faith. The fact 
that they contained no promise of immediate 
execution rendered them impossible of consid- 
eration, even if they had met Italy's wishes in 
other respects. Besides, he contended that they 
fell far short of his country's demands. The 
boundaries proposed for Trentino were, he main- 
tained, not those asked for by Baron Sonnino 
on April 8, and, if accepted, would leave Aus- 
tria-Hungary in possession of the gates to Italy. 
The offer provided for the autonomy of Trieste ; 
Sonnino had asked for its independence. Be- 
sides, there was no provision that would give 
Italy a satisfactory position in the Adriatic. 36 

It may be that Italy was not at this time as 
free to accept bids as she was on April 8, for it 
is thought that on April 25 she had entered into 
an agreement with Great Britain which tied 
her hands as regards further bargaining with 
the Teutonic powers. 37 

ss A. R. B. (2), 202, 203. 

36 See Salandra's speech. 

37 Allen, The Great War, 343; A. R. B. (2), 171, 196. 



Italy Enters the War 177 

The war policy of the Government was sup- 
ported by both houses of Parliament by large 
and enthusiastic majorities, 38 and on May 23, 
1915, war was declared against Austria. 39 It 
was not until August 27, 1916, that a declaration 
of war against Germany was made, which was 
to be effective August 28. 

ss A. R. B. (2), 198, 201. 
3«A. R. B. (2), 204. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE LESSER BELLIGERENTS 

As has been seen, Bulgaria at the opening of 
the war was smarting under the defeats of the 
last Balkan War, and was anxious to recover 
territory in Macedonia then held by Serbia. 
She had a seaport, Dedeagatch, on the .ZEgean 
Sea, but to get to it by rail her people were 
obliged to pass through Turkish territory. 
They were, therefore, desirous of getting from 
Turkey a strip of land that would properly link 
up Dedeagatch with their other possessions. 
Both the Teutonic and Entente Allies were, 
therefore, in a position to make tempting offers 
to Bulgaria. 

The Bulgarian premier stated on August 9 
that his country was ready to go to war on 
such terms as would satisfy her " national as- 
pirations. ' ' She would join in with the Entente 
Allies if they could give binding guarantees that 
the portion of Macedonia which had been lost 
to Serbia in the second Balkan War and minor 
portions of Greek Macedonia would be re- 
stored to her. This was virtually an announce- 
ment that Bulgarian support would be sold to 
the highest bidder. 

178 



The Lesser Belligerents 179 

The Entente powers were handicapped in the 
game of bargaining. Serbia was unwilling to 
give up as much of her Macedonian territory 
as Bulgaria demanded, and the Greek king was 
opposed to the sacrifice of any of his posses- 
sions. Russia's announced intention to take 
Constantinople for herself also aroused the 
jealousy and fear of the Bulgarians. Besides, 
considerable friction developed between the 
Serbs and the Bulgars over the Valandova in- 
cident. On April 2 a Serbian blockhouse at 
Valandova was attacked by a band of raiders, 
with a loss of life on both sides. Serbia claims 
that these raiders were Bulgarian soldiers 
(Komitadjis). Bulgaria denied that they were 
and disavowed all responsibility for the inva- 
sion. 

Russian diplomacy, however, smoothed over 
this cause of dispute, and the Entente were able 
(by August 10) to make Bulgaria a good offer. 
According to the Giornale d' Italia, they offered 
to meet her demands as to Serbian Macedonia, 
Serbia to be compensated out of Greek terri- 
tory. 

In the meantime, the diplomacy of the Central 
powers had been active and, as it later proved, 
more successful than that of their rivals. Ger- 
man bankers had in February made large ad- 
vances on a loan contracted by Bulgaria in the 
summer of 1914, and Turkey had agreed to 



180 The Causes of the European War 

allow Bulgarian express trains from Dedea- 
gatch to go through without stopping on Turk- 
ish territory. Later a treaty was signed (an- 
nounced August 23) between Bulgaria and Tur- 
key by which the former was granted the cov- 
eted strip of the latter 's territory, which would 
properly connect her seaport Dedeagatch with 
the interior of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Gov- 
ernment promised as its part of the agreement 
to maintain armed neutrality. 

On September 21 Bulgaria began to mobilize, 
declaring at the same time that she was not 
preparing for war, but was only taking steps 
that were necessary to preserve armed neutral- 
ity. It looked now as if Bulgaria had decided 
to cast in her lot with the Teutonic allies. She 
was aided in making up her mind by the failure 
of the Allied campaign against the Dardanelles 
and the collapse of the Russian defensive in 
Poland. It is thought, too, that Bulgaria had 
entered into a secret agreement with the Central 
powers in July, 1915, whereby she was prom- 
ised very liberal territorial concessions on con- 
dition that she would attack Serbia. At any 
rate, Bulgaria had decided that the Teutonic 
promises were either more alluring to her or 
else stood a better chance of being redeemed. 

The Entente powers were not satisfied with 
Bulgaria's explanation regarding the mobiliza- 
tion of her forces, and on October 3, 1915, Rus- 



The Lesser Belligerents 181 

sia sent an ultimatum to Bulgaria stating that 
the events then taking place showed that the 
Government of King Ferdinand had decided 
1 ' to place the fate of its country in the hands of 
Germany." "The presence of German and 
Austrian officers at the ministry of war and on 
the staff of the army, the concentration of 
troops in the zone bordering Serbia and the 
extensive financial support accepted from our 
enemies by the Sofia Cabinet, no longer leave 
any doubt as to the object of the military prep- 
arations of Bulgaria." The Russian minister 
was instructed to leave Bulgaria if the Bulgar- 
ian Government did not "within twenty-four 
hours openly break with the enemies of the 
Slav cause and of Eussia, and did (does) not 
at once proceed to send away officers belonging 
to armies of states which are at war with the 
powers of the Entente. ' ' x 

Instead of complying with these demands, 
Bulgaria, on October 13, attacked Serbia and 
next day declared war on her. Great Britain 
declared war on Bulgaria October 14, and Rus- 
sia and Italy followed suit on October 19. 

Portugal and Great Britain have been bound 
together by the ties of friendship for centuries. 
It is said that since the time of Edward III 
(1373) the two countries have been united by 
"a covenant of mutual support." This old 

i Chicago Herald, October 4, 1915. 



182 The Causes of the European War 

agreement, revised by Cromwell and again by 
Charles II, was declared to be still binding in 
1873 by Queen Victoria. Portugal was thus 
in close alliance with Great Britain when the 
war broke out in 1914. The fact that Portugal 
owes the security of her African possessions to 
British friendship makes her value the more 
highly her alliance with the mistress of the seas. 

When Britain became involved in the war, 
Portugal declared her willingness to act on 
her obligations to her ally whenever the latter 
should desire it. This policy announced by the 
Government received the approval of Parlia- 
ment and the support of the press and of all 
political parties. The Portuguese premier even 
offered to send an expeditionary force to aid 
the Allies in Belgium. There were, however, 
strong military and financial objections to Por- 
tugal's participation in the war, and it was de- 
cided best for the Allied cause for her not to 
break with Germany at this time. She, there- 
fore, maintained a formal neutrality toward the 
Teutonic powers, but her heart was all the time 
with the Entente Allies. 

The role that had been imposed upon Portugal 
by her friends was a difficult one to fill, and Ger- 
many charged her with numerous violations 
of neutrality. The final break did not come, 
however, until March 9, 1916, when Germany 



The Lesser Belligerents 183 

declared war on Portugal. Austria-Hungary 
followed the German example on March 15. 
The immediate cause of the rupture was the 
seizure by the Portuguese Government of thirty- 
six interned German merchant vessels on the 
ground that her commercial needs urgently de- 
manded an increase in her shipping facilities. 
Germany claimed, in her declaration of war, 
that the shortage in Portuguese tonnage did 
not justify the requisition of so many ships and 
that the Government had taken no steps toward 
satisfying the shipowners as to compensation. 
Sir Edward Grey, however, contended that the 
vessels would have been duly paid for if the 
German Government had had the patience to 
wait. 

Eumania has an ambition to incorporate in 
her dominions the three and one-half million 
Rumans living in Transylvania, Bukovina, the 
Banat, and Bessarabia. As these territories 
now belong to Austria-Hungary and Russia, 
it follows that her aspirations can be realized 
only at the expense of these two neighboring 
powers. 

When the Great War broke out, both groups 
of belligerents were thus in a position to make 
attractive bids for Rumanian neutrality or sup- 
port. Each could offer territory already under 
its control and also lands that it hoped to 



184 The Causes of the European War 

wrest from the enemy. Both sides were fa- 
vored by advantages and hampered by disad- 
vantages in the bargaining contest. 

The Teutonic allies could start with an official 
friendship that had lasted for forty years. 
Eussia had appropriated Rumanian Bessarabia 
after defeating Turkey in 1878 and had thereby 
destroyed the cordial feeling that had existed 
toward her among the Rumanian people. The 
Teutonic powers thus found it easy to extend 
their influence over Rumania. The present 
King of Rumania is a Hohenzollern, and her 
ruling aristocracy has been guided by German 
ideals. 

Despite all of this, however, at the outbreak 
of the great conflict, public sentiment in Ru- 
mania seemed to be overwhelmingly in favor of 
the Entente Allies, and she was expected to go 
into the war on their side. Entente diplomacy 
had, however, failed to win her over until Aug- 
ust 27, 1916, when she entered the war against 
the Teutons. The Rumanian Government was 
induced to take this step partly by the fear of 
Bulgaria and partly on account of Allied suc- 
cesses on the western front and contempo- 
raneous Russian successes in re-conquering Bu- 
kovina. This action also brought her into war 
with the allies of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bul- 
garia, and Germany. 



CONCLUSIONS 

It now remains for the reader to judge as to 
the degree of culpability attaching to each bel- 
ligerent for this great crime. Of course, to un- 
derstand thoroughly the causes of the war, we 
should have to go back and explain commercial 
rivalries, race hatreds, and historic enmities. 
But for the correct placing of the responsibility 
for the conflict, a knowledge of remote causes 
is not so necessary as an intimate acquaintance 
with the immediate causes. The present gen- 
eration is not altogether to blame for national 
antipathies. Many of them are the heritage of 
former decades and even centuries. No coun- 
try can be judged too harshly if she harbors a 
feeling of jealousy toward her neighbor be- 
cause she supposes that the line of her rival's 
ambition crosses the path that Providence has 
marked out for herself. The nation that fans 
a smoldering feeling of rivalry into an act of 
hostility has the greater sin. It is, therefore, 
important to arrive at a correct conclusion as to 
what country or countries were responsible for 
the war and to what extent each was culpable. 

A perusal of the published correspondence 
raises many questions which must be answered 

185 



186 The Causes of the European War 

before guilt can properly be apportioned. 
Among the problems to be solved are the follow- 
ing: 

(1) Was the assassination of the heir-appar- 
ent to the Anstro-Hungarian throne the culmina- 
tion of a propaganda having for its aim the 
disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian mon- 
archy? Was the act upheld by public sentiment 
in Serbia? Was the Government of Serbia an 
accomplice in the crime, either before or after 
the fact? That is, did the Government aid in 
any way the conspirators and, if not, did it mani- 
fest a proper willingness to mete out justice to 
the criminals? Also, did it give adequate guar- 
antees as to good conduct in the future? From 
the answers to these questions, we determine 
the guilt or innocence of Serbia. 

(2) But if Serbia should fail to exonerate 
herself, the next problem is that of the char- 
acter and degree of her punishment. Did 
self-protection demand that Austria-Hungary 
inflict as severe a punishment as her note pre- 
scribed? Did Austria-Hungary desire only 
the punishment that a compliance with the 
terms of her note would entail, or did she 
want to discipline Serbia with war? If she 
wished war, did she plan only a punitive cam- 
paign? Or was it her aim to compromise the 
independence of Serbia and thus extend her 
overlordship over Serbian territory? Did she 



Conclusions 187 

realize that her policy toward Serbia was a 
menace to the peace of Europe? If her griev- 
ances called for dire punishment of Serbia, did 
they justify her in entering upon a war that 
would jeopardize the peace of Europe? The 
solution of this problem involves not only the 
guilt or innocence of Austria-Hungary, but that 
of Germany also, inasmuch as Germany, accord- 
ing to her own statement, supported Austria 
and shared in the responsibility for her Serbian 
policy. 

(3) To decide upon Russia's responsibility, 
we must answer other questions in addition to 
those mentioned above. Did Austria promise 
to respect the sovereignty of Serbia ? If so, did 
these promises rest on sufficient guarantees ? If 
Austria did intend to reduce Serbia to vassalage 
to herself, did Russia have a right to come to 
the latter 's help? Did her interest in the inde- 
pendence and integrity of Serbia arise from 
sympathy for a helpless kindred people or from 
fear for her place in the Balkans? Assuming 
that she had a right to champion the cause of 
Serbia, should she have exercised that cham- 
pionship at the cost of war? 

(4) It is clear that France's interest in the 
Austro- Serbian dispute arose purely from the 
bearing it might have on her obligations to Rus- 
sia. To determine France's share in the guilt, 
we have, therefore, to decide whether she did 



188 The Causes of the European War 

all she could to keep Austria and Serbia from 
going to war. After war was declared on Ser- 
bia, did she exert herself to prevent its spread- 
ing to other countries ? When Russia and Ger- 
many went to war, was she bound by her treaty 
obligations to aid her ally? If so, was she justi- 
fied in entering into such an engagement with 
Russia! 

(5) As for the guilt or innocence of Belgium, 
only one question can be raised : Had she vio- 
lated her own neutrality before she was invaded f 
If she had, then guilt lies at her door also. If 
she had not, she can be blamed for upholding 
her neutrality only on the theory that war is 
never justifiable. 

(6) England's responsibility is also compar- 
atively easy to determine. She declared that 
she would not go to war over the Austro-Serbian 
dispute or even the Russo-Austrian quarrel, but 
would not pledge her neutrality if France and 
Germany were involved. The questions to be 
answered in her case are as follows: If Ger- 
many and France should go to war, would the 
balance of power in Europe be disturbed to the 
extent of involving England's safety or her in- 
ternational obligations ? If not, was a war be- 
tween France and Germany of sufficient concern 
to England to justify her in refusing to com- 
mit herself to either side in advance. Did she 
have a right to keep her hands free by refusing 



Conclusions 189 

a promise of assistance to France and a pledge 
of neutrality to Germany when war between 
the last named countries seemed imminent? 
Should she have decided then, or should she have 
left herself free to be guided by future develop- 
ments? Should she have abandoned this non- 
committal attitude when Germany promised that 
the integrity of France proper would be re- 
spected, even though this promise did not cover 
France's colonies or the neutrality of Belgium? 
Should she have come to an agreement with Ger- 
many when the latter afterwards asked if she 
would pledge her neutrality on condition that the 
promise of Germany would be extended so as to 
cover the neutrality of Belgium and the French 
colonies? Did she have a right to promise 
France the aid of her navy in case her coast was 
attacked by Germany? After war between Ger- 
many and France had begun, was England jus- 
tified in keeping her treaty engagement as to 
the neutrality of Belgium at the cost of war? 

(7) One other important problem is the at- 
titude of the various powers toward the peace 
proposals that were made during the negotia- 
tions. In connection with this problem the fol- 
lowing questions arise: What proposals were 
made? Were these proposals reasonable and 
fair to all the disputants? What powers initi- 
ated proposals? By what powers were they 
supported? 



190 The Ccmses of the Europecm War 

If we can find answers to all these questions, 
we can accurately apportion the blame for the 
war so far as the immediate causes are con- 
cerned. The documents quoted in the preceding 
pages give us positive answers to some of these 
questions, and they furnish us facts on which to 
base an intelligent opinion as to the others. 
This is as far as we can go at present. 

There are no difficult problems connected with 
the participation of the later belligerents in the 
conflict. The war had become general before 
they entered it, and so they were not responsi- 
ble for it. Besides, the reasons for their going 
in are evident, namely, self-interest and treaty 
obligations to other belligerents. 

The documents, as a whole, are rather vague. 
One subject is complicated with another in such 
a way that it is difficult to treat the proposals 
topically. It seems not impossible that one 
cause of the war was the failure of the diplomats 
to understand each other. This theory is sup- 
ported by the fact that no adequate cause for a 
great European conflict appears in the official 
correspondence. One has the feeling that the 
whole trouble could have been avoided by wise 
diplomacy. It was not a case of statesmen be- 
ing pushed into war by public sentiment. It is 
true that the documents reveal a strong public 
sentiment in Germany and Austria in favor of 
punishing Serbia and in Eussia against allow- 



Conclusions 191 

ing Serbia to be humiliated. But if the people 
in these or other countries expected or desired 
that the nations should at this time engage in a 
titanic struggle for the settlement of their dif- 
ferences, there is no hint of it in the published 
correspondence. Nor does one get the idea that 
the governments expected or wanted a general 
European war. It is true that each nation was 
insistent upon standing by its alleged rights and 
duties. But I believe that an adjustment of the 
conflicting claims could have been arranged if 
the governments could have foreseen the re- 
sult of insistence upon them. The powers seem 
to have misunderstood each other; the game of 
bluff was carried too far. And thus it seems 
that the war was not only a crime but also a 
blunder. 



INDEX 



Adrianople, treaty of (1829), 18. 

Afghanistan, clash of Russian and 
British interests in, 9. 

Africa, friction between France 
and Great Britain due to con- 
flicting claims in, 10—11 ; at- 
tempted interference of Germany 
with France in, 12—16. 

Agadir crisis, 15 ; attitude of Bel- 
gium at time of, 137. 

Albania, early history of people of, 
16, 25, 27 ; by treaty of London 
(1912) becomes an autonymous 
state, 28; disadvantageous effect 
of creation of Kingdom of, on 
Serbia, 30, 31; offers of Austria- 
Hungary to Italy regarding 
(1914-15), 163. 170, 172. 

Albert, King of Belgium, appeals 
for help to King of England, 
115, 130-131. 

Algeciras Congress, diplomatic de- 
feat of Germany at, 13. 

Alsace-Lorraine, effects of loss of, 
on France, 4. 

Assassination of Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand and his wife, 32. 

Austria (Austria-Hungary), party 
to quadruple alliance of 1815, 1; 
friendly relations between Ger- 
many and, cultivated by Bis- 
marck, 5 ; rivalry of Russia and, 
in the Balkans, 5—6; diplomatic 
victory of, over Russia at Con- 
gress of Berlin (1878), 6; joins 
Triple Alliance against Russia, 
6—7 ; enters on policy of expan- 
sion toward JEgean, 22 ; annexa- 
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
by, 22 ; agitation among great 
powers against, 23 ; support 
given to, by Germany, 24; in- 
creased hostility of Russia to, on 
account of attitude in Balkan 
Wars of 1912-14, 29; state of 
relations between Serbia and, in 
1914, 32; general sentiment in, 
upon assassination of Arehduke 
Francis Ferdinand, 33, 37-40; 
ultimatum sent by, to Serbia, In 
note of July 23, 1914, 41-46; 
statement issued by, to great 
192 



powers, 47-50 ; support given 
to, by Germany, 52 ; reception 
of note by Serbia, 52—53 ; refuses 
Russia's request that time limit 
set by ultimatum be extended, 
59 ; moderate reply of Serbia to, 
in note of July 25, 62-68; dis- 
satisfaction of, with Serbian 
reply and breaking of diplomatic 
relations, 68—69 ; question of de- 
sire of, for war with Serbia, 
77-78; rejects Sir Edward 
Grey's mediation proposals and 
proposals made by Russia, 81- 
82 ; declares war on Serbia, but 
continues negotiations with Rus- 
sia, 83 ; efforts of other powers 
to prevent war between Russia 
and, 84—85 ; final offer made to, 
by Russia (July 30), 92; de- 
clares war on Russia, 99 ; steps 
leading to declaration of war 
between France and, 99—101; 
declaration of war against, by 
Great Britain, 120 ; breaks off 
relations with Japan, 145 ; 
events leading to declaration of 
war against by Italy, 158—177 ; 
question as to blame to be placed 
upon, for share in the war, 186— 
187. 

Bagdad railroad concession ob- 
tained by Germany, 22. 

Balkans, account of peoples in the, 
16—17 ; history of states in the, 
18—21; wars between Turkey 
and States of, in 1912-14, 25- 
31; results of wars of 1912-14, 
31. 

Barnardiston, Colonel, conversa- 
tions between General Ducarme 
and, 131-132. 

Belgium, neutrality of, not guar- 
anteed in German propositions 
to Great Britain before outbreak 
of war, 104 ; Sir Edward Grey's 
statement concerning preserva- 
tion of neutrality of Belgium, 
106-107; replies of France and 
Germany as to respecting Bel- 
gian neutrality, 107 ; charged 



Index 



193 



with committing hostile acts 
against Germany, 107; appeals 
on August 4, 1914, to Great 
Britain for diplomatic interven- 
tion in her behalf, 115 ; Ger- 
many's reasons for violating neu- 
trality of, 116 ; difference be- 
tween Britain's obligation to 
preserve neutrality of, and case 
of Luxemburg, 121 ; history of 
events leading to guaranteeing 
of perpetual neutrality of, bv 
treaty of 1839, 122-124; argu- 
ments of both sides concerning 
Germany's violation of neutral- 
ity of, 124-140 ; question as to 
guilt or innocence of, in the war, 
188. 

Berlin Congress and treaty (1878), 
5, 21. 

Bethmann-Hollweg, made chancel- 
lor, 14 ; final interview between 
British ambassador and, 117— 
120 ; quoted on violation of neu- 
trality of Belgium and Luxem- 
burg, 130. 

Bismarck, policy of, regarding 
France, 5 ; formation of Three 
Emperors' League by, 5 ; suc- 
ceeds in policy of isolating 
France, 7-8. 

Bosnia, annexation of, by Austria- 
Hungary (1908), 22. 

Bridges, Colonel, conversation be- 
tween General Jungbluth and, 
132-133, 136. 

Buchanan, Sir G., views of, on 
Austro-Serbian crisis, 54, 55. 

Bucharest, treaty of (1912), 30. 

Bulgaria, revolt of, from Turkey 
in 1876, 19; declared an au- 
tonymous state under treaty of 
San Stefano (1878), 20; by 
treaty of Berlin is made an au- 
tonymous principality tributary 
to Turkey, 21; results to, of 
Balkan Wars of 1912-14, 29, 
30 ; dissatisfaction of, with 
treaty of Bucharest, 31; mer- 
cenary course of, upon outbreak 
of war of 1914, 178-181; war 
declared upon, by Entente 
powers, 181. 

China, friction between Russia and 
Britain in, 9 ; foothold gained 
by Germany in, 141; Japan's 
request in 1914 that Germany 
withdraw from, 144—145. 

Concert of Europe, league of great 
powers known as, 2 ; duration 
of, 2 ; progress toward world 
pea-ce made under, 2—3. 

Crimean War, Moldavia and Wal- 



lachia freed from Russian pro- 
tectorate as result of, 18. 

Delcasse, Theophile, appointed 
French foreign minister, 11 ; 
brings about friendly relations 
between France and Great 
Britain, 11-12. 

Dernburg, Bernhard, defense of 
Germany's violation of Belgian 
neutrality by, 134-135. 

Diplomacy, inefficiency of Euro- 
pean, during Austro-Serbian 
crsis, 72-73 ; question whether 
war could not have been avoided 
by a wise, 190. 

Dual Alliance, formed between 
Russia and France, 8. 

Ducarme, General, conversations 
between Colonel Barnardiston 
and, 131-132. 

Edward VII, influence of, in estab- 
lishing friendly relations be- 
tween Great Britain and France, 
11. 

Egypt, arrangement between 
France and England as to 
(1904), 11; as a cause of 
trouble between Great Britain 
and Turkey, 153-155. 

England, party to quadruple al- 
liance of 1815, 1; drops out of 
quadruple alliance, 2. See Great 
Britain. 

Entente Cordiale, establishment of, 
between Great Britain and 
France, 11-12. 

Fashoda, Marchand expedition to, 
10-11. 

France, effect on, of loss of Alsace- 
Lorraine, 4 ; Bismarck's policy 
toward, 5 ; success of Bismarck's 
policy of isolation of, 7-8 ; forms 
Dual Alliance with Russia, 8 ; 
rivalry between Great Britain 
and, at end of 19th century, 10- 
11 ; establishment of Entente 
Cordiale between Great Britain 
and, 11-12; attempted inter- 
ference of Germany with Moroc- 
can policy of, 13—16; attitude of, 
toward Austro-Hungarian ulti- 
matum to Serbia upon assassina- 
tion of Archduke, 54 ; asked by 
Germany to influence Russia to 
moderation, in Austro-Serbian 
crisis, 73—74 ; attitude of, to- 
ward Germany's proposal, 74; 
immediate steps leading to war 
between Teutonic powers and, 
99—101 ; effort made by Ger- 
many to secure neutrality of, 



194 



Index 



110-111; charged by Germany 
with intentions of marching 
through Belgium, 126, 133-134; 
share of responsibility of, for the 
war, 187-188. 

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, as- 
sassination of, 32 ; questions 
raised concerning assassination 
of, as to cause and results, 186. 

Franco-German War, results of, 4. 

Frankfort, treaty of (1871), 4. 

Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium, 
cited, 125 ; quoted, 140 n. 

Germany, policy of, as dictated by 
Bismarck, following Franco- 
German War, 4—6 ; forms Triple 
Alliance against Russia, 6-7 ; 
growth of rivalry between Great 
Britain and, 8—9 ; defeat of at- 
tempt of, to interfere in French 
Moroccan policy, 13 ; further 
controversy with France over 
Moroccan policy, 14—16 ; de- 
velopment of rivalry between 
Russia and, in the Balkans, 21- 
24 ; supports Austria-Hungary 
in Balkan policy, 24 ; relation 
of, to affairs between Austria- 
Hungary and Serbia following 
assassination of Archduke, 51— 
52 ; counts on neturality of 
Great Britain in Serbian crisis, 
55 ; plan of, for solving war 
problem in Austro-Serbian 
crisis, 71, 73—74 ; key to situa- 
tion in Austro-Serbian crisis 
said to have been held by, 78— 
79 ; declines to exercise influ- 
ence over Austria, 79 ; objection 
of, to Earl Grey's suggestion of 
mediation by four powers. 80 ; 
ratifies Austria's promise to re- 
. spect integrity of Serbia, 87 ; 
attitude toward efforts of the 
powers to isolate the war, 90, 
91; war declared between Rus- 
sia and (August 1), 94; steps 
that led to mobilization in, 94— 
99 ; declaration of war between 
France and, 99-101 ; steps lead- 
ing to declaration of war upon, 
by Great Britain, 102 ff . ; seeks 
to keep Great Britain neutral, 
104 ; effort made by, to secure 
neutrality of France, 110-111; 
reasons given by, for violating 
Belgian neutrality, 116 ; decla- 
ration of war against, by Great 
Britain, 120; violation of neu- 
trality of Luxemburg by, 120- 
121; bound by treaty of 1839 
to observe neutrality of Bel- 
gium, J24; argument? of, in de- 



fense of violation of Belgian 
neutrality, 124-140 ; events 
leading to Japan's declaration 
of war against, 141—145 ; 
course followed by, to win sup- 
port of Turkey, 149-156; Italy 
declares war against, 177 ; de- 
clares war on Portugal, 182- 
183 ; share of, in responsibility 
for the war, 187. 

Goschen, Sir E., account of final 
interview with German chan- 
cellor, 117-120. 

Great Britain, isolated position of, 
between powers of the Triple 
and the Dual Alliance, 8 ; indus- 
trial and colonial rivalry be- 
tween Germany and, 8—9 ; 
strained relations with Russia 
and France, 9-10 ; alliance with 
Japan due to Russian rivalry 
in Far East, 10; conflicting in- 
terests with France in north- 
ern Africa, 10-11; friendly un- 
derstanding brought about be- 
tween France and, 11- 1 12; steps 
leading to friendly relations 
with Russia, 12 ; declares a neu- 
tral attitude concerning Austro- 
Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, 
54-55 ; steps leading to declara- 
tion of war on Teutonic powers, 
102-120 ; declaration of war 
against Germany, and later 
against Austria, by, 120; prom- 
ises aid to Belgium in case neu- 
trality is violated, 131; inten- 
tion of violating neutrality of 
Belgium disavowed by, 137- 
140 ; dealings between Turkey 
and, leading to break in rela- 
tions, 145-156 ; reported agree- 

I ment between Italy and (April 
25, 1915), 176; share of, in re- 
sponsibility for the war, 188- 
189. 

Greece, steps leading to independ- 
ence of, 17-18. 

Greindl, Baron, dispatch from, to 
Belgian minister of foreign af- 
fairs, 133. 

Grey, Sir Edward, gives impres- 
sion that England will remain 
neutral in case of Austrian 
war with Serbia, 54-55 ; opin- 
ion of, as to proper course for 
Serbia to follow, 61 ; opinion of 
Serbia's reply to Austria, 68 ; 
asked by Germany to exercise 
moderating influence with Rus- 
sia, 73 ; policy of joint media- 
tion proposed by, 74—75; asks 
Germany to use influence with 
Austria against war, 79 ; second 



Index 



195 



proposal of, concerning arrange- 
ment of an agreement by four 
powers, 79-80 ; proposal of 
July 31, looking to prevention 
of war between Russia and Aus- 
tria, 89 ; statement by, of Brit- 
ish position as to taking part in 
possible European war, 103- 
104 ; failure of, to give positive 
declaration of Great Britain's 
attitude concerning war be- 
tween powers, 103—106 ; state- 
ment as to preservation of neu- 
trality of Belgium, 106-107: 
negotiations between German 
ambassador and, 107-112 : 
quoted on British protection of 
neutrality of Belgium, 137, 138. 

Hague Tribunal, Franco-German 
dispute over Casablanca affair 
settled by. 14. 

Hayes, Political and Social His- 
tory of Modem Europe, cited, 
9, 11. 12. 15. 16. 

Hazen, Europe Since 1815, cited, 
17, 19, 21. 142. 

Hertslet, The Map of Europe by 
Treaty, cited, 125. 

Herzegovina, annexation of, by 
Austria-Hungary (1908), 22. 

Internationalism, significance of, 
as opposed to nationalism, 3 ; 
becomes allied with despotism, 
3 ; lost opportunity of, 4. 

Italy, reasons of, for becoming a 
member of Triple Alliance, 7 ; 
attitude of, in Austro-Serbian 
crisis, 75-76; effect of war 
with Turkey in 1911-12 on re- 
lations of, to Triple Alliance, 
157; remains neutral upon 
breaking out of European war, 
158; progress of events leading 
to declaration of war against 
Austria, 158-177; declaration 
of war against Germany by. 
177. 

Japan, alliance between Great 
Britain and, 10 ; joins sides 
with Triple Entente, 12; 
treaties between England and, 
141-142 ; conduct of, at open- 
ing of European war, 142 ; ulti- 
matum sent to Germany, re- 
garding withdrawal from Orient, 
144-145; declares war on Ger- 
many, 145 ; Austria breaks re- 
lations with, 145. 

Joint mediation plan proposed by 
Earl Grey in Austro-Serbian 
crisis, 74 ; approved by Russia, 
Italy, and Prance, 75, 



Jungbluth, General, conversation 
between Colonel Bridges and, 
132-133, 136. 

Kato, Baron, Japanese foreign 
minister, speech by, quoted, 
143-145. 

Kiaochou, held by Germany, 141 ; 
Japan demands Germany's with- 
drawal from, 145. 

Law, A. Bonar, letter to Asquith, 
quoted, 113. 

Lichnowsky, Prince, negotiations 
between Sir Edward Grey and 
107-112. 

London, treaty of (1913), 29. 

Luxemburg, violation of neutral- 
ity of, by Germany, 120-121 ; 
difference between relations of 
Great Britain to, and her rela- 
tions to Belgium, 121. 

Marchand affair, 10-11. 

Metternich, reactionary influence 
of, 3. 

Mobilization, steps that led to Rus- 
sian and German (1914), 94- 
99. 

Montenegro, disposition of, under 
treaties of San Stefano and Ber- 
lin, 20, 21; declares war on 
Austro-Hungary and Germany 
(August, 1914), 101. 

Morocco, friction between Ger- 
many and France over, 12-16. 

Nationalism, meaning of, 3 ; allied 
with liberalism, 3 ; responsibil- 
ity of. for war of 1914, 4. 

Navarino, defeat of Turks in 
naval battle of. 18. 

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 
defense of Germany's violation 
of Belgian neutrality by, 134- 
135. 

North German Gazette, quoted on 
negotiations between Sir Ed- 
ward Grey and German ambas- 
sador, 108-109. 

Pashitch, Serbian prime minister, 
on public sentiment concerning 
assassination of Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand, 35-36. 

Persia, clash of British and Rus- 
sian interests in, 9. 

Portugal, sympathies of, with Al- 
lied cause in European war, 
181-182; Teutonic powers de- 
clare war upon, 182-183. 

Prussia, party to quadruple alli- 
ance of 1815, 1. 



196 



Index 



Quadruple Alliance of 1815, 1. 
Quintuple Treaty, guaranteeing 

neutrality of Belgium (1839), 

124-125. 

Rumania, races found' in princi- 
pality of, 18-19 ; results to, of 
Balkan wars of 1912-14, 30; 
position at opening of European 
war, 183-184; joins sides with 
Allies, 184. 

Russia, party to quadruple alli- 
ance of 1815. 1; a member of 
Three Emperors' League, 5 ; 
rivalry of Austria and, in the 
Balkans, 5-6 ; diplomatic vic- 
tory of Austria over, by revised 
treaty of San Stefano, 6 ; Bis- 
marck aids Austria against, 6 ; 
alliance of Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, and Italy against, 6- 
7 ; Dual Alliance formed be- 
tweend France and, 8 ; rivalry 
between Great Britain and, at 
end of 19th century, 10 ; steps 
leading to friendly relations be- 
tween Great Britain and, 12 ; 
continued rivalry between Teu- 
tonic powers and, in the Balk- 
ans, 21-24; Germany supports 
Austria-Hungary against, 23- 
24 ; hostility of, toward Aus- 
tria-Hungary increased by Aus- 
tria's attitude in Balkan wars 
of 1912-14, 29; takes stand 
against Austro-Hungarian de- 
mands on Serbia following as- 
sassination of Archduke, 53-54 ; 
seeks support of Great Britain, 
55-56; refusal of request made 
by, to Austria, that time limit 
set by ultimatum to Serbia be 
extended, 58-59 ; plan of, for 
preventing war in Austro-Ser- 
bian crisis, 71 ; effort made by 
Germany to secure neutrality 
of, 73 ; mobilizes forces, but 
shows anxiety to avoid a con- 
flict, 77; negotiations of, with 
Austria, 81-83 ; determination 
of, to stand by Serbia, 84 ; ef- 
forts of other powers to prevent 
war between Austria and, 84- 
85 ; final offer made to Austria 
bv (July 30), 92; war declared 
between Germany and (August 
1), 94; steps that led to mob- 
ilization in, 94-99; Austria de- 
clares war on, 99 ; events lead- 
ing to break in relations with 
Turkey, 155-156 ; share of re- 
sponsibility to be assigned to, 
for the war, 187. 

San Stefano, treaty of (1878), 6, 
20. 



Sazonof, Russian foreign minister, 
views of, on Austro-Serbian 
crisis, 53, 55, 57 ff. 

Serbia, early history of, 17 ; 
achieves independence, 20 ; ill 
treatment of, by Austria-Hun- 
gary, 24; results to, of wars 
with Turkey in 1912-14, 26- 
31 ; state of relations between 
Austria-Hungary and, in 1914, 
32 ; attitude of press, people, 
and government of, concerning 
assassination of Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand, 33-40; ul- 
timatum sent to, by Austria- 
Hungary, in note of July 23, 
1914, 41-46; attitude of, upon 
receiving the Austro-Hungarian 
note, 52-53 ; moderate reply of, 
to Austrian note, 62-68 ; failure 
of reply of, to satisfy Austria, 
and consequent rupture of diplo- 
matic relations, 68-69 ; reported 
inevitability of war being thrust 
upon, by Austria, 77-78 ; war 
declared against, by Austria, 
83. 

Stowell, The Diplomacy of the War 
of 1914, cited and quoted, 7, 
12, 23, 124, 125. 

Three Emperors' League, forma- 
tion of, 5. 

Times, London, quoted on nego- 
tiations between Sir Edward 
Grey and German ambassador, 
108 ; quoted on points which 
decided British policy toward 
the war, 113, 115; quoted on 
British view of neutrality of Bel- 
gium, 137, 139. 

Triple Alliance, formation of, 7 ; 
weakening of, by Turco-Italian 
War of 1911-12, 157; articles 
of, affecting Italy's obligations 
in European war, 158 n. 

Triple Entente, steps leading up 
to, 12. 

Turkey, effects of treaty of San 
Stefano upon, 5-6 ; history of 
early activities of, in Balkans, 
16-18 ; Greece becomes inde- 
pendent of, 18 ; German sup- 
port of, against Russia, 22 ; 
wars between Balkan states 
and, in 1912-14, 25-31; events 
determining course of, in Euro- 
pean war, 145-156; breaks re- 
lations with Entente powers, 
156. 

Vienna, rearrangement of map of 
Europe at Congress of (1814- 
15), 1. 



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